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Foreword
 
The role of government in the regulation of urban land use is 
undergoing profound change throughout the world, under the pressure 
of rapidly evolving demographic forces, and a parallel elaboration of the 
political and legal ideas underpinning our concepts of property rights. 
Basic questions affecting the proper balance between individual rights 
and collective needs impinge forcefully on public- and private-sector 
decision makers as they address the l)roblem of fashioning mechanisms 
to facilitate the efficient and equitable alloca'ion of resources. Thus, those 
involved in urban lanJl problems find themselves confronted with urgent 
practical problems requiring difficult decisions, despite their inability 
to resolv puzzling indetormi nacies regarding long-term ramifications. 
In dealing with the area of eminent domain and expropriation, for 
example, we confront vexing questions concerning the definition of public 
purpose, creating mechanisms for valuation and compensation, and 
appropriate administrative procedures, which, if improperly solved, can 
seriously undermine land development for decades. 
While we in the industrial nations often seem to be fighting a two­
front battle, with the Forces of change a! rayed on one side, and the 
venerable, sometimes obstinate, structures of traditional property law 
on the other, the developing nations of the world seem less bound by 
the solutions of previous generations to urban land use problems. They, 
nonetheless, face an equally difficult task presented by the initial thrust 
into an urbanized stage of development. Like those thrown into the water 
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to learn how to swim, they bravely cope with a pressing need to develop 
and improve techniques for regulating land use practices. 
Urban land use policy analysis has g-rown deeper and broader in the 
past twenty years, and a substantial body of' knowledge stands ready 
to be utilized by the developing nations as they enter this period of 
urbanization. The tantalizing prospect of being able, from the beginning, 
to do things right, glimmers in thes vibrant nations. It is with a great 
sense of'optimism, therefore, that I welcome Michael Kitay's book, which 
skillfully distills a vast body of knowledge in light of the current 
predicament of the developing nations, and attempts to assist institution­
of the developing world to manage urban growth by elucidating 
thoughtful policy options, models, and programs for land acquisition. It 
makes a substantial analytic and comparative contribution which can 
make possible the kind of 'idvance planning thtt avoids the ill effects 
of misuse of' urban land. 
The intellectual process is a bidirectional one, of'course. As we attempt 
to apply the experiences and knowledge of the industrial world to the 
variety of conditions and policies in the developing countries, we discover 
by contrast numerous insights on land-acquisition policy that are equally
applicable in either area. Thus, studying this book is a rewarding 
experience for anyone interested in comparative land policy I am 
particularly gratified to see this knowledge being made available, in such 
organized and concise form, to the policy makers in the dcveloping 
countries, who bear so many of the hopes, not only of their own 
countrymen, but of all mankind. 
Charles M. Haar 
Brandeis Professor of Law 
Harvard University 
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Introduction
 
A few hundred years ago, it took an entire century to add one 
million people to the population of the earth. Today, it happens in one 
week. And by the year 2000, there will be about six billion people on 
this planet, with more than half living in cities. 
This acceleration in numbers is apparent everywhere. From 1950 to 
1970, for example, world population grew by 45 percent. More 
significantly, for purposes of our study, the urban population during that 
period soared by 98 percent, and the greatest of those increases was in 
the newly developing countries. 
As this trend shows no signs of abating, it is clear that in a very short 
time, the urban populations in developing countrics will be growing tN ice 
as fast as in developed countries. By the year 2000, it is expected that 
59 urban centers in the world will have populations in excess of five 
million, and 47 of these will be in developing countries. Barbara Ward 
has said that, in the next 30 to 40 years, we may see as much building 
in developing countries as in the whole previous history of mankind, 
simply to shelter this new urban population.' 
Obviously, the growth in amounts of land devoted to urban purposes 
will be similarly dramatic. Estimates are not yet firm. but one group 
of specialists has determined that land given over to urban needs will 
grow from 16.5 million acres in 1950 to about 41 million acres by the 
year 2000. Most of the growth is expected where urban areas, whether 
a town or a thriving city, already are estabiished? Especially in cramped 
municipalities of developing countries, significant new quantities of land 
will be required. 
xv 
xvi / Introduction 
Despite the abundance of evidence that a population crunch and its 
consequent demand for urban living space are threatening the world, 
especially in developing countries, little planning for the impact is under 
way. The developing countries are virtually without laws, policies, 
procedures, institutions, trained personnel, or the financial resources that 
must be employed to cope with the inevitable. As we rapidly approach 
the year 2000, the necessities to acquire even the minimal amounts of 
land for th urban pop'lation explosion are conspicuously absent. 
The hypotheses of this book, concerning rapid urbanization in 
developing countries and the role of land acquisition, are as follows: 
1. 	There will he enormous, unprecedented physical and population 
growth of cities in developing countries over the next decade. 
2. 	 This growth will result in a need for significant acquisition of urban 
land for public purposes, (roads, schools, housing, and the like). 
3. 	 Few developing countries possess adequate laws, procedures, policies 
trained personnel, or institutions capable of' performing the land­
acquisition function in an effective fhshion. Major efforts to address 
these deficiencies are needed now. 
4. 	 Once the machinery is in place, it is expected that land-acquisition 
efforts, including perhaps strategic advance acquisition Of' limited 
amounts of urban land by public or qmUisi-pullic institutions will 
enable (a) immediate public needs for land to be satisfied and (b) 
cities to exercise rough but important land use control functions, 
when accompanied hy targeted use of capital budgets for infra­
structure, and other policies. 
The primary purpose ofthis book is Iu provide models of land-acquisition 
laws, policies, precedures, and institutions. These models, in th°. context 
of the inevitable urban-population explosion, are intended to stimulate 
dialogue and debate that will lead to substan-tial reform of existing laws 
and institutions fbr land acquisition. 
Because of the broad geographical scope of this worl". much of the re­
search is based on secondary sources. Some of the laws cited and policies 
noted may be out of date. Accordingly, the examples of laws and policies 
should be 'ead for the idea.-; they represent and less as a statement of 
the current laws and policies in the countries cited. 
In the pages that follow, we will take a close look at the rapid growth 
of urban areas :it developing countries and the laws and procedures by 
which the needed land is acquired and disposed ofrby public authorities. 
We will also see models of various public institutions that specialize in 
land acquisition and examine some ways in which public acquisition of 
urban lands can be financed. The case studies offered in the appendices 
examine land acquisition in Korea, Thailand, Ecuador, and India. 
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As will be apparent, developing countries have had widely varying 
degrees of success using the available options and techniques for land 
acquisition. It is true here, as in any such endeavor, that trade-offs must 
be accepted with each option, and as even a cursory examination will 
show, no model fits all. There is no quick fix for this gnave problem, no 
panacea for each and every case. For that reason, generalizations are 
avoided, and the models should be scanned in the same spirit. 
It would be a wonderful gift, of course, i"there were some easy way 
out for the developing countries. Their current high population statistics 
now present an almost insurmountable problem, but the challenge will 
be truly enormous in size and complexity over the next 20 years. This 
is because of the high birth rates among those people already living in 
the cities of developing nations, plus massive population shifts from rural­
to-urban areas. One author has called these rural-to-urban movements 
in developing countries one of the greatest human migrations in the 
history of the world.: Figures 1.1-3 illustrate the growth of selected cit­
ies in developing countries by including population data for 1950 and 
1975, and projected population figures for the year 2000. 
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Figure 1.1. Population growth in majoi' cities, 1950-2000: Latin America.
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Figure 1.2. Population growth in major cities, 1950-2000: Asia.
 
Even in countries already developed, this rural-to-urban transformation 
has been painful at best. Despite enjoying far more time and more
abundant resources, developed countries have produced little better than 
mixed results. In comparison with the industrialized West, the nations 
of the developing world face almost overnight shifts in their populations
from open country to teeming city. With little time and few resources,
they must somehow find the capital and train the administrators to adjust
to the situation. Because of the relative lack of capital, building materials,
and heavy construction industries, the cities are expected to grow
horizontally rather than upward in multi-story buildings as has been 
the case for developed areas. Consequently, the resulting urban sprawl
will add to the burdens of urban managers.
We have attempted to estimate the impact of projected population
growth on the land needs for Third World cities, assuming differing
densities. Table 1.1 (p. xx) indicates a doubling and tripling of physical
growth of most of the cities listed. It is difficult to project future land 
needs, and the estimates shown in the table are subject to many variables. 
Nevertheless the trend is clear. 
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Figure 1.3. Population growth in major cities, 1950-2000: Africa. 
The people flocking to the cities of developing countries over the next 
decade will be poorer and less equipped to make a contribution than 
their counterparts in developed areas. They will be, in the main, ill fed 
and ill educated. They will be, in effect, a mass of humanity in dire need-a 
political force that must be reckoned with, a "taking" rather than a
"giving" element that, by its very size and complexity, presents city 
managers with problem of immense proportions. 
Furthermore, wLether or not the developing countries can provide land 
and the basic amenities to meet the needs of these demanding migrants
will have a profound impact on all the people of the world, an effect 
rippling far beyond the borders of the countries immediately involved. 
The task facing government officials in developing countries i- truly 
overpowering. The rapid urbanization of their burgeoning populations 
demands the utmost attention. If solutions are not found and applied, 
all of the dire projections for the 1980s and 1990s undoubtedly will be 
realized. 
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Table 1.1. Projected Land Needs for Third World Cities 
Iand Need at Differing 
Land 2000 t rend Den.silies (Kin') 
Population Area Density Projection Projection Low Atiddle High 
City )OW)0 (Kn) (1I/ 1a) (()dds) (KcnO) (72) (14 5 (252) 
Cities with Itigh Growth Rates, Small Population., anti Low l)ensities 
Abidjan 1,750 135 130 5,750 370 666 331 190 
Bagdad 2,260 139 163 10,907 460 1,041 517 298 
Caracas i,800 112 161 5,963 205 458 227 131 
Cotonou ill 47 24 826 223 73 36 21 
Freetown 128 35 37 1,320 263 134 66 38 
Kampala 332 268 12 2,506 1,547 226 132 76 
Kinshasa 1,323 292 65 9,112 1,078 981 487 280 
Nairobi 509 509 10 3,371 2,630 365 181 104 
Ouagadougoij 135 30 45 717 119 74 37 21 
Rangoon 1,927 120 161 7,372 307 685 340 196 
Mean 1,028 81 720 474 236 136 
Standard 
dev. 865 65 810 358 178 102 
Cities with Medium Growth Rates, Populations, and Densities 
Ahmedabad 1,588 93 171 5,502 201 477 237 136 
Algiers 943 210 45 2,861 375 234 116 67 
Bangkok 2,050 291 70 11,030 1,101 1,070 532 306 
Bogota 2,818 131 215 9,527 284 848 421 242 
Casablanca 1,791 113 158 5,242 214 470 233 134 
Karachi 4,000 237 169 15,862 675 1,584 787 453 
Madras 2,470 128 1(13 10,375 343 919 457 263 
Rio (Ie Janeiro 1,805 130 139 19,383 796 1,537 763 439 
Mean 2,183 145 9,973 499 893 443 255 
Standard 
dev. 925 59 5,576 325 495 246 141 
Cities with Low Growth Rates, large Populations, and High Densities 
Alexandria 2,31.j 193 120 5,599 262 437 217 125 
Bombay 3,8,10 68 565 19,055 212 1,663 826 475 
Buenos Aires 2,972 200 149 13,978 313 646 321 185 
Cairo 7,000 297 236 16,398 402 1,316 653 376 
Calcutta 4,200 127 331 19,663 350 1,608 798 459 
Lima 3,600 164 220 12,130 375 1,143 5611 327 
Santiago 3,700 250 148 5,119 139 286 142 82 
Mean 3,947 252 13,136 293 1,014 504 290 
Standard 
dev. 1,482 155 5,933 94 550 278 160 
Source: Prepared for the author by PADCO Inc. 
Chapter 1 
The land
 
In 1941 Robert Frost wrote in his poem "The Gift Outright": 
The land was ours before we were the land's. 
She was our land more than a hundred years. 
Before we were her people* 
He was speaking then as an American, about the American people 
and the land they had colonized a hundred years before they achieved 
their independence from England in 1776. But the philosophy can apply 
to any people, anywhere, at any time. There is a bond, an ahnost mysti­
cal communion, that exists between the land and the people living on it. 
There are practical considerations of momentous importance, of course, 
and these are what we address in this work. But any planner, an" demog­
rapher, any manager must not fail o consider the deep and Abiding rela­
tionship L-hat exists between people and the land. Declared or undeclared, 
it exists. 
The starting point of all urban development is land. It is the locus of 
shelter, industry, roadways, and the other devices of communication and 
*From "he Gift Outri;!ht" from THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST ecited by Edward 
Connery Lathem. Copyright 1942 by Robert Frost. Copyright : 1t69 by Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. Copyright 1 1970 by Lesley Frost Ballantine. Reprinted by permission of 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Publishers. 
I 
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social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, and other public services andfacilities). In short, land is the be-all and end-all of what a city is goingto be and where it is going to go. The attendant complexities presenta formidable bottlcneck in the development process. 
CONFLICT OVER LAND 
Land is unique and limited; it is therefore valuable. And who­ever controls th? land controls a potentially profitable asset. This is so,whether the land is Used for the production of agricultural goods orwhether the lai d is removed from the agricultural realm, (with a conse­quent economic less in that area) and added to the urbanized region oryet devoted to some other use such as industrial production, transporta­tion, or recreation. In matters of control, a basic question arises: Whodecides on land use-the public sector or the private sector?Decisions on land use must be considered seriously. For one thing, theycreate a long-term effect that is not easily reversed. A variation of New­ton's law of inertia is at work. Any structures on the land are apt toremain there for great periods of time, and accordingly, the predomi­nant current use of a land area tends to become the predominant futureuse. For instance, it is difficult to convert an industrial area to a residen­tial area, and vice versa. The paradox is that, even as cities are experienc­ing rapid change in their overall growth, areas within the cities tendto remain stagnant in their original use.The financial stakes involved in land use decisions are so high thatthey heighten the sense of conflict. In each case, there is a winner anda loser. Researchers have found this is true in virtually every major cityin developing countries when urban land values are increasing fasterthan inflation rates generally.
As a result of the urban land values, landowners play a "waiting game."
The trick is to keep great parcels of urban land vacant 
until there isa dramatic boost in the selling price. Shrewd, patient landowners thus
are able to get two. three, or more times the amount of money they would
have gotten if they had not kept their property offt he market until the

right time.
 
In most. developing countries, however, such opportunitiesonly to are opena few, those with disposable income. Land investments repre­sent one of the few aspects of the domestic economy in such countriesthat can absorb excess funds. The small percentage of population whohave disposable income almost certainly also have political power. Thus,the most active speculators in land markets invariably would be thoseholding high government positions or their family members. These 
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"establishment" figures would not take kindly to any concept that threat­
ened their investment opportunities; they would view public interven­
tion in land markets as anathema. 
Thus, a difficult conflict, of interest often arises. The result in most 
developing countries is generally a standoff. Those calling tor more pub­
lic control over land markets clash with those favoring private-sector 
management entirely. Resolving the conflict can be a long and painful 
process. 
Evidence abounds that this is an important issue to government offi­
cials throughout the world. One example arose in the spring and early 
summer of 1983, when separate international conferences convened in 
Finland, the United States, and Sweden.' Senior public officials and 
experts from the private sector attended each conference. They repre­
sented a wide variety of countries-rich and poor, rural and urban, 
socialist and capitalist. Each coi berence was scheduled independently 
of the others, although each considered the same issue: land policy in 
a world experiencing a population explosion and rapid urbanization. 
Such commonality of concern could not have been happenstance. 
Rather, it was evidence that the dwindling availability of land, in rela­
tion to the growing numbers of people, is regarded a; a critical problem 
demanding solution everywhere on the face of the globe. 
GOVERNMENT VERSUS PRIVATE
 
CONTROL
 
In all societies, except those in which land is totally national­
ized, limitations are applied to the use of land, all land. The use of 
privately owned land for the public good is a principle that has been 
firmly established. The issue is not whether the government can inter­
vene and exercise control; rather, it is whether there is a proper balance 
between private and public control-when is government intervention 
permissible? 
In developed countries that have imposed relatively light regulation 
on private land markets, economic growth and development tend te out­
strip that of the more centrally controlled societies. This economic growth 
is offered as an argument that this approach, despite inequities, bettcr 
serves the needs of the peopie. Consequently, the scarce land is rationed 
by its price, and it is the price that also allocates each parcel to its most 
valuable use. 
Thus, in theory, the private sector has provided benefits to both the 
public and private sector while bearing all of the economic risk. Those 
developers clever enough to assemble the pieces of land that best serve 
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the society are rewarded vith financial success. Those who guess wrong
fail econonlically. In either case, the public profits.
But critics ofa comnpletly "fee" land nmarket argue that, if the system 
were truly working as it should theoretically, why would there be such 
an increase in government regulation over speculation? These private 
systems are perceived as providing neither equity nor efficiency.' It is 
common practice fr"the private sector in developed countries to hold 
vacant land at prime locations offthe market until the demand increases 
the price. And it is denmonstrable that, all too often in developed countries,
such puhlic necessities as schoo 1and highways are placed on low-priority
land that may Just happen to be publicly owned already. Private 
developers act ing alone, wit hott public support, in (levelopi ug countries 
never have put toget her vast amounts of land required for major public 
undertalkings like new towns. 
A miajor crit icisin is that, private !andlowiers often henefit from pubhlic
expenditures t fiat ptit them at no risk at all. Urhan land that is improved
with infrastiuctire-roads, electricity, water, sewerage, and the like­
can increase the value of'surrnn(fing private properties to a significa otdegree, at little or no cost to the owners. At the 1976 UN Hahitat Con­
ference, there wa,; strong Support for incro.ased )uhllic intervention to 
gain benefits for the public 1i*)l the sur'plus Valle thus Created, and 
a nuliber of' subsequze nt United Nations publications hav echoed the 
sentiment. 
It is :ulr id therefore that govermaunt interventiom in land policy and 
contol is valid for two basic rea.sms: 
1. 	G(rvahr ,'/ii'i,' cy in un'on 1holin i. A public a ut ho-it y would be 
charged by law anhd government regulot ion to help the community 
meet future social needs, such as schools, housing, and health facil­
ities. The private sector, on tle other hand, would not have social 
needs as priorities, .ilice their prime aim is to make "1coimercia; 
success 'f the vent ue. 'Thegovein ne's supervis ion, in this way,
could he vital to the s-mcces., of co:niiunity adijust ment to the rural­
to-urban influx. 
2. 	 Greater equity. , s,/pist ice In e!'cttilig tIV aCq11,isition of land,
lie governenIcIlt could Imore redily chaniuel tile municipality's
growth so that it benefits all grons etuiitablv. Public intervention 
would he eXpeCt(,d :o have a more stabilizing effect on the prices 
of land than the unfettered play of tile marketplace. 
in order for goverilinent intervention to work in a relatively free soci­
ety, private developurs will hal'e to be coivi nced that g.overilrment owner­
ship or development of' land i-s not necessarily financiiilly had for them. 
Eventually. mo.-;t land developed hy th- government "i11 be returned 
The Land / 5 
to the private sector. In the meantime, the private sector will have 
escaped heavy capital outlays, at the price of only some loss of power 
to say how the land should be used. There will always be some role for 
the private sector. 
The one danger that opponents of government intervention keep point­
ing to is this: Because governmentE are large and faceless, often manned 
by inefficient, careless, mistake-prone bureaucrats, confusions and 
failures may be more frequent than if the private sector were in charge. 
Is the tradeoff worth the risk in potential fraud, theft, and abuse, not 
to mention the loss of property and income taxes, plus demoralization 
of the private sector? 
It is interesting that we could find no examples in developing coun­
tries of governments that relied solely on a free market to control land 
use. Beyond that, there seemed to be no view among the experts that 
allow a completely free market, given the unique and limited nature 
of land. 
LAND USE CONTROLS 
Placement of Infrastructure 
There are indirect, noncoercive steps that governments in developing 
countries can take, however, to control land use, instead of government 
ownership of land. One such approach involves the targeted budgeting 
of resources for infrastructure. 
It is the government's responsibility in developing countries, gener­
ally speaking, to provide the roads, sewers, water, electricity, and other 
aspects of infrastructure to the urban areas undergoing development. 
Landowners made aware of plans for such work usually hasten to develop 
their adjoining areas as well, ready to benefit from whatever increased 
values that ar-ise. World Bank experts agree that providing infrastruc­
ture is the single most powerful tool-short of direct government acqui­
sition of land-to control the use of surrounding land .3 
Land Readjustment 
Land readjustment (sometimes called land pooling), or some other form 
ofjoint venture between the public and private sectors, is another sub­
stantial, although indirect, tool.* South Korea, Taiwan, West Germany, 
Japan, and parts of Australia have practiced this approach. The 
* For a more detailed discussion of land readjustment, see chap. 2. 
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government, by agreement with a group of' landholders, develops ')r
improves privately owned land. A portion of the improved property is 
resubdivided and sold offto the private sector intil the government has 
recovered its costs of develhopient. What is left is returned on a pro­
rated basis to the original owners. Holders of Ianod surrou nding such 
developments react somewhat like those enjoying the benefits of tar­
geted infrastructure- that is, they are stimulated to invest in develop­
ment of their private properties, too." 
Restrictive Controls 
Governments maintain the right, of course, to intervene more directly,
through a series of'restrictive controls such as zoning laws, building and 
subdivision laws, huilding permits, tax laws that favor or punish cer­
tain land uses, regulations ol buyers to affect demand (like nationality
restrictions for buyers imposed in Liberia and Papua New Guinea), and 
ceilings on the amount of land permitted to an individual (India).
Land use controls ofthis kind can he effective, but they are essentially
negative. They prevent landowners and developers from acting free y
with the land they control. And they require a Sophisticated, well-trained 
bureaucracy, with a strong enforcement arm, to operate effectively.
As far as we could tell, with perhaps one or two exce,:t ions, no develop­
ing country uses such zoning and tax controls effectively at this time. 
Tax controls are not en forced with regularity in most developing coun­
tries or considered w(rthwhih , y t hemselhes in dictating the use of land 
sought by the controls. Few develop ing countries can aftrd the elaho­
rate system of' inspectors, officials with police powers, and judicial bod­
ies to resolve disputes to make such systems work well. 
In a few cases, land use controls are combined with land-market con­
trols regulating the price and amount of' land any individual may own. 
Rent control is an example. Such controls work poorly or not at all, how­
ever, in societies with relatively free markets. India's Urban Land Ceil­
ing Act was passed optimistically, but large landowners circumvented 
it by conveying their excess land to relatives. Anytime that rent control 
laws exist, it seems that elaborate gambits exist to avoid the ull impact 
of the lows. 
Tax Policy 
Tax laws, to control the use of land while producing revenues, have been 
adapted in some developing countries. The idea is to discourage owners 
from keeping their land vacant or underutilized, usually by imposing
the tax on an assessed value of the site, instead of any income it might 
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produce. Heavy capital-gains taxes have been levied to discourage specu­
lation, as have public purchases of land through tax incentives on prop­
erty sold to the government. 
In most developed countries, when such tax schemes have been adopted, 
they usually proved ineffective in contributing to land policy. What hap­
pened was that, without land price control, the ta' ; simply were shifted 
to the buyer so that the price of the land went up -,,ithout any compen­
sating effect on land use. Taxing vacant land has not been utilized much, 
but when it has, it has not always worked in bringing land into the 
market-although, again, it raised the price of land.5 
As a result., when governments set out to bay land directly, they often 
find that the price has gone up because of their own tax policies. More­
over, developing countries seldom find the cadres of trained people neces­
sary to implement the programs. Tax avoidance and poor tax 
administration compound all the problems inherent in the theories. 
The effects of tax policy, at best, are negative. And they tend to deter 
only the worst cases of unsatisfactory private development. According 
to a growing number of authorities, only direct, positive government 
action is likely to control urban growth in most developing countries 
in a manner that public planners would desire. 
LAND ACQUISITION FOR PURPOSES
 
OF LAND USE CONTROL
 
Direct land acquisition is the method central to proposals for 
positive action in the area of land use." This view was expressed in the 
1976 UN Habitat Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver, Brit­
ish Columbia, and in many UN publications. Basically, its proponents 
feel that, in general, the world's growing need for urban land and land 
use control can be met better by direct public land acquisition than 
through other regulatory or tax devices. Land-acquisition laws, effec­
tively implemented with a well-articulated public land policy, can chan­
nel growth more intensively, meet such needs as housing and 
transportation, protect the environment, stabilize land prices, and cap­
ture for public benefit the surplus value of land created by public invest­
ment. Three types of acquisition are generally considered: 
1. 	Acquisition for specific projects. 
2. 	 Excess acquisition in connection with a specific purpose (as with 
land acquired for a railroad line that is expanded to include an extra 
50 meters along the right-of way for possible future use). 
3. 	 Advance acquisition of large land reserves as part of a land-banking 
plan. 
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Strategic, limited, advance land acquisition can serve as a key ele­
ment in land use contol in developing countries. Often, it is the only
practical way to assure that, Imd will be available For public purposes.
But acquiring land is not automatic assurance of efficient use of the 
land Governments sometimes hold land vacant, like private specula­
tors, and then sell it when the price is high to satisfy some requirement
in their budgets. Moreover, squatter invasions sometinmes cost govern­
ments the land they have acquired, not an uncommon occurrence in Latin 
America and Asia. Policies far the release and management of land, it 
would appear, can be equally as important as p-olicies for acquiring it. 
LAND-POI CY FORMULATION 
The debate over control of land- public control versus private
control- is not likely to he settled any tire soon in nlost developing coun­
tries. Constituents wviil argue for the sanctity of private-property rights,
and their counterparts on the other side will speak of the paramount
rights of the state. But the real battle will rage in the marketplace, in 
the courts, and in the legislative bodies, and points will be won or lost 
each tine the statu; quo is upset o- disturbed. 
Despite the difficulties, developinb countries, matter of tit mostas a 
priority, should attempt to debate land policy and to adopt a system for 
allocating land and resolving conflicts over its use- urban and other­
wise. The purpose of such an exercise should he to fird consensus when 
it exists, and to v.ork toward a defined policy. This land policy should 
have a number of clearly stated goals to keep the availahility tof' land 
in line with the demand for land, and at an acceptable time and price.
These goals, which can be ta;ilored and expanded to fit particular require­
ments, should include: 
1. Preventing land frma lI ing idle. 
2. Avoiding urban sprawl. 
3. Keeping prices reasonable for the private and public sectors. 
4. Assuring that. the pul)lic recaptures a reasonable part of the sur­
plus value of the land created by public investment.5. Makingcertain that land is availa!e for essential Ipublic purposes 
at a air price in a timely raimer. 
6. Protecting the environment. 
7. Guaranteeing equity for all and preventing unjust enrichnient of 
a few. 
8. Protecting the rights of private owners to the most efficient use 
of tleir land. 
9. Maintaining art uninterrupted supply of critical food. 
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Table 1.1 shows a broad range of land-policy goals: top-level goals, first­
level goals, and second-level goals. 
Few developing countries have clear comprehensive urban land poli­
cies which prescribe the desired role of public land acquisition and dis­
position. Nor have many assessed their urban-land needs as a 
prerequisite to formulate such policy. Undertaking the necessary policy 
exercise-to assess the problem and select the appropriate response-is 
not easy but should be attempted. 
And there is little time, . ,ally, for ideological argument. The urbani­
zation cf developing countries is moving too swiftly, and existing stocks 
of government-owned land are dwindling rapidly. Each country involved 
must decide its own ideological policy: Which land function is to be pub­
lic, anc which is to be private, and how muich of each? Unfortunately, 
there may be as many answers to this question as there are developing 
countries. 
It is clear, however, that officials in developing countries ought to have 
what we offer in the pages that follow. And that is a way to understand 
their future land needs-at least to 'he year 2000; an understanding 
of various policies, laws, procedures, and institutions used to carry out 
public land-acquisition programs and their relative effectiveness in var­
ious settings; and finally, an understanding of the analytical tools and 
methodologies which can be used in decision making. 
Table 1.1. Goals of Urban Land Policy 
Second-level goals 
To make possible the implementation of certain 
social and physical qualities in such areas of urban 
development where there is consensus that society
should play an active role or, as a possible next step 
to make planning and pl:l implementation free of 
such private or other interests in land, which are notFirst-level goals in accordance with the common interest of society;
i.e., to secure the making and implementation of the 
hest possible plan. QI . To assist in the 
plann~ig and plan To ensure that larid needed for urban developmentimplementation for is at the disposition of the proper de eloper at the
urbn development. right time and in the right place. r4 
To tacilit. :e he implementation or national, 
reginai, and local housing po licies or programs. 
To pre en t an\ !,!nd 1 in t idle or underu 5ed. 
To pvie.nt undesired urban spraM . 
To protect caluahle natural, Loultural, and historic 
obiects. 
Top4evel goal 
To minimize-in the 2. To influence land 
context of urban prices and profits on 
development-all land in various ways. 
problems related 
to land. 
3. To assist in realizing 
social justice in urban 
development (equality 
principle), 
To make it possible that the cost of land for various forms 
of land use is kept at a level acceptabie to society both in 
acquisition ind disposal. 
To define urearned increment on land and which part of 
it should be recaptured hv ,ociet. 
To recapture (part of) the "unearned increment." 
To formulate a logical and generally acceptable definition 
of land speculation and to formulate which part of it 
should be recaptured by societ\. 
To recapture (part of) the profi;s from land speculation. 
To prevent land speculation. 
To prevent "second hand speculation" with land 
sold ofrleased cheaply by public bodies. 
To ensure equality (a) between landowners ina 
particular planning area (b)between landowners in 
different planning areas or (c) between all landowners. 
To ensure equality of land costs for cititens living in 
similar urban areas. 
To ensure that no landowner or other person involved 
suffers real economic loss because of the plan or plan 
implementation. 
Source: Reprinted with changes from "IFHP Working Party on Urban Land Policy," Proceedings of the International Federation for Housing 
and Plannine Urban Land Policy. Lieve. Beium. 26-1f ipntpmhpr qAl nn IF(-17 
Chapter2 
Land-Acquisition Techniques 
All developing countries have some laws and procedures for the 
public acquisition of privately owned land. But few have genuinely com­
prehensive laws and procedures and still fewer have institutions and 
t-ained personnel to administer the laws they possess. 
Those countries that have been comparatively successful in land acqui­
sition generally have a broad variety of compulsory and noncompulsory 
powers at their disposal. Some may iely heavily on compulsory powers, 
as India dors, and others, like Singapore, on voluntary purchases. Yet, 
each has a full range of powers to acquire land. As a practical matter, 
a realistic capability to acquire land compulsorily is necessary to induce 
citizens to negotiate in good faith. The reverse is equally true. If the pub­
lic sector can demonstrate to the private sector its good faith and reasona­
bleness by pointing to a broad, successful program of voluntary purchases, 
the private sector will not object to an occasional use of compulsory 
eminent-domain powers. A broad array of acquisition powers, including 
the compulsory and noncompulsory, as well as a system of incentives 
to encourage voluntary sales, should be sufficient. In addition to tradi­
tional legal authority, broad equitable powers also are needed to acquire 
land on suci, other nontraditional terms and conditions as are reason­
able, necessary, and proper. 
When political will to acquire land by compulsion is lacking or if pub­
lic sentiment is against public land acquisition, there tends to be out­
dated, ineffective acquisition laws. Often in developing countries, the 
13 
PXP~40.kf
 
14 / Land Acquisition in Deis'eloping Countries 
result of citizen ambivalerce or opposition is manifested in the laws them­
selves, resulting in laws that are equally ambivalent, weak, and badlyin need of reform. Acquisition laws are tools, to be used or not used atthe discretion of their owners, and should never be weak. Rapid urbani­zation in developing countries over the next few years will have a pro­found effect on attitudes toward public land acquisition. Many ThirdWorld migrants to cities will come from tribal or customary backgrounds,
where public control of land is the norm. Powerful minority landholdinginterests now opposing government acquisition of urban land will loseinfluence as urban populations rise dramatically. For city officials, nowis the time to enact broad and varied standby powers for public land acqui­
siticn to use when needed. 
VOLUNTARY BARGAIN AND SALE 
In an ideal system, perhaps 90 percent of all public land acquisi­tion should be done on a voluntary basis. Voluntary bargain-and-saletransactions tend to minimize administrative cost and ill will. Develop­ing countries with relatively free-market systems prefer this non,,.:' 
-pulsory method, and undoubtedly this will continue to be the practice.Required are willing sellers, willing public buyers, and a relatively oper­able land market where title to land and fair prices are determinable.In most developing countries, one or more of these components are usually
missihg.
The first requirement-willing sellers-poses a special problem. Thereis an increasing concentration of urban land in developing countries inthe hands of powerful private interests. Because their economies arecharacterized by weak private markets, highly inflated currency, andabsence of alternative investments, land is the best investment in develop­ing countries. Consequently, the land is held for investment or specula­tive purposes and to store excess income. When selling the land, the owner
faces the same 
problem that prompted the original land acquisition­
where to invest excess capital? This lack of alternative investment oppor­tunities cannot be solved in the near future. Even if it could, the demo­graphics of rapid urbanization in these countries generally will ensurethat urban-land investments will continue to be comparatively safe and 
highly profitable.
Furthermore, many citizens in developing countries are unwilling toconduct a commercial transaction with the government when their land­
ownership and financial profit become matters of public record. In somecircumstances, when tax avoidance or indifferent tax collection is preva­lent, the seller is reluctant to disclose records. Others may simply not 
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want to deal with "red tape," delay, uncertainty of payment, and other 
problems often characteristic of public bureaucratic procedures not found 
in a private sale. Indeed, even negotiating an excellent purchase price 
could create problems for the private seller: His very success could lead 
to charges of corruption or political favoritism. 
As for the second component-willing public buyers-public agencies 
in developing countries generally surround themselves with rules and 
practices that have the effect of discouraging or complicating the sale 
of land. Public laws often require rigid evidence of a good title in any 
public purchase. Unfortunately, land-titling systems are ineffective in 
many developing countries. Even if laws permitted officials to take rea­
sonable business risks in purchasing land with less than clear title (and 
we discovered no such laws), it is doubtful that many would be willing 
to take the chance. Public officials are rarely rewarded for risk tak­
ing anywhere. In developing countries, rewards are fewer and risks 
greater. 
Complicated public )rocurement procedures are another burden. Pub­
lic notices, as are generally required, may lessen chance of corruption 
but they inhibit the assembly of' land at noninflated prices. For ex­
ample, publicly advertised intentions to acquire land tend to escalate 
prices and tempt owners to wait for higher prices. No private developer 
would declare his intentions in this way, but most land-procurement 
laws dictate this practice. Mexico and Portugal appear to be exceptions, 
in that the identity of the intended government purchaser may be 
wi th hel Id. 
The American Law Institute Model Land )evelopment Code permits 
a public agency to acquire land without disclosing to the seller the pur­
chaser's public identity Secret purchases, through private real estate 
agents, should be considered by developing countries at least injustifia­
ble circumstances and under adequate safeguards. There is precedent 
for this in developed countries: The city of Stockhohn is reported to use 
private agents to purchase land. Furthermore, the new towns of' Tapi­
ola, Finland; Columbia, United States; and Louvain la Neuve, Belgium 
assembled land secretly in this manner. 
One suggestion ta control potential abuse would allow a court to autho­
rize a secret government plurchase upon a showing of cause in an ex­
parte proceeding. After the sale, the court and sales records could be 
published. Another suggestion, made in a ,Joint Land Policy Study for 
Ii the sum mie of" 1982, letters were sent to .10 members of FIACBI (the Intt.l'national 
Real Estate Federation) in developing countries. 'Ihe letters asked questions about the 
public's use of secrecy and/or priva te real estate I)rokers in land p)urchases. With the two 
noted exception.s, this practice appears to be unknown. 
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Egypt, would be to create a land-development agency with authority to 
purchase land quietly without formally publishing its intentions in 
advance. Regrettably, public procurement laws generally do not allow 
sufficient discretion for the government to fast. ,on an offer meeting 
requirements of different sellers. 
The third component-a vigorous private land market-is lacking in 
many developing countries. The market value of land thus cannot be 
easily ascertained. Without sufficient data to compute value, public offi­
cials would be imprudent to risk criticism by consummating purchases 
on their own authority. 
The practices in Thailand represent examples of the limitations of a 
program that depends too heavily on the voluntary sale of land. Its Na­
tional Housing Authority (NHA) has no effective compulsory-acquisition 
practices and acquires land almost entirely through a public-bidding 
procedure. The NHA will publish its land requirements from time to 
time and invite voluntary tenders. It might publish a call for 1,000 hec­
tares in the northwest area of Bangkok, for instance. After that, it must 
wait for the private sector to present offers. It often takes months, even 
years, before the NHA is satisfied that the landowner's price is justified.
After months and months of official deliberation over whether to pay
the price, the NHA often finds that the landowner has then escalated 
his demand because of inflation. In recent years, fewer and fewer people
have initiated offers in response to NHA invitations. There is some indi­
cation, moreove, that private developers and real estate corporations 
have acquired large tracts of land on the periphery of Bangkok and will 
use their market dominance carefully. Their investment in this land 
will do more than keep pace with inflation. Rapid urbanization of Bang­
kok virtually assures a dramatic capital gain in land value for private 
owners and accordingly, assures that there will be few willing to sell 
to the NHA. 
In contrast, many countries are actively encouraging the private sec­
tor to sell land to the public sector. In Sweden, where the vast majority
of land comes into public ownership through voluntary purchases, a com­
plicated array of legal and tax-relief mechanisms make such purchases
possible: Norway taxes land sales heavily uiless land is sold to the pub­
lic, in which case there is no tax. In India, a 1 percent transfer tax due 
on the private sale of land is waived when the public is the purchaser. 
In Guatemala, tax authorities engage in an unusual fiction to reduce 
the tax bill of a private seller when the sale of land is to the public: The 
taxpayer's tax "basis" is recalculated, simultaneously with the sale, so 
there is no gain or loss on the sale.' 
Quite clearly, governments of developing countries will not have 
unlimited funds with which to satisfy every prospective seller. The goal, 
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therefore, should be to assemble a variety of benefits and inducenlents 
that cost the government relatively little but of'er significant v Ilue to 
sellers. 
The most direct way to encourage voluntary sale offers is throuLh tax­
relief or tax-abatement incentives. Governments can induce such sales 
by lowering taxes on profits in land sales (like in Guatemala), or by delay­
ing or deferring tax payment, or giving tax rebates, or giving tax for­
to the land sold to thegiveness on other landholdings of a size equal 
so on.government, and 
In addition, other incentives are possible. For example, a seller might 
be given preference in the title registration For his other landholdings 
in return for the voluntary sale of a specific parcel. In countries where 
problems of land-title registration take years to resolve, this could be 
an effective, cost-free incentive. Also, a government could designate its 
budget for infrastructure and services to areas where landowners have 
made voluntary sales. Govei nments could offer variances from zoning 
or revise their own procure­laws or building codes, where they exist, 

ment rules to reduce the inefficiencies caused by overregulation.
 
And then, of' course, the government could impose penalties for 
those refusing to sell. Idle or underused land in the inner city is a seri­
ous problem. If vacant lands were taxed at appropriate rates resulting 
in real carrying costs, landowners might be more willing to sell. The 
same holds true for excess land held for speculative purposes. The Philip­
of 5 percent on assessed value, althoughpines has an idle-land tax 
reports are that it is not being vigorously enforced. Taiiwan has a vacant­
lands tax. 
by sector to purchase land in aThe techniques used the public 
voluntary-sale procedure will affect the success of a land-acquisition pro­
gram. Public officials should study carefully the strategies of individuals 
and organzations in the private sector who have developed successful 
techniques for acquiring land in the comtlicated and risk-prone real 
estate market. Understanding such techniques may well provide some 
guidelines for similar ventures in the developing countries. While assum­
ing the same degree of risk may not be suitable for government-directed 
the private sectoi may be suit­activities, some of the methods used by 

able for goverinment-directed acquisition programs.
 
private land developer (withAn important general concpt of the 
some exceptions) is that no one piece of land has all the attributes of 
a perfect site. However, a large number of land parcels may contain at 
least some of these attributes. This is particularly true fbr shelter develop­
ment. Since land for shelter development generally consumes f'om 50 
a great number of' land parcelsto 70 percent of the total urban area, 

may be suitable for shelter. In acquiring such land, those in the private
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sector will evaluate the suitability of and negotiate on many parcelsof land simultaneously. This practice makes land far more susceptibleto the laws of supply and dcemand than when a single piece of land isthe subject of an ac(uisition I)rog!:,m. By conducting a multiple­acqui iAion program. the private sector is able to determine the realisticmarket for land at i particul ar point in time aid is thus more likelyto find the seller who has the greatest incentive for completing a trans­action. Basically, by looking at a region for land rather than at a partic­ular parcel, the private sector land buyer will have more options and 
opport un ities. 
Uncer the best of circuLstances, cm'pulsory acquisition takes time,causes political resentment, and creates hidden costs. Developing coun­tries, therefore, should invest time and resources to ensut'e a workablesystem for voluntary' acquisition. It is for arare voluntary system towyork well in developing countries without some positive incentives tosellers. Any attempt to revise laws and regulations for public land acqui­sition will be seriously deficient unless the bulk of the effort is "oncen­trated on how to make voluntary transactions the major tool of public
land acquisition. 
PUBLIC ACQUISITION OF LEASEHOLD
 
INTERESTS 
 AND OPTIONS 
Public acquisition of land may be facilitated if the governmentacquires something less than full fee-simple ownership. Instead of pur­chasing outright, governments may wish to acquire leasehold interests.Private sellers may also find this more acceptable. The advantage tothe government is that it can acquire needed lanc from current. operat­ing budgets, without paying exce'ssive lump-sum sale prices that require

extraordinary appropriations.

Acquiring a leasehold interest is particularly useful if the pur)pose Of"
ac(uisi tio) is short ter'im, 
 as f'or example, in teniporary refugee and relief programs. The government coUl sublease and the owner-leasor couldhold the land or sell the land to third persons subject to the government'slease. The owners of land so leased woul( have the security of' knowingthe land will ultimately return to them and their heirs. This practice
would help to overcome the reluctance by landowners.There is considerable usage of this technique in tile islands of the SouthPacific. The Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tuvalu govern­ments often acquire customIary land through the use of'leases.' In Tuvalu,the law limits the government to leases of not more than 25 years. In 
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addition to annual rent, with the rate renegotiated every five years, the 
Tuvalu government pays a lump-sum compensation at the beginning 
of the lease for the loss of trees and standing crops. Public acquisition 
of leasehold interests is not. widely used today. It nonetheless deserves 
careful study by officials in developing countries wv'ho are rethinking 
the alternatives. 
Options to purchase land provide another example of less-than-fieehold 
acquisition. Private land developers in developed countries rely heavily 
on the use of options to assemble parcels of land in large projects. Often. 
options are acquired by different nominees, each secretly controlled by 
the same developer. The use of' nominees is necessary to avoid holdouts 
by a few landowners. If the developer is successful in assembling rights 
to a sufficient number of contiguous parcels of land, the options will be 
exercised and the land purchased. If, however, for reasons foreseen or 
unforeseen, the developer is blocked in his efforts to acquire rights to 
all of the various lots needed to comprise an economically viable parcel, 
then he can abandon the project. The developer's cost is only the sums 
paid to secure the options. Without the use of the device of purchasing 
options, the developer vould presumab!" have to pay the full purchase 
price ef each successive lot until such time as the land-assembly efforts 
were successful or were blocked-in which case, the costs and risks of 
land acquisition and assembly would be considerably greater. 
Frequently, the cost of such rights (which are in reality a number of 
options undel' Which the buyer may purchase the land) is related to the 
present owner's carrying costs of such land. Since the principal carrying 
costs for land, at least in the United States, are taxes, the annual cost 
of the option may well be less than 5 or 10 percent of the current value 
of such land. To ,nake such a transaction attractive to the landowner, 
the future acquisition price is set significantly higher than the current 
value. By employing the use of' options to acquire land, the land buyer 
is able, with a limited amount of resources, to control far more parcels 
of land than if' he employed the technique of outright purchase. Since 
there is a high degree of risk in determining the future use of the land, 
this strategy can help reduce risk by controlling many parcels of land 
simultaneously. In addition, the use of the option allows the buyer to 
drop a particular plr'ojeLt when it becomes apparent that the parcel is 
not suitable for development. The use of options are generally employed 
for intermediate periods of time, For example, from two to five years. 
Normally, since land values increase rather rapidly just prior to use, 
the cost of the options plus the premium on the site itself, are usually 
offset by the rapid increase in the site's value. 
There is little evidence in developing countries of the similar use of 
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options by public authorities. The reasons for this are fairly clear; it 
can be traced to the difficulty in recording options on land-title registers
and in enforcing the rights to land embodied in the options. The use 
of options presupposes a relatively sophisticated land market, sophisti­
cAted landowners and sellers and importantly, a legal system that can 
record and protect the rights of holders pertaining to options. Specifi­
cally, the holder ofan option needs to be able to record the option quickly
in a land-title register, thereby preserving the right to acquire the land 
upon the exercise of' the option against the original owner and against 
any third person to whom the original owner may have wrongfully
attempted a land sale. In many developing countries, it unfortunately
takes many years to record a land transaction on the official land-title 
register. This obstacle needs to be removed before options can be used 
in such countries. 
Another obstacle to the use of'options is inadvertently created by laws 
in some countries which limit the damages that courts will allow to buyers or sellers when one party has breacled a contract to sell or buy
land. For example, in Colombia, dimestic law provides that if a seller 
is unable to honor a cortract of sale, the seller must pay the buyer liqui­
dated damages in the amount of twice the down payment received. Like­
wise, if the buyer defaults, ti.,es ller can keep the down payment. The 
law imposes an equal penalty to both parties for breach of contract, and 
importantly, no other remedy il available to an injured party.Such laws 
which limit damages can undermine the use of options, as in the follow­
ing example: A government purcchaser agrees to pay a seller considera­
tion equal to 12 percent of the purJhase price for an option to l)urchase
certain land anytime within two year. from the date thn option is signed.
Then, after securing the option, the g'overnment purchaser is able to 
provide the area with roads, water, elecilricity, and other amenities, calls­
ing the value of the land to increase by 300 percent its original value. 
When the government seeks to exercise its option to purchase, the seller 
has a choice: either to honor the contract to sell or to dishonor the con­
tract. If' the seller decides to dishonor the contract, he will be forced to 
pay the buyer (the government) no nio."e th -n 24 percent of the original
sales price or now, only 8 percent of the iair market value of the land. 
If the seller then resells the land at the new va'ue, he will make a hand­
some profit-even after paying the breach of contract penalty as limited 
by the law. Laws of this type often unintentianally discourage the use 
of options and should be carefully r,-c,;1 sidered. Options can present an acquiring institution with an affordable method 
to assemble land over a period of time at reasonable prices. Every effort 
should be made to assure that applicable laws and practices facilitate 
the use of options. 
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ACQUISITION THROUGH BARTER OR 
EXCHANGE 
In many instances, land sought in developing countries is 
appreciating so rapidly that sums received from the government in a 
voluntary or forced sale cannot be reinvested easily in as profitable an 
asset. Resistance to public acquisition, then, can seriously hamper the 
ability to acquire land. As a means of compensation, prior-owned govern­
ment land can be offered in barter. 
All too often, governments must use lands already owned to build 
schools, hospitals, housing, or roads- regardleq of their suitability. To 
prevent this, the government can offer such prior-owned land as com­
pensation for the acquisition of other land more ideally situated, Many 
countries have allowed specifically for the barter and exchange of land. 
Guatemala, Peru, Romania, the National Capital Commission of Canada, 
Chile through the Chilean Urban Development Corporation (CORMU), 
India, Mexico, Egypt, and Hong Kong--all appeal- to use this practice 
with some frequency.7 
Often, government agencies will trade or exchange land already owned 
with other government agencies. In Egypt, a law required the ninistry 
of Awkaf to turn over land in itsjurisdiction to the governorates in return 
for whole or partial compensation, depending upon how the land was 
to be used. If lands were to be employed for public purposes, the gover­
norate was to recompense the ministry of Awkaf up to 50 percent of the 
value of the property. If not, tile governorates were to recompense the 
ministry up to 90 percent of the value, with an additional 10 percent 
for administrative expenses. The order does not appeal to have been 
effectively implemented but has led to greater cooperation among these 
bodies.' More difficult problems have been presented by military-owned 
land in Egyp. A more effective formal means for transfer of such land 
is required. Such a plan was worked out in the early 1960s for the develop­
ment of Nasr City, the planning of which the ministries of housing and 
defense were jointly involved in. 
In Guatemala, barter is provided for as a way of compensation in the 
acquisition of land. The Purchases Contracts Law" provides that the pub­
lic acquisition of land shall be done with or without payment and through 
barter or offset. 
Jamaica provides an interesting case study otthe use of land exchanges. 
In the mid-1960s, a decision was made to i evit:.lize the Kingston water­
fr'ont area, which had begun to decay following the earlier relocation 
of port facilities to another area of the city. At this time, pending the 
establishment of the proposed Urban Development Corporation Law, 
a new corpor'tion w;,s established under the Companies Act and named 
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the Kingston Waterfront Redevelopment Company. The company was 
whclly owned by the government. It v'as given a mandate to acquire
all the land in the redevelopment area and to implement a plan to develop 
or redevelop the area. The government both gave and "loaned" govern­
ment land to the company and also provided some capital. The first task 
of the company was to prepare a landownership map of the area and 
establish a valuation of each of the parcels owned by private persons.
After this was completed, it became apparent that the normal processes
of negotiation or compulsory acquisition would be totally inadequate 
to allow the company to assemble the land at prices that would make
the entire scheme economically feasible. The company then decided to 
exchange land (owned by the government and given to the company) in 
two new port sites for land on the Kingston waterfront. In some cases,
commercial interests were given four square feet of land in Newport East 
for each one square foot of Kingston waterfront land surrendered. The
total value of lands acquired on the waterfront by the company over a 
three-year period was Jamaican $7,133,901 (approximately $3,500,000, 
at that time). Over 26 percent of the value of lands acquired in this ven­
ture is accounted for by land exchanges.' 
Various ministries own or control a considerable amount of urban land 
in developing countries. For example, in India, the Railway Commissions 
are reported to own sizable urban parcels alongside railway lines; in 
Seoul, Korea, the military controls the tops of hills for defense purposes.
An important first step for every country is to take an accurate inven­
tory of all land held by the various public agencies. Then, the land should 
be assessed to see if it is appropriate for the responsibilities and func­
tions of the controlling ministries. The result of such analyses in many
countries will be to identify land that is more suitable to other minis­
tries' purposes than those of the holder. Excess land, germane for barter 
and exchange, can be identified in this way, too.* 
To barter, a government will need a system for establishing the value 
of its tradable lands. Because of the usual difficulties in determining
such values, barter may not be useful in compulsory acquisitions. Yet,
in a voluntary transaction, it could be extremely important.
There is another land-acquisition technique which is important but 
does not fit precisely into any one of the categories in this chapter. The 
technique falls into the category of "intergovernmental transfers" or 
*Funding for such studies should be readily available from the international donor agen­
cies. A project of this type would interest a donor agency such as AID, but as an intrinsic part of the exercise, the donor would want to establish a system to maintain and continu­
ally revise the data. 
Land-Acquisition 7'chniques / 23 
exchanges. The actual acquisition of land by one public entity from 
another in an intergovernmental transfer may occu" in a voluntary sale, 
gift, barter, or even part of'a joint venture. In developing countries where 
national governments are strong and tribal areas and municipalities 
often weak, and where the national government is often the supplier 
ofservices requiring land (roads, hospitals, housing, and ithe like), there 
are many instances when land held by the city or tribe is required for 
the proposed project. If the public owner desires the national govern­
ment to proceed with the pro'ject, a land transfer can take place. Often 
such land is donated to the project as the owners' fair share of' expenses. 
On occasion, particul *arlVwhen the national purposes are more remote 
to the immediate needs of tile owner (for example, defense), other land 
is bartered or exchanged. We have not discovered instances in which 
expropriation has been atteml)ted by one )l0l1icagency aga iiist another. 
These problems are usually worked out by the chief executive or through 
po l i tical processes. Ilowever, tribal anth0oities-althougl1 public bodies 
themselves-have litigated against national govern ments in an attempt 
to prevent compulsory land acquisition. Liberia, some of the South Pacific 
Island territories, and Indonesia v(With its IIhuge ti'ansinigrat ion p'okject 
1ivolving silifting urban l)Opulitions to u lerlpopulated islands)provide 
examlples of such litigatioii. 
It is difficult to generalize about intergovernmientl ] trallsfeirs and 
exchanges except to note that the practice is widespread. As governments 
begin to ma ke in ventories t' I,an(ls held 1)V themnselves (Is We I ,c(oin­
niend in chap. () and lie iilfoinit ioin )e('omes almatter of public record, 
it, is expected tlhat ti l)let ice of' int(ergoverninental 'lnra sfei's of' land 
through va.rious techni ies will increase. 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE VENTURES 
Background 
Public land acquisition plOgliiins consume considerable administrative 
time and pulic expense. Further, handownersbi), alone, is not the goal.
The governmllle,nt's goal is to devote the acquired land to Some publicly 
useful purpoise, such as roads, housing, or imarketplaces. It is possible 
through public-private Cooperation to acconrlisil tibe public purpose with­
outt the pul)lic sector actual iy acqtii'i ire land as a first step. Many 
developing countries are using this teci.1:i Ij( of'.a coope','ative joint Ven­
tre with success. The US delegation at the UN Habitat Meeting in May 
1983 has advocated such joint pl)l ic-l)rivate Ventures. When there is 
an active private sector in developing countries, tile joint technique 
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can be as effective as a voluntary or compulsory public acquisition.
The e:sential element in these ventu,'es is that land is devoted to a 
public purpose without the government acquiring the land and develop­
ing it. Considerable public outlays are saved. The approach varies from 
country to country. In Korea, most joint ventures have been initiated 
by the government. In Japan, private landowners have tended to organize
first. a,,ree on a site plan, and then petition the government to assist 
in development." 
Lind Readjustment 
Joint ventures involving land contributions by the private sector and 
land servicing by the public sector are referred to as "land adjustment"
or"land pooling.' In land adjustment, an undeveloped parcel on the periph­
ery of an urban area, is dec!ared a land-adjustment area by approp.iate
legislation. Landowners are notified of the scheme, which may or may
not be compulsory, depending on the percentage of landowners consent­
ing. A site plan, prepared by either the government or the landowners, 
subdivides the parcel into streets, parks, schools, and section:; For other 
uses. The area to be dc. ted to public use is measured and compared
to the total project area. T. cost of servicing tie public and private areas 
is calculated, as well as the probable value of the private lots if they 
were placed on the market after servicing and land titling. With these 
figures, it is possible to determine how much serviced land must be sold 
to the private sector to recoup the cost of subdividing and servicing the 
land. The object is to create three categories of land in tile project area: (a) the public land (roads, schools, and tile like) that Will remain in the 
public sector (usually between 15 and 25 percent of the total area); (h)
the private land that will be sold by the government at a public sale 
to reimburse the government for its out-of-pocket costs for -;ervicing tile 
entire area (between 15 and 25 percent of the area); and (c) the private
land that will be returned to the original owners in amount; propor­
tional to original ownership shares f'om the remaining, now-serviced 
land aftei the public sector set-aside and after the land sales (between 
50 and 60 percent of' the area).
An examination of land readjustment in Korea may be informative.": * 
It is based upon Japanese land reform a,idconsolidation laws of tile 
1920s that, wvee spurred by new cultivation methods and the increase 
of motor vehicles and roads. In addition, the following developments made 
new land use demands on rural areas: land consolidation; rectangulari­
* This information issummarized fr'om Professor William lDoebele' excellent work, Land 
Readjustment. 
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zation and the straightening and widening of' rights-of-way for all­
weather roads; the extension of'educatioii to i'ural areas; and the build­
ing of district and village adninistrative, health, and police facilities. 
Land-reacliistuient p'ro,''tinres involve organizing a voluntary associa­
tion of local landownie's, often uinder t ie leadership of a (listrict offficial 
acting as executor, who woul pool landholdings and give up to public 
use a small share (10 to 15 percent). Under this arrangement, each 
participant would get back consolilated land, usually rectangular in 
shape, with access to a1fari lall that connects to an all-weIther rural 
road. Land for school,;, police stations, tellel sites, and the like 
\would also be included in tie siniall ict',llttge of* land taken t'"o( each 
pht holdei'. 
The exectni' \ hot1(uld lrst deteriii troi tIe laild iec'ds the number 
and size oft',ach ownel's holdings alld then wotuld (h':\\ iipia replotting 
sceeie t'," appri'Val. Linnlowne,'s woulcl i'egal i plots equal ill area to 
50 to ,(0 l(ei'Ceiit oft hei ortiginal hldings. The executor, thlgh ii'got i­
atioll and adljust ntut wo(uld ti'y to retuln to each owner a plot located 
on or near his preadjustnoent holdings. ('ash payments, by landown, r%" 
to the executor, and by the t('XiCUoi' to lo1 (hwIOVtIrs, ('ou1ld also he used 
to even out any slight (liscr'(pa ici's in the i'i'eaIiiust mlili p'xes. When 
the landowners appr)v(' tle replotting plan ad1 I5.'rv(yoirs r',estalblish 
the fielct imtillidlairit's, public-tlse sites and road 'ighl.t-of'way, the execul­
for isstte. new\X certific;ltes (,' title[. 
Lanzd rea(titll mn ,t procedurelzv(s th, r',("'Ukirlize' midl('z dd' e: .il 
tu,-al plots; widell vl'ral m-cces's r'oads1, lnd ['':t'Cw11111111 ll hIlid I'm' vii 
I.,ge school., c'('nti'il sluir(s, (id1 re'ljgil, sttc('tres lh(\ e been 
accepted in r'ural th' 1 0s ii Irltall was nottKoreaSiSince I93 [st' arevas 
extensive until thel mid-l19GOs. 
InAugust 1966,' Korean gov pl'lli't ,d th' Linelr l tlng;ll 
iustilient Prokject L, toIlodit'*v ib' tog .s (Imit1 4 -1do usll ollo h 'xi ullsv St nt 
aind ttelhance its applicatio(n( to 1)l180 tuteas.l il, langlige ofht'h 
law\\. the( purpo(seu~ to) conl~tributte, fl d the'- promo[tionw of,' land use 
planning, adjust illeit, nd (oisllidatt iol, to ',ili livtI' f i' i 111d k18 icttednr 
(leveloplient of,1111'i11 ars( , :111d to impo)v(e\t' the, , , 'lal we'll' 'r,ot lie 
('itiz'ns by\' Sti latiut i ll l;ltteors' ('c l e('rllill ' ill l'O'lell l pIlit' ,t11th iti((hires, iprlce,s. , anld respmlsilhihtie'; 
Lo)cali governent('l ad(]llillis-;r'atol'. W% r(I llilck too:q' the. ;Idva lltIge's 
of using land r dI(ljustltn'it e n'd '\lxlil pr''l''(,r tnt', ti l'81li t l I',iurit imi 
laws of' 1961 (n( 19 t(4 r mist(er Ilamii ji , t' urbllaln t((4;1(. N  iily 
could ulnplannld settlem(,nts it'i''re il:li'iz(,d, but laIld 1',',((l 1,61. high 
ways, 1(18(15, pu'ks, schoo ls, piildlic .S;tll(res, andbe thli' it' 1l)tulietf'(like ('(1111(1 
'itnol icuiisition cost to the llllicilpallity. l"urth r. land co(uld 'he 'ld 
in reserive' tiy tilit' exector ('iually. the Ill yior), 0o 1he stli to cover' 
26 / Land Acquisition in Developing Countries 
the cost of infirastructure as well as overhead and other administrative 
costs. 
Landowners 'ooperating in land readjustment projects also benefited. 
Their land after reduction (subtraction from their net holdings of an 
appropriate percentage to be used for public purposes or sold to recoup
costs) became regularized urban land with basic services. The increase 
in land value was oiten four to six times the value of the original land 
before reduction. 
Land readjustment has been used by a number of Korean municipali­
ties to acquire land for major roads and more recently to develop land 
previously designated as agricultural but changed to urban residential 
under the city mastor plans. After the 1966 Land Readjustment Project
Law, land readjustment became a primary tool of Korean urlban land 
development. During the period 1966--74, for example, 25 land-re­
adjustment projects vere carried out in Korean cities resulting in the 
development of 327.5 square kilometers of urban land. In Seoul alone,
approximately 41 land-readjustment projects completed by 1974 
accounted For nearly one-third of the capital's developed area. The land 
returned to owners has varied from about 80 percent during the forma­
tive years of land-readjustment implementation (1966-76) to about 50 
percent or even 45 percent during recent years. The willingn,,s of'land­
owners to accept smaller percentages of rcturned laind rl,.ects the 
progressively improved standard of infirastructure provision and the infla­
tion of land values in newly urbanized areas. Presently, a typical land­
readjustment project in urban areas would result in the lollowing land 
use: about 30 percent for public use (including infr-astructure and con­
mercial), 20 percent retained by the executor for market sales to recoup 
costs, and 50 percent returned to the original owners. Small plot holders 
of the association, if their holdings are reduced after readjustmenL Lc 
a size too small to be a legal building plot, must accept cash compensa­
tion for their holdings. 
The Korean Land Development Corporation (KLDC) recently entered 
into urban land development.* This has resulted in expanded con­an 
cept of the meaning and use of "reserved land" in laud-readjustment 
undertakings. The KLDC has proposed that the executors of land­
readjustment projects use the highest possible reduction ratio to hold 
back more land than is necessary For public use (roads, parks, schools, 
and the like) and for land to be resold (to recover infrastructure construe­
tion costs). The additional reserved land would be developed and used 
for housing construction for low-income families1 4 
Several advantages are indicated over outright purchases under the 
*See.generally, Appendix A for a case study of the KLI)C by Professor Gill Chin Lir. 
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City Planning Law (CPL). The executing agency-the city, KLDC, or 
the Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHIC)-does not have to 
purchase the land or use expropriation to force landowners to sell. This 
reduces the capital flow of the developing agancy, particularly during 
the initial stages of development. Politically, it is not seen as forcing 
owners to sell but rather as entering into a voluntary agreement for 
joint land development for urban use. 
Land readjustment has great potential as a major tool for development 
of serviced land for housing low-income families-a function that the 
legislation in Korea did not originally intend. 
Whether land readjustment has been fully successful in Korea is a 
topic for debate. Clearly, large amounts of land for public purposes have 
been acquired, at little direct cost, to the public sector. The debate on 
the success of the program is centered more on the actual uses of the 
public land, however. In Korea's ten-year plan for national urban develop­
ment (1981-91), tip to 30 percent of the estimated land needed fbr residen­
tial sites is expected to be acquired through land-readjustment methods.' 
The problems of land-readjustment methods might adversely affect 
its attractiveness, however, for use in other developing countries. 
The legal procedures and negctiations involved are complex, and time 
consuming. Cohesiveness and cooperation between the private sector 
and the government are essential. The technique has been used, with 
varying degrees of success, in a number of countries, including India, 
Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, and West Germany. Each 
is relatively more developed than the developing countries; of those 
developing countries that do employ land readjustment, all are Asian 
countries. 
Does the technique offer anything for the other continents? To answer 
this, we must first consider that land readjustment has the following 
prerequisites: 
1. 	 National, provincial, and local support is essential. 
2. 	 Key ministries must be sympathetic. 
3. 	 In most countries, major new enabling legislation is required. 
4. 	 A country must possess an efficient system of cadastration or title 
registration. 
5. 	 An adequate corps of well-trained, objective appraisers of real prop­
erty is n-.essary. 
6. 	 Highly skilled negotiators and administrators are essential' 
Because of these requirements, many countries may give land adjust­
ment a low priority. Trained personnel, particularly at the municipal 
level, are one of the great shortages in developing nations. 
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Charitable Organizations 
Other bases for joint venture versus outright public land acquisition
should also be considered. Latin America and the Middle East have large 
tracts of valuable but decaying inner-city areas that are held by char­
itable organizations. In Latin America, the organizations are called 
beneficencias; in the Middle East, they are called Waqf Both organiza­
tions hold properties in trust. 
In Quito, Ecuador, the Society of Jesus Foundation owns a large tract 
of poorly serviced land, occupied by squatters and known as the Solanda 
sitc. The Banco de ta Vi'ienda and the United States Agency for Inter­
national Development, in a joint project, are upgrading this land with 
public funds. The foundation is contributing a portion of its land to the 
low-income people who occupy the land. In Peru, a single beneficelncia 
may own up to 20 percent of the tuguriasof Lima-densely occupied slums 
in the inner city. These charitable organizations are uncomfortable with 
their roles as slumlords and would be amenable to some form of joint
venture. Public funds coi'ld upgrade the land in return for concessions 
on the part of the charitable organization-perhaps a transfer of a por­
tion of the upgraded land to the public or to the low-income families. 
The same basis for joint cooperation would appear to exist in the 
Middle East countries where waqf land, located ofter in the crowded,
underserviced inedinas, is badly in need of upgrading. Here too, land­
lords have semipublic purposes and large holdings of inner-city land,
which seem to supply the foundation for effective joint ventures with 
the public sector. Such joint ventures could well be in the form of land 
readjustment. 
Development Plans 
The Urban Development Act in Malaysia provides another example of 
a joint venture. When an area is declared to be a designated urban­
development area, the landowners have three options: First, they can 
elect to participate in the venture by pledging their land and accepting 
a certificate specifying their share of profits or income. Second, the 
landowners can transfer their land to the public sector and agiee to 
receive land of equivalent value in the redeveloped project area. Finally,
they can elect to make a cash sale of land to une Urban Development 
Authority. 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, Sweden, and France, private owners hr ve 
transferred land to public land-development agencies to participate in 
development schemes.17 
The willingness of landowners to donate land to a public venture, in 
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return for a right to share in profits, depends upon how the !and wi!l 
be used. If, for example, the public is acquiring land for use as a public 
market or industrial park, a private landowner may b- willing to donate 
his land in return for a proportional share of rental income earned by 
the government.. The concept of landowners sharing in the rewards of 
public acquisition-through a share of rental income or through stock 
dividend payments-is intriguing. It presumes an economy that is com­
fortable with notions of securities and has a market for the sale of secu­
rities. Not many developing countries fit these criteria, but the idea is 
worth investigating. 
Turnkey Projects 
Another type of joint venture is seen in turnkey projects sponsored by 
public agencies. These often involve the construction of low-income pub­
lic housing and have been carried out successfully in Honduras, Jamaica, 
and Hong Kong, among others. The government, as an alternative to 
public action, encourages the private sector to acquire land and construct 
housing. The private developers often acquire land more quickly and 
cheaply than the government. In turn, the government promises to be 
a buyer of last resort if the houses cannot be sold, and the developer 
can use this government backing to raise capital for the project. As a 
practical matter however, he can sell the houses to private persons at 
a higher price than the government would pay for the unsold houses. 
Thus, in return for a promise unlikely to become due, the government 
manipulates the private sector to design, develop, finance, and market 
houses that the government wants supplied to low-income families. All 
of the costs and most of the risk are intended to be placed on the private 
sector, enlisted for a socially worthwhile endeavor. For a turnkey project 
to be fully successful, the developer must judge the market correctly and 
develop units of land economically enough to show a profit. When it ,,,'wks, 
both sectors profit equally. 
Excess [nd 
Another version of a public-private interaction is found in such public 
agencies as highway departments which occasionally acquire excess land 
in connection with their projects. Typically, a ministry of transportation 
in the course of acquiring rights-of-way to build a road will acquire land 
at key locations in excess of the strict requirements of the road-building 
manuals. After the road is built, and the land adjacent to the road appreci­
ates in value, the ministry of transportation will sell or lease the excess 
land to the private sector. The income from the sale or lease of the excess 
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land will assist in financing the road and Ei'capture, for tile public
secto, the increased value of land created by the original investment 
of public funds. The disposition of this excess land For defined purposes
will also allow the public to accomplish some land use controls not other­
wise within the grasp of the public sector. 
When the so-called excess land is acquired under the eminent-domain 
powers of the public sector, serious legal issues may arise concerning
whether a required public-purpose test has been met. For this reason, 
public officials contemplating the use of emin, 
-domain powers willrequire the advice of counsel. Tipically, land ti becomes excessis acquired volMuntari ly, inure by accident 
land 
than design. In some cases,
sites used to store construction materials and equipment l)ecome excess
after construction is finished. In other cases, the excess land is acquired
at the request of the owners or the courts; they ask a pubjic agency topurchase remiAnts or remainders of'property )ecause the major portion
of a seller's landl has been l)urchasedl and the smaller remaining piece,
not required by the pul)lic, will be rendered uneconomic by its severancefrom the major parcel. In the United States, the Washington Metropoli­
tan Area Transit Authority owns many parcels of land alongside its newly
constructed subway which were acquired in this manner. These parcels
are being sold or leased to private developers in a process that earns 
about $1.5 million per year fbr the authority." 
Lar.J Sharing 
Finally, land sharing among landlords and squatters merits attention 
as a technique when some purposes of public land acquisition might be
achieved without the actual public purchase of land. Land sharing is
the term used to describe the development and joint use of land firmly
occupied by squatters for which the legal owner does not have the practi­
cal ability to evict the squatters. In these cases, generally involving very
valuable inner-city land, the legal owner will approach the squatters
with a development proposal by which the squatters will agree to vacate 
a portion of the land (perhaps one-third) in return for a package of' benefits 
to be given by the legal owner. Land sharing in this manner has been
used successfully on an infbrmal, ad-hoc. basis iii India and Thailand, 
to name a few countries. 
Legal owners of slum pMroperty occupied by squatters are often unwill­ing to permit public authorities to upgrade these slums. The owners fear
that such action will tend to make their chances of re-entry even more 
remote. Land sharing affords government the opoortunity to cause slum property to be upgraded without the necessity ofdirect public expropria­
tion. Serious considerations should be given to how government can facili­
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tate private land sharing as an alternative to direct public land acqui­
sition. 
Joint public-private projects require that laws encourage and give 
administrative flexibility to government officials to engage in such 
projects while offering the private sector incentives and benefits. 
SELECTED REGULATIONS THAT FACILITATE 
LAND ACQUISITION 
Freezing Land Use and Value 
One way a government can facilitaLe land acquisition, through compul­
sory or voluntary means, is by freezing the use and value ofprivate land 
preparatory to a government taking. In Sri Lanka, a minister can issue 
an order, either for a general or a special-interim development, that will 
hold land in an area for which a land-planning scheme has been pre­
pared. The effect is that no development, subdivision, or construction 
can occuj- without permission of the planning authorities. Such freezing 
orders are especially useful when a country's laws or procedures pre­
vent quick acquisition of land or when disclosing government intentions 
to purchase might cause a sharp increase in land prices. Turkey has 
a regulation that enables the freezing ofsite value fora four-year period 
during which land ac luisition can take place. Malaysian law permits 
such freezing, too. In France, the minister ofbuilding may specifly develop­
ment -,ones, freezing value for the purpose of government purchase at 
a price equal to that prevailing one year before the declaration of the 
development zone." 
Preemption 
Similar to freezing is preemption, which allows public agencies to step 
in and assume the position of'a buyer, once the terms of a private land 
sale have been set. The right of preemption is usually confined to cer­
tain identified areas where government development plans have already 
been approved. In this instance, the law requires the seller to inform 
the government of the terms of each proposed sale of land within the 
defined area. The government may elect to become the buyer on the same 
terms offered the prospective private purchaser. 
In Tunisia, preemption is exercised the Housing Land Agency­h.,, 
Agence Fonciere d'Habitation (AFI-I)- land bank. No real estate transfer 
may take place within areas designated for urban expansion by the 
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council of ministers until the AFH has had two months to exercise its 
right of first refusal. If'the AFHI notifies the seller of its decision to pur­
chase and its willingness to pay, the seller has one monLh to accept the 
offei, agree to adjudicate its price, or take the property off the market. 
If the AFI-I decides not to make an offer, it cannot exercise its right of 
preemption on the property involved for six years?"
Hungary, Poland, and Sweden have preemption rights that apply
throughout the country. Japan, France, the Federal Republic of Gernmany,
and Korea have such rights in restricted, designated areas.2 ' Preemp­
tion is the step before expropriation. When used with regulations for 
freezing land values, preemption tends to control prices.
The preemption right is a tool that limits free trade. It must be used 
carefully, to avoid an undue chilling effect on land markets. When used 
without effective steps for voluntary and compulsory acquisition, the 
procedure is not sufficient to allow the government to acquire land effi­
ciently. Used in conjunction with other techniques, it may help give
developing countries time to sort out priorities and implement inper­
fect procedures for land acquisition. 
ACQUISITION THROUGH CONFISCATION 
AND NATIONALIZATION 
Confiscation or Forfeiture 
There are various laws in existence that. mandate the forreiture of land 
as a penalty, when certain laws of the country are breached. Such laws 
do not appear to be widespread in either developed or developing coun­
tries. Yet, such forfeiture laws, when based on the misuse of land or 
the failure to pay taxes on land, can become useful land-acquisition tools. 
These laws can be effective in enforcing land use controls, strengthen­
ing a country's land-acquisition potential, and in some cwses, serving 
as a substitute for land acquisition.: 
The most st raightforv.'ard laws of this nature will provide for the for­
feiture of land when land isused in violation of health and safety codes 
to the detriment of the public.Abandoned buildings that pose a fire haz­
ard to the entire community would fit into this category.Typically, the 
laws provide that, ifthe hazard still remains after proper notice to the 
owner, then the public may condemn the property and take possession. 
* The instruments for land acquisition that fialwithin the concept of-vxprlpriation rre 
discussed ir chap. 3. 
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Forfeiture laws, if' used for other than the most 
compellilig situations 
(and then only with prop~er procedural and judicial safeguards), will 
always be unpopular and a source of discontent. Gien twestrong need 
for a general conefnsus in favor of fair land-acquisition powers, forfei­
lessen citizen confidence rarely will be 
worth­
ture laws that !,end to 
while. In developing countries, where most of the residential 
units for 
low-income people are technically illegal andi not built 
to code specifica­
would be viewed asviolationsfor building,-codetions, forfeiture 
unreasonable. For this reason, it is important 
for a developing country 
to enact such laws that will maximize public 
goals without threatening 
public colsensus. 
to build to pirescribed legal codes The threat of' forfeitutre for 'iure 

might induce developers (as opposed to residents) to build 
properly. If
 
may be more inclined to sell 
this does not work, however, developers 
land voluntarily to the public or to form a joint venture with the public, of tile difficultiesthe land. Considering some should the public want 
of upgrading sliums in illegal housing units, 
the threat of forfeiture might 
useful bargaining tool to gain the developer's 
cooperation.
be a seen the Swamps 
early example of forfeiture legislation is 
in 
An 
Improvements Ordinance of 1863 in Nigeria. 
It rtequired the owners of 
the island of Lagos to fill the swamps. If they certain swamplands on 
did not do so, the penalty was that land would 
be sold by public auction 
to anyone who could carry out the requirements 
of the ordinance. If no 
purchasers were forthcoming, the government 
could take possession of 
the land. 
Tuvalu Island is tile South Pacific provides another 
illustration of con­
fiscatory legislation. Under thc Neglected LIand 
Ordinance, the govern­
ment is entitled to seize neglected land and 
redistribute it to tile needy. 
There is no adequate definition of"neglected 
laid" and no evidence that 
ever has been used."this ordinance 
Perhaps the most significant opportunity for 
land acquisition through 
confiscation is foud in the area of delinquent 
property taxes. So much 
urban land in developing countries remains 
untaxed (for one reason or 
another) that this topic deserves considerable attention. 
Most develop­
ing countries have (lifthculty in taxing urban land. Some 
of the difficulty 
is traceable to poor land titling and recording sysi 
ems. Much, however, 
is due to poor tax enforcement, lack of citizen 
cooperation, and ineffec­
tive penalties for wrongful tax avoidance. If 
the penalties for tax avoid­
ance were to include forfeiture of the land, it is 
believed that tax collection 
would increase and the public would acquire 
greater reserves of urban 
land through confiscation. 
is practiced in many jurisdir' ',ns in Forfeiture for tax delinquency 
the United States and in Canada. Peru, Indonesia, 
Sri Lank - livia, 
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and Jamaica 
are reported to have similar legislation."3 In
of tax delinquency, the land is simply viewed as an asset to be seizedin the event of nonpayment; the state acts as creditor to sell the landto raise revenue and discharge the debt. Some United States laws havea slightly different purpose, 
most cases 
more likeIn the United and acquisition.States, the Ohio legis~ature enacted a law in 1976with the purpose of restoring tax-delinquent property to the tax rolls.The law established a land reutilizationland in a programland bank until it to hold forfeitedwas sold. Most of theder"this program land acquired un­is unique, since it is abandoned inner-city land.14The city of St. Louis and the state of'New Jersey have specialdelinquency forfeiture laws. They permit a uthorities to proceed against 
tax­
the property itself, in an in-rem proceeding as opposed to finding and ob­tainingjurisdiction over the delinquelt owner. In New Jersey, the lawpermits cities to foreclose 
Such foreclosed 
on properties 21 months after delinquency.property is auctioned to the public at the next, annualforeclosure sale. At this sale, and for six months thereafter, the trueowner may regain the property by paying the taxes due. After the six­month period, if no one has bought the property (which often is the case),the city can take clear title. Thereafter, the city can hold the land or sellit subject to such contditions as use, rehabilitation, and the like,deems appropriate as itThe Ohio law has special features of interest. TheLand Reutilization Authority (LRA) enjoys broad powers to sell, hold,or dedicate the land fbr public purposes. The law requires the LRA to actwith advice of'several adv isory committees, composed of citizens of thetax district. The Ohio LRA will 
not acquire property 
 that is actuallyoccupied, since it does not seek to become a slum landlord; nor does itacquire property when an owner is attempting to improve the property
and pay taxes.
Utilizing s11ch laws in developing countries should be considered care­fully. What is needuc iz 1 land-development agency, a land bank or theequivalent public institution that cin effectively hold, manage, and dis­pose of land acquired by this method. When there is no instituILion withbroad land-management authority, the law could simply appoint a sin­gle agency ­ for enample, the national or city housing ageccy-as bene­ficiary of the land to take possession of and use it filrhousing parposes.
If procedural safeglar'dS al-e assured, tax-delinquency iorfeiture lawscould add more acquired land. Such laws could augment other volun­tary and compulsory land-acquisition laws. Even if'rarely used, the threatof foreclosure for delinquency would assist in tax collectionwell induce a and couldvoluntary sale or assist in the negotiation of compensa­tion under an eminent-domain proceeding,Another type of confiscatory law relates to nonland-related crimes per­
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petrated by persons having property. In Liberia, crimes of high treason 
are punishable in part by the confiscation of the real property of the 
"guilty person. 5 Historically, laws of this nature have accounted for large 
tracts cf land coming into public hands. Fallen heads of state (e.g., A. 
Somoza in Nicaragua, Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, and William Tolbert 
in Liberia) owned significant amounts of land confiscated upon their 
ouster. 
Some confiscation statutes have nothing to do with the failure of owners 
to comply with any law, but relate rather to the public's need for land: 
thus, some laws permit the government to seize small portions of pri­
vate land without compensation for public purposes such as roads. In 
Zanzibar, up to one-fifth of any owvner's land may be so taken."' Other 
developing countries permit small seizures without compensation. In 
Jordan, for instance, up to 25 percelt of a person's land may be taken 
for road or open-space purposes.2 7 The 20 percent and 25 percent figures 
used in Zanzibar and Jordan seem high. A lesser percent, say five per­
cent, might be more reasonable, and if adopted, might make laws of this 
nature more usable as a practical matter. 
Nationalization 
Some developing countries have sought to control land use through the 
nationalization of' all land. Nationalizatior is accomplished through 
general lows which transfer broad categories of land to government 
ownership. It differs friom confiscation because it is generally more sweep­
ing and does not depend upon a concept of punishment or forfeiture. 
Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe have issued decrees of nationaliza­
tion. Zambia has converted all land formerly held by freehold tenure 
to 100-year leasehold. Land subject to the leasehold may now be trans­
ferred only with permission of the head of state, in theory. It is not clear, 
however, how the law is being applied in practice. 
There is no evidence that nationalization across the board has solved 
land-control problems in countries like 'Ianzania, Ethiopia, or Zimbabwe. 
Squatting and illegal land invasions appear to occur with the same fre­
quency as in neighboring countries where nationalization laws are not 
in force?" Indeed, the experience of countries that have nationalized all 
land demonstrates the essential weakness of public land acquisitions­
it is not the acquisition per se that accomplishes useful purposes, but 
rather, the policies and procedures for land use that follow acquisition. 
While land acquisition permits positive cont. ol of land, it does not auto­
matically carry out such control. 
In some cases, developing countries have nationalized property owned 
by noncitizens. Korea has acquired large areas of land formerly owned 
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by the Japanese. Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan took over Crown lands
of significant size when Great Britain ceased to control these countries. 
In the Dominican Republic, the estates era dcp'sed dictator were nation­
alized. The Federal District of'Mexico accuiicd large est ates un-ler land 
reform expropriations in the early 1900s. 
The decision to nationalize land is rarely made on the basis of'tareful
analysis of land-acquisition goals and the cost and benefit of various alter­
natives for such acquisition. Mather, decisions are made in a highly polit­ical context. Ideology often is deemed more important than analysis. For 
example, there is an increasing trend toward nationalization of both rural
and urban lands in Africa, a region characterized by highly unstable 
political systems. 
ACQUISITION THROUGH GIFT OR
 
DEDICATION
 
Gifts of land from private citizens to the public, for various rea­
sons. account or a fair percentage of public land holdings. Increasingly,
in the United States, developers are giving land to the public in transac­
tions that resemble barter or joint-venture contributions more than gift
procedures. In some instances, a developer seeking approval from a zon­ing commission will be forced to dedicate a percentage of his land to 
the public, as a condition of getting zoning or building approvals. In other 
cases, involving large tracts ofland, developers may give land to the public
for schools, roadways, and the like, thus avoiding taxes on such land and 
avoiding express or implied duties to provide such public services directly.
The gift in such cases, when followed by state-financed school construc­
tion, will redound to the advantage of the donor, by raising the value 
of the remainder of his land. 
Tax laws can encourage gifts of land. For example, a developer, having
caused the value of his land to increase markedly, may shelter his income
through a gift to the public of a portion of the highly appreciated land. 
Perhaps the i..ost impressive examples of gifts of land can be foundin the Middle East. Individuals there give land to the religious authori­
ties, to be held in trust for the benefit of the donor and his heirs. These 
gifts, ostensibly motivated by a sense of religious duty. often are
administered by the state. In Egypt and Tunis, for example, separate
ministries exist. For the purpose of administering lands held tinder these 
trust arrangements. Much of the inner-city land in Tunis, comprising
the medina, or old city area, is Waqf land, having been deeded to the 
religious authorities by private citizens. 
For developing countries engaged in drafting comprehensive land­
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acquisition laws, proper consideration should be given to laws that induce 
or facilitate the gifts of land to the public. 
CONCLUSION 
Ideally, developing countries should have laws that permit the 
use of all the land-acquisition techniques mentioned in this chapter. This 
would require extensive law revision in most countries. The laws should 
provide a broad range of options to officials seeking to acquire land. If 
public sentiment tended to disfavor certain of the options, it should be 
the goal of progressive elements in the country, nevertheless, to keep 
all the options in the legislation as standby authority fbr use whenever 
public sentiment shifted. In essence, it is recommended that legislative 
revision go forward at the same time a land-policy debate is occurring. 
The goal is to have te outcome of the policy debate affect the admin is­
tration of the revised acquisition laws but not the laws per se. By the 
year 2000, the needs for land acquisition will be markedly different from 
the needs of today. Those countries best prepared to meet the needs of 
tomorrow will be those that act today to establish a broad array of legal 
tools and procedures. 
Chapter3 
Eminent Domain and
 
Expropriation
 
No one tool is enough to guarantee a successful public land­
acquisition program. Furthe; no voluntary land-acquisition program will 
be effective in developing countries unless it is coupled with the real 
threat of compulsory land acquisition. 
The concept of expropriation is based on a sovereign's power of emi­
nent domain; this power is generally accepted worldwide and allows th, 
state to take private land for the good of the state. Much of the laws 
pertinent to eminent domain in developing countries is inherited from 
former colonial powers. The cost and time required to implement these 
outdated laws make them almost useless. According to the World Bank, 
the majority need drastic revision, if they are to be effective during pei'iods 
of rapid urban expansion.' Furthermore, it is necessary to adopt and mod­
ernize comprehensive land-acquisition legislation and policies, through 
democratic processes, to secure the kind of public support needed for"com­
pulsory acquisition. 
Following is a broad survey of the various laws of expropriation, as 
found in selected developed and devcloping countries. Amid the range 
of the various laws and the special cha,'cteristics of various countries, 
certain models will appear more effective than others. (The reader can 
judge which model best suit- the historical and cultural characteristics 
of a given country.) Expropriation laws are as diverse as countries' notions 
of the importance of private property and social land needs. Certain 
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features, however, a re common enough to just ify grouping them I nder 
organizational headings f'or this survey.
The first section of this survey -1unde r the heading "Public Purpose
Doctri ne"-will discuss how dilTlre nt countries deterinoe VhIIn theC 
expropriation power may e isetd. The secold, "Valuatioll a1d ( om pel­
sation," will explain how compensation paid to landowners is fixed bv 
various laws. The third and final section, "'ocedure," will catalog lilme,

notice, and other procedural provisions, and the manner in which

expropriation 
 laws allocate power almrog the differelnt adm in ist rative
 
branches (legislative, executixive, and judicial) and govern m'ent levels
 
(national, state, and( local).
 
The laVs and COULrt (decisiolns (fiscussged elll'y will o', ret'eP ,ed to 
in the present tense, although some max he old or outdated. This is done 
mainly Col. simplicity, since tIhis survey is dt'sigNt 10 ilatIuiMlt- t l,
variety of' possible a-lhternait ives, no1t tatalog what laws actually are in 
ef 'f, et today. 
P[BLIC-PURPOSE DOCTRINE 
Introduction and Bask Principles 
In one woy or another, all expropriation laws permit land taking onlyfor the public bIenefit; that is, all countries have some n'orm of pulic­
purpose doctrine. In each country, the doct rine meldiat es c('lict bet Well 
a private citizen's right to control his landl,ownings an( the land require­
ments of*the puhl ic. The form of' a tomiti vy's public-purpose doctrine 
depends on a balance betwxeten these two interests acc oiling to the conin­
try's cultural norms. 
Public-purpose doctrines are (xpresse( ill two Iitsic wavs: 
1. General guidttlines, which state miit(Tlv th;t txpropriati n retmlire,s 
a public purpose.lt'm'ms call va 'v: Puhbli' Ii a Ivcome s50'1(l, g'tw'al.
common, orcol('/'ttit''. Simil rl 'v,pur)os, Imy he replaced hy /oed,
ltecs'.sity. inIt'rst, /tout/lion, Wilitv, or usc. Not surpris:n, , ithese 
general guidelines, laid down )y ,legislatires, leave ct),lsi(lIt uljt,,
discretion il the hands of the executi,.'e and judicialry branches of 
government. Executit,x po \ (!' to d(rlet' , a giveli pritject, such as 
a hospital, withil the pullic-pur'pose reteuirtlnt is checkted only
by judLici ary power to interpret the statutte. 
2. Li,;t provisions, exl)li ident if'ving the,)pt'post.s-schools, roads, 
government buildings, and the like- that the legislatume deenis to 
be public. Purposes not appearinmg on the list may ,lot f'nt tihe basis 
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for expropriation of land. List provisions permit the executive and 
judicial branches less discretion than general guidelines. 
Frequently, tile two approaches are combined in a single expropria­
tion scheme. The Labour government of Great Britain in 1974 enacted 
the Community Land Act (CLA) to promote land banking in localities 
around the country. Land banking is the public acquisition of land to 
be held in reserve to meet flture public needs. The CLA public-purpose 
doctrine gave very broad discretion to local authorities. Pow:r was 
delegated to acquire "development land," which, in turn, was defined 
as "land which, in the opinion of the authority concerned, is needed for 
relevant development." ' This general expression of power is subsequently 
restricted in the statute by a list of exemptions and exceptions. First, 
the land must be needed for "relevant development" within ten years. 
Second, the act exempts single houses, certain agriculturat ind forestry 
land, and certain charitable and church land. Finally, the CLA gives 
the national administration power to create new exceptions by regu­
lation. 
In addition, the combination, list plus general guidelines, is used often 
in expropriation laws that have "quick-taking" provisions. Such provi­
sions allow possession before compensation is fixed or paid (sometimes 
immediately upon -leclaration of public purpose). For example, the law 
of Guatemala permits expropriation generally 'for reasons of the collec­
tive good, benefit or public interest."' On the other hand, it permits quick­
taking only in cases of war, pul)lic calamity, serious disturbance of the 
peace, and whenever lands are needed For the construction of roads or 
highways.' 
The Guatemalan quick-taking provision is an example ofan exclusive 
list. These are intended to limit the discretion of the executive expropri­
ating agency. That is, the agency is prohibited from straying beyond 
the bounds of the list. Another type of list-the inclusive list-is designed 
more to limit the discretion ofthejudiciaiy. It always is used in conjunc­
tion with a general guideline, so that the entire public-purpose doctrine 
permits expropriation if the purpose conforms to the list or the general 
guideline. Under such a statute, the executive agency is afforded discre­
tion to stray outside the list (to declare purposes which, although not 
named on the list, nevertheless fall within the general guideline). But, 
when the purpose declared is named on the list, the judiciary's discre­
tion to interpret the statute to disallow that purpose is limited (or elimi­
nated) by the explicit nature of the legislative authorization. 
Thus, in Brazil, two purposes are recognized as justifying expropria­
tion: (a) "public utility," defined by list to include national defense, 
public health, construction of' public works, and achievement of state 
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monopolies; and (b) "social interest," a general guideline that permits 
purposes aiding in achievement of the "social function of property," which 
includes the just distribution of property. 
A variation on this approach can be found in the law of'Mexico. There,
expropI iatioji is justifiable by a showing of-"public utility," defined as: (a) public services, including roads, bridges, tunnels, expan­
sion/nmaintenance/beautification of villages and harbors, hospitals,
schools, parks, gardens, sports fields, governmen. office buildings, and 
scenic/artistic/historic preservation; (b) national defense; (c) public safety
and health; (d) monopoly profits (against): and (O)all other cases provided 
for by special laws. 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, housing and physical planning are listed 
as acceptable public purposes in the Expropriation Act. Any other pur­
pose must be declared as within the scOpe of"puhlik utility" by a special 
act of Pariiament. 
Nigeria has a list statute, but the categories are broad. It defines pub­
lic purposes as including: exclusive government use or general public
use; use in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind (includ­
ing reclamation); use for laying of new townships, obtaining control over 
land contiguous to any port; obtaining control over land whose value 
would be enhanced by the construction of any railroad or other public
works or convenience about to be undertaken, and obtaining control over 
the land required For mining purposes, r'al settlement, development,
telecommunications, and other economic, industrial and ag'icuLtural 
development purposes.7 
There is a noteworthy difference between the Brazilian approach on
 
the one hand, and the Mexican and Dutch approach on the other. Under
 
the Brazilian, the executive may declare purposes outside the list. The
 
executive declaration is subject to judicial review (statutory interpreta.
tion of the general guideline, "social interest"). In the Mexican and Dutch 
systems, the executive must obtain legislative authorization for purposes
outside the list. Both approaches limit executive discretion, but theydo it in different ways. The Brazilian approach uses equitable princi­
ples and is basically reactive (the judiciary may disallow demonstrably
bad purposes). Conversely, the Mexican and Dutch approach, which uses 
democratic principles, is basically active; (e-. en a demonstrably good pur­
pose must be approved by the legislature before the expropriation may 
proceed). 
*Although this is primar ly a list statute, the final catch-all provision (labeled "X11" in 
the actual law) provides an avenue for ongoing legislative expansion of the definition of
"public utility." 
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Executive discretion may be ftrther restricted by completely remov­
ing the power to declare a public purpose. In Argentina, the power to 
declare a public prpose for a given project resides in the legislature. 
The executive merely chooses the particular parcel to effect the purpose. 
The legislature is confined by the constitutional requirement of"public 
utility," which has been broadly defined in terms of "all those cases in 
which the satisf action ofa requirement determined by social improve­
meit is aimed at." These guidelines, however, do little to limit legisla­
tive discretion. A legislative determination of public utility will be 
judicially overruled only when seriously arbitrary, as when property 
is taken from one person to give to another for the latter's private use. 
'TheArgentinian "public utility" requirement is like most general 
guideliniies in that it delegates broad discretion to the entity empowered 
to make the pulblic-purpose declaration. In most countries, however, this 
entity is part of the executive, rather than legislative branch. When 
gIleral guidelines exist, rarely is there an effective legal mechanism 
for attacking an expropriation on the grounds that it is not for a public 
purpose. Court generally are reluctant to undermine the public-purpose 
finding. The expropriator's discretion under a general guideline provi­
sion is frequently bound only1by procedural safeguards and standards 
for judicial review. 
Valid Purposes 
The purposes permitted tojustify expropria t jn, under the public-purpose 
doctrines Of various countries, derive fiom three sources: the three 
branches of government. The legislature may set out certain purposes 
in a list provision. The executive may, either by regulation or by prac­
tice, identify permissible purposes (assuming they are not invalidated 
by the judiciary). Finally, the judiciary, in the course of many decisions, 
compiles a list of purposes construed as falling within the statutory or 
constitutional guidelines. 
Various Permissible Purposes. Among countries Fbr which data 
about particular permissible p)tIIIposes are available, transportation pur­
poses appear with the most fiefuency RPads and canals are listed in 
the laws of Afghanistan; roads and railways in the laws of Japan; high­
ways in the laws of Nepal; and roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, 
wharves, piers, airports, and canals in the laws of the Philippines. Simi­
lar transportation purposes are approved in Mexico, Pananma, Costa Rica, 
Thailand, Honduras, the United States, Sweden, Venezuela, and 
Guatemala (the quick-taking statute). 
Neither the list of transportation purposes, nor the list of countries 
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specifically approving transportation purposes (ofsom ftbrm) is intended 
to be exclusive. The fbrmer is meant only to convey a flavor f the kind
of transportation purposes some countries have approved. The latter isbut a partial list of such countries. These caveats apply as well to tihe 
other types of purposes which %%ill be discussed. As a practical matter,however, almost every country approves some Form of transportation 
purpose. 
Another class of' purposes frequently permitted is the construction ofpublic buildings. A typical country, Panama, defines schools, libraries,
hospitals, founcdling homes, and sanitariums as within "social interest*" 
Many simply provide for "public" or "government" buildings, as in thePhilippines, Afghanistan, and Mexico."' Honduras also permits expropri­
ation for charitable bIildings. Stadiums in Venezuela, markets in thePhilippines and Afghanistan, as well as mosques, plants, factories, andhouses for the poor in Afghanistan 
-all are approved pulblic iJUrp'O es.
It is nof uncommn to see military prposes mentioned, as in lon­duiras, Afghanistan, Venezuela," and Thailand. National defense is always
expressly 01' by implication an acceptable public pturpose. Moreovei, public
utilities-water, sewerage, electricity, and gas-are frequently singled
out as permissible public pi'poses. Again, these may be included only
within the general guideline of'"public purpose." They can, howeve, be
subsumed under some slightly more specific heading, like "public works" (Republic of Korea and Brazil), or "public health" (Brazil, Costa Rica,
and Mexico), 0r "physical planning" (the Netherlands)." Finally, they may
be specified in even greater detai 1.Costa Rica has an entire law devoted 
to aqueducts and sewers. Afghanistan provides specifical ly for"expropri­
ation for dams and reservoirs, waterways, and canals fbr irrigation.
Panama singles out aqueducts, drainage ditches, and pipelines. And 
Japan cites electric power lines.' :'
 
Parks often are defined 
as within the scope of "public pui'pose" or itslocal equivalent. Costa Rica (parks and gardens), Honduias (pub]lic 
squares), Panama (parks), Mexico (parks, gardens, sports fields, and sce­nic, artistic, and histo'ic prese'vation), Sweden (recreation), Venezuela (cemeteries), and the Pil ippines (lpa'ks and playgrou ',ds(all make spe­
cial note of'one or more puirposes in this category. Other singled-out pur­
poses include telecomniunicatio(ns' and monopoly profits. 
Misuse of Property. In some cases, the public-pui';pose test to sip­
port an expropriation is not determined by how the public authoi'ityintends to use the land. Rather, the determination is how the private
owner's existing use is cont'ary to the public interest. 
In Ecuadoi, the MumiicipalRegime Law says that it is the prerogative
of the municipalities to expropriate land that has not been put to a socially 
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efficient use. This prerogative is awarded to the Ecuadorian lousing 
Bank (BEV). Under this law, a parcel can be expropriated if not built 
upon within five years after a notice is given by the BEV. The same applies 
to structures that the BEV considers obsolete, except that, in fhe case 
of houses or buildings, the deadline for imiprovenments is six years. When 
a parcel is large (10,000 square meters or more), the deadline for parcel­
ing, development, and sale is two years after notice?' Payment for expropri­
ation in these cases is made at the municipal-assessment valUe, with 
30 percent down payment and 70 percent in 20-year bonds carrying 8 
percent interest. Liands or parcels expropriated lmay he used for multi­
hmily housing construction or hy the social security institute. The lands 
also can he used for other low-income housing progranis and can be sold 
to the beneficiariesV Si iarly, in Bolivia, there are grounds for expropri­
ation when certain property is not being used to fulfill a social func­
tion!" rhese k inds of purpomes- to prevent misuse of property- have a 
superficial appeal. Yet, they are not recommended for general adoption. 
The difficul ty of defining which uses are antisocial makes such provi­
sions difficult to apply fairly and tends to interfere with the legitimacy 
and utility of more conventional expropriation statutes. 
Agrarian Refoirm aiws. Agrarian reform laws are plentiful among 
the developing counties. But since this ;ttudy is primarily concerned 
with urln prolems, we will describe ond briefly the two most preva­
lent types of agrarian reform laws as they elucidate the public-purpose 
doctrine: (a)one, typified by Panama's Agrarian Code, alfows for expropi­
ation of agrarian land f'or redistribution when the land is insufficiently 
exploited. (b) Another, typified by Chile's Aginarian Refoim Law of 1967, 
provides for expropriation ofthe excessive portion of very large, privately 
owned plots.' 7 
A combination of these two approaches can be found in Costa Rica. 
Under the Law of Lands and Colonization, the land on which squatters 
live is expropriated and deeded to the squatters.'" This is a combination 
of the principles of the Panama and Chile laws in the sense that, if the 
owner does not purge his land of the squatters, the land is deemed not 
sufficiently exploited, and consequently, the law presunmes he has more 
land than he needs. 
Housing. Most countries have some provision to make housing con­
struction a public purpose. Sweden and the Netherlands use expropria­
tion for housing for a broad range of the population. Singapore, on the 
other hand, has limited housing expropriation to serve the low-income 
* See also Appendix C. which cmoins a casp studyorI Ecma d. 
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strata of the population." ltousi ng, of some form, is also specifically
authorzed as a proper expropriative purpose in the Republic of Korea,the Philippines, Pakistan, Costa Rica, Panama, Puerto Rico, El Salvador,Chile, Peru, and India. Some col t ries (El Salvador ia d the Philippin es,for eXample) allow qu ick-taking for housing purposes. Others (N icara gua and Panama) specif, housing for workers" 
-is a valid public pu­pose. Slum clearance is singled out as a public purpose in the Philippines 
and in Brazil.2-' 
Many expropriation stat utes in developing countries expressly includepublic, low.income, housing within their definitions of public purpose.Countries with list statutes that expressly include public housing, or
with specific expropriation statutes dealing onlyN' with housing, in ight
consider housing as a valid pulblic pUrpose, despite its effect on individual 
be nefici a ies. 
Mlalny Cotilnl ries have coil)reliensive expropriation taws dealing solely
wit I housing. Costa Ria has its Law of the National Institute oflous­ing and Urbanizat ion. Chile, in the late 1960s, empowered the ministry
of housing and urbanism to expropriate aplartments and resell them tothe occupants on subsidized financial terms. PertI ias a simiiar provi­
sion for expropriation, redevelopuent, and resah Atf"m'argilnal distrcicts
and shanty towns," and a statUte allowing expropriat ion of un(Ievelopedland for "urban development and promotion of economi ic hotsing.'-Taking property from one private person to give to another can beproblematic under the public-purpose doctrine. In the context ofl )1bic­housing programs, this issue has ariseil often when title tothe new hotis­ing is to be vested in the Ieneficiaries. Problems have occurred even

when the public retains title but the benefits at'the expropriation accrue
 
to specific lessees. In West Genrmany, under the Urbaa 
Renewal Law
of 1971, power was given to the executive br'anch to designate a redevelop­
ment zone, to expropriate land, to install new housing infrastructure(upgrading water and sewers), and to I _sell tile land to private persons. 
2This power has been little used for fear of political repercussions. 1 InThailand, the National Housing Authority has never used its eXpropri­
ation autthority, largely because of fears of' the legality of taking land
compulsorily from one citizen ftor the benefit of alother.'
 
In India, the legislature has imposed 
a sort of piyvate-puipose iinit.Land expropriated for housi ng in lDelh i is -lot sold as a freehold, butleased in perpetuity. Conditions on the leasehold prevent change ofland 
use; they also prohibit transfer for ten years and reserve to the govern­
ment half of the increase in value on traLnsfer.' 
In the United States, the judiciary has been watchful over the private-
See CaIs- study 01nTh,'ih d in Ai)pt, ridix B. 
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purpose limit in housing cases. For many yeairs, federal courts held that 
expropriation for resale violated the "public use" requirement as set forth 
in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. A 1954 Supreme Court. 
decision reversed this trend. The Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the District of' Columbia Redevelopnent Act, expanding "public use" 
to mean "public purpose" or "benefit." Alt hough most federal court s have 
followed this countertrend, it has been limited to slum-clearance cases, 
when the public benefit is clear."' 
The private-purpose limit is not merely a formal exercise. In Pakistan, 
the Punjab provincial government passed legislation that conferred 
almost unchecked pw.ver on housi ng and city planning agencies. This 
power has been used to take land f'or minimal conpensation (often 25 
percent or less of market value), subdivide it, and resell it at highlv sub­
sidized prices. One observer has remarked, "'Through this se(luelnce, one 
set of landowners is deprived of' market values, and they are transf'erred 
through allotments to another set of' property owners. It is no wonder 
that the act has t ued into a political and adm in istrati ve tool to enrich 
' influentials."2 5 
Industrial Development. Some countries permit expropriation for 
industrial development. Here, the government assemlbles a large block 
of land to be resold to private industrv for industrial use. This process 
serves the public interest by allowing industry to avoid Ihe typical 
problems f'acing private-land assembly efTbrts. A business ti'ying to 
assemble land f'or a l)arcel big enough f'oi' an efficien t-scale plant might 
go elsewhere, rather than submit to exorbitant demands of' a local 
property owner. Avoiding these problems benefits the public, by provid­
ing employment and boosting the tax base. Afghanistan and Puerto Rico 
expressly include industrial development within the scope of the public­
purpose doctrine. In the United States, the Supreme Court of' the state 
ofWaE hington, however, held that such an industrial development plan 
violatel the public-use requirement of' the State Constitution. Interest­
ingly, seven years later a State Constitutional Amendment reversed the 
effect of*the decision."; 
India, Korea, and Singapore provide excellent examples of states exer­
cising compulsory acquisition l)owers to benefit private industrial growth. 
In India, the centralized government's land-acquisition offices go so fai' 
as to accept rieqiisitions foi' land issued by private companies. For exam­
pie, a company wishing to buxild a f'actory will identify a parcel and then 
request the government to use its powers of' eminent domain to acquire 
the land. The company pays the cost of the land acquisition, as deter­
mined by the govern,aent office. 7 
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Land Banking and Advance Land Acquisition. Land banking, 
as noted previously, has the potential for private purpose-abuse in much
the same way as other abuses of expropriative power. It creates an oppor­
tunity for private gain and thus for official corruption, favoritism, and 
abuse. Land banking, as the term is used here, is the taking of property
before a public purpose is stated or known; it is distinguished from 
advance land acquisition, under which the future public purpose is
announced at the time of expropriation. Sometimes, however, the terms 
are used interchangeably in the literature and in cou't opinions.
Advance land acquisition as such is prevalent in many countries. 
Expropriation for advance acqtuisition or land banking is less conin on.
Most such actions come tl'ough voluntary acquisition techniques.
Specific provision for some form ofexpropriatiye land banking is madein the Philippines, Cameroon, Sweden, Singapore, Indi a, Great Britain,
Puerto Rico, and some US states." 
Land banking was long practiced in West Germany under a 1902law, but it has been declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitu­
tional Court, relying in pa't on the public use or benefit provisions of 
the Basic Law. The general rule in the United States is that the public 
purpose ofa land-banking program must clearly outweigh any inciden­tal priivate benefits. Thus, while land banking for urban renewal was 
upheld in Colorado, land banking for industrial development in Ar­
kansas was not.2 1 
Limits of the Public-Purpose Doctrine 
The contours of the public-purpose doctrine are not easily defined. Effortsin various countries to produce workable general rules (as opposed to
 
the specific list provisions) appear to have been less than fully success­
ful, in terms of avoiding .isputes and litigation.
When substantive limits to the doctrine have been enacted by the legis­
lature or' declared by thejudiciary, they have generally been quite vague.
We noted the definition of'public utility" in the Argentine Expropria­
tion Law of 1948 as "satisfaction ofa re(uirement determined by socialimprovement." The Philippine Supreme Court has wrestled with the 
meaning of "public use," equating it with "public advantage" and "pub­lic benefit." The Court has found permissible uses that (a) enlarge the 
resources, increase the industrial capacity, and promote the productive 
power of a considerable number of inhabitants iin any part of the State;(b) lead to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources fbr
the employment of capital and labor; and (c) contribute to the general
welfare and the prosperity of' the whole community.:'
The Supreme Court of Mexico also has reworked the definition. In 1917, 
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"public utility" xas defined as that which satisfies a public needl and 
redounds to the benefit of the collec'tivity. Nineteen veairs latern how­
ever, the Court overruled itself, h()]ding that the earlier delinition was 
too narrow. lt new definit ion encomlpassed st rict publiciutil ity (tanta­
mflouint to public use), social lit ility (redistrilution of wealth), and national 
utility (war,nationalization).:" 
Ihe Supiem Court of .Jusi ice(of Poanama has (d,nell )IIl ic l)ulpose 
as that in which the state has a dinict involvement and which coinsti­
tutes an 'ctivit of thu state, directly Or through c()ncessionaiies, and 
which are intended tosah istY nedels of general interest in a regular and 
continuin 1,61gfm.: 
Previously, we described the shift trout ")ublc lise" to ")tilic pui­
pose" or "henefit" in the United States in tht cote'xt of llaill i'eiin'wal 
and the privalte-l)ui'pose limit. 'Ih samC issue has gete'l(,d u()nstitu­
tional (lebate in the lhili)l)ines. Both the 1935 and the 1973 Philippine 
Constitutions have s)ecial Ipovisions Omn the eXl)rp))iatioln Of land "to 
be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to (eserving citizens." 
The 1935 provision was severel Vv linlited in al))licatiotn by the Philip­
l)i ne Sn preme CoUNt in 1949 (hi ido v. Iur'l ro('ogl,, Ad,(in isru/tion). 
Balancing the subdivisioll-resale provision against the public-pUrpose 
prIvision, tile Court held hat a distribut ion of' land m1"'ist benefit many 
)eople, not merely 10(i' ()i' 0 )O)le and their fanilies. The Court 
deci ined to girxe any more guiidaince Oilotile ieallining of'"ullnny." Alt hough 
the (huido Case was wide ly frllowed fern ally years, there is soni ques­
tion as to whether a 1970 cast, iay have rversed this trend of'judicial
" 
unyielding insistence on tile primacy of property lights. :T 
In Brazil, expropriation may. be eff'cted ror reasons of' puhlic utility 
or social intei'est. In the latter case, the goal is the achievement of' tile
social f'unctioll of' l)rol)ertY," which, in tuin, a)rilnalmilyile,ils the just 
clistriut ion of property. The Brazilian Supreitme ('oui't has held t hat prop­
erty So expropriated illay go to prix'ate )ai'etis so long as it is used in 
tle Comlnmon interest. Ifexplropi'iat ion is cai''ied l t so!ed' in the iinte',st 
of' the lfriVate iransfi'ee, it shouid be diSallowed. :'' 
In contrast to the iquantitati\xe al))roach suggested by the Phili)ine 
Court in the (Guidocase, the Briazilian (ti't in the Vargas case seens 
to adopt a more (ualitative, although )trhalls)e(LuIlIyvaglI,, ap)i'nacth. 
To delollnstrate t Ile ]it teir ajproach, consider tIle h(ou.sing l)'Og'allS of' 
the Netherlands, S xeden. and Sigal)ri'. m itsSihngapOi' iinits 

exprol)rintioin-hased housing pirogian to low-incont housing. The Nethe ­
lands and S"eden iuse expropriat ion to pIroivide the land to house broader 
sectors of'the l)ipoulat ion. Si ngal)Oi's l)icy niav be b;Iased Onl the convic­
tion that only low.;ncolme housing const ittes a qualitat ively adequate 
public purpoSe to outweigh the lri'vate.)Urpise argule nt against i'esale. 
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As we have seen, this is expressly the case in the United States. :15 
The private-purpose argument may ble mitigated by controls placed 
on the transferee's use and profits. ThuIs, the i ndustrial-development 
law of the state of Washington, United States, was struck down in the 
Hogue case and restricted the use of the expropriated land to be resold 
:for industrial use, "' (although it was effectively reversed later). Simi­
larly, we see the freeze on land use imposed under the Delhi program(prohibiting a person fiom converting a publicly provided dwelling into,
for example, a supermarket). Many countries allow expropriation for 
concessionaires (r public utilities (for the provision of water or electric­
ity) which are private or quasi-public. They, in turn, are typically closely 
restricted with regard tu pi ict s and profits. 
VALUATION AND COMPENSATION 
Valuation 
Expropriation is a forced sale; as distinguished from confiscation, 
expropriation as means that the ownerused here is compensated for 
the property taken. The valuation process, whereby the compensation
is fixed accord':j-to law, is generally the most difficult, time consuma­
ing, and litigated part of the expropriation process.
The fundamental pI nciple that guides valuation under most expropri­
ation laws is the payme,it of"fair market valute" or "just valtie." Brazil's 
practice is typical. The Constitution requires compensation to be just;it should neither enrich nor impoverish the expropriated party. 7 The 
determinants for the just value are set out by statute: (a) assessed value 
f'or tax purposes; (h acquisition costs of the property, (c) profits earned 
from the property; (d) location of the property; (el state of preservation
of the property; (f)insured value of the property; (g)market value over 
the past five years of comparable property; and (hi valuation or depreci­
ation of' remaining property after the sought land is taken.:'" 
Brazil is unusual in that it considers the profit-earning capacity of 
the property. Lost profits as a result of the interruption c" iusiness are 
awarded on the basis of the time that the owner could reasonablv take 
to buy a comparable piece of income-producing property with the com­
pensation nioney. : 
The Brazilian valuation process is judicial, as distinguished from 
adrinistrative. The judge appoints an expert, and each party (the state 
and the private owner) appoints an assistant to the expert. The expert
makes an advisory report to the judge, who is fi'ee to Ie.ject all or part
of it, but he must explain any differences between his opinion and the 
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advisory report.- If tile judge-determined value is greater than the 
amount originally offered by the state, the state will normally he assessed 
attorney's fees," Valuation is based on the vidue on the date of the 
appraisal; if more than a year passes between the appraisal and the final 
judicial determination (whether in the trial or appellate court), an adjust­
ment is made to account for change in the value of property.'" 
Under the India Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the court considers (a) 
the market value ofthe land as of the notification date of the compulsory 
acquisition; (b) damage sustained by the taking of any standing crops or 
trees; (c) damage sustained by severing the land to be taken from other 
land; (d) damage affecting other property movable or immovable, or earn­
ings; (e) reasonable expenses in changing the person's residence or place 
of iusiness; (f)damages resulting from diminution of profits of the land 
between ,ne publication and declaration of taking and actual taking 
by the collector: and (g)an award of an additional 15 percent of market 
value as solotium in consideration of the compulsory nature ofthe acqui­
sition. Matters not to he considered include the increase in the value 
of the land resulting from the anticipated public use and the improve­
ments made after the notification of the intended acquisition.'" 
In Mexico, the valtULItion is based on the value declared or accepted 
by the owner For tax purposes. The only valuation issue therefore is deter­
mining the change in value as a result of property improvement or deteri­
orat ion after the assignment of a tax val tie. BY contrast, in Singapore, 
the declared tax value (within the last two years befi-e expropriation) 
is a ceiling for valuation."' In (Iuatenlala City, the ceiling is the tax 
value plus 30) percent." 
In Venezuela, the price is fixed by a committee of two: an expert 
appointed by 'ie court and another appointed by the property owner. 
The decision of this committee is virtually final. It may be overturned 
only on a showing of' bias, open violation of the valuation principles set 
out in the Expro)priation Law, or plainly erroneous data.'"; The experts 
are allowed to consider loss of "good will" in their valuation'" 
Like Brazil, Venezuela provides For the reduction of compensation when 
the expropriation project enhances the value ofad,jacent property retained 
by the owner (when there is only a partial expropriation). Unlike Brazil 
and Venezuela, however, tIhonduras does not custonmuri ly deduct, from 
the valuation of' a paitia expropriation, the increased value of the 
"remainder because of' the expropiiation prj(.ect. 'Venezuela stipulates, 
on the other hand, th 't if the redoction in value of the retained portion 
exceeds one-(luarter of' the total compensation, the owner may require 
the government to expropriate the entire property. 4 ' Provisions of this 
type-"inadequate remainder" provisions-are common, although few 
have such a well-defined condition of' operation. The usual statute, as 
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in Argentina, allow,,; the owner to requirle )urlhlaise of the w hole parcel
oi l showing that the 'llainlher has been rendered iicapable of rational 
use (because of irregular shape, for instance) h I the expropriation.'"
Nany valuiation schelles attempt to) lecover f(in the state the 53-called 
tUnearned increment." that is, \vlit adefd to )i)operty by s(cinl illiprove­
meiLts or spticulati()n ill alitiCilltioi Of'the eXp)Flpriatioll. (Ghina. fO' 
1x.llnplC, ignor'S te last t wo veais of' i)llp)'V llielits in3 its valuatiton 
calculations. Singap ie hIMs a siimilar prvision that places a I)tt'den Of 
irootlon the ow, to sh('ow tha3 any improvem)ents ill the last two years 
wex.,not made ill c()liteiplat ion of e.poplriatiol.9, Anothei Singapore 
provision af(just ()m)) (10h,ward "Or the 
to go(VtI'Ifll t inl ')3o\',lltlls omer Ite la .' ' Vell year. pri)r to ex­
propriat io1. 
(l in ... V(ll i nt rib)titlhle 
,\v'tdlt'l fis 1131 i Ideblii setti ng hit' \'lltl t t he niket 

tell yealrs 1eftor( t' 

int i3n VNlue 
Iihe exp\ 'ia)3' t 1i3,)appi ti)n.11 it ted. There is.333was suilli 

however, all) exce)ti ('xpl)prillti3)3
)'o (of'i(i\10 t iid dfwefllings.
Also the owner tust I),,tara3'3ntce(fd suffici(int c(O)MlntiS()t i t)buy an 

new hone (3f coilpar: 31l qtIa lit y.2
 
Value freetiIig isa eI3chuIioItie t1:ed t ) IMIn W3I prices 01' 1 t)1lit IC tIisi­
tion. StAtutes using this (fevice pick a tille peio3d 
hefr lie (at(e (of 
expropriation and declare that the VILtie ti he pai(l will he the value
 
of the land as itexisted as 3)fthe specified p)i)W, 1()1txampl)e, two or
 
four years oI('bre the date ifexpr()priatii)n. Variations (ifthis device alre
 
seen inlstattites tind(er which the pubhlic can dechre ceit lin lin(s to) lie 
slhject t( )potential public purchase. 'l'hereafter, for a specif'ied period 
of time, the pll!ic has a preellipt i'e right to purlchiase tIh' land, and the
 
value of the land is 
frozn as of* the date the, notice, is )ide. :
 
Somne V.ltlltion pro'isio)s reflect 
 o)ther social coiceins not related to 
property. For example. Sri lninki--Is well o manyv o(thrt c(tllt)ies­
ignores \vilue deriving f331) tist' co)ntrai'v to law (orpublic health. New 
York and lHong K1,4 (h,(luct firll)the,valaio (3of 'xproprilited land 
hotising thlt does n(ot coIformi t3)tildiig 1n) ptihlic-healt hst nlhldlsrs'r 
Sonle stlt tites lre iore g('li i'(L5s to tit expr)priated party. F"or many 
years, India provided Cor a 15 petcent h(3tiF1s .53,htjiUII to added tohe(f 
the market valu. In 1976. however, the 1Jr'lin liond Act crlied co)m­
plisalio ceilings for eXprol)priatio(3 (3f excessive vacant landholdings.
F(r exalliple, ifai individual ()\\'is ro13re 1h1n 501)squ~u't,nlettrs of land 
in a city of )'lorethan five million inhabitants, theexcess may ble expro­
priated for conpensation not. exceeding 10 rtt'', (or about US $1)per 
square meter. Similarly, the Punjab Provincial (overnment of Pakistan 
has estlhlished a 2 0 ,()t(J-rl/ews-per'nicre com11pensation limit." Both of 
* Soe discussion m clip 2 3"S &,Mtt,dRgulaltins that Facilitatel ,and Acquisition"). 
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these acts fix compensation at a fraction of market value, and both have 
generated serious implementation problems. 
Of particular interest are the Singapore and Taiwan laws, which com­
pel a property owner to sell to the exprop)riatinglpublic authority at a 
price equal to declared tax values. Declared or assessed tax valuations 
are used as a basis for expropriation. For this device to be effective, there 
as to whether there will be expropria­must be considerable uncertainty 
tion and highly developed land-title and taxation systems. 
follows: First, anSelf declaration of land value in Taiwan works as 
Urban Land Value Appraisal Committee is established. It is comprised 
local area. Also on tle comm it­of elected members of the city or town o~r 
are various public officials from tax, public works, andI admilnistra­tee 
landtive offices. This committee establishes an annual evaloat ion f1O' 
tied to a Torrenssystem of land registration. After the stanhrrd value 
of different types of land has been declared by tile committee, kAch lnd­
owner has to declare his own land value, which should not be less than 
80 percent of' the p)ublicly announced land value. If it is below 80 per­
cent, the government requires the landowner to declare his value again 
within a certain period of time. Should the redeclared value still be below 
80 percent ofthe appraised value, the government has the option either 
to purchase the land at the value declared by the owner or to collect 
publiclyland-value taxes according to the higher appraised and 
announced land value."' 
In Spain, the Expropriation Act of 19-14 governed the expropriation 
agreement a mong the parties, valuation isprocedlure. Fa;ling iutual 

assessed by an independent provincial expropriation board and, in prin-

If the board
ciple, is based upon the tax assessment of' tLe property. 
believes that the tax assessment does not reflect the real value, it may 
take steps to rectify it. A 5 percent "deprivation bonus" must be paid 
within six montls following expropriation.to the owner 
This law was changed by the National Housing Plan leading to tile 
Act of' 1962, under which the expropriation and valuation of' land is to 
be determined exclusively on the basis of' comminercial indices of' land 
values. These indices are prepared by cities with more than 50,000 inhabi­
tants, f'rom evaluation of' all land under its jurisdiction. Tbhis practice 
represents an attempt to speed up expropriation procedures while still 
maintaining the safeguards enjoyed by private individuals. This law, 
intended to secure rapid expropriation, grants compensation based on 
the use and value of the land and not oi1speculative value. Under the 
1962 Act, land purchased for a 15-vear national housing program 
(1961-1976) was purchased compulsorily, according to the price indices 
determined by local authorities. When local authorities fail to set prices, 
a central land authority with its own financial resources and an effec­
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tive administration takes over. A local authority is obliged to publishassessments of lad prices periodically, irrespect ive of whether the landis to be expropriated. The valuation serves as a basis for taxation andis revised every few years. The added value of the land resulting fronieconomic and social development is taken into consideration diuring peri­
odic revisions.'" 
A simple ay to calclilate compensation is t( flix it at the price theowner paid for the property. Singapore and El Salvador have laws thatpermit this method of valuation as long as the owner purchased the prop­erty within two years before expropriation. Commercial property inMaharashtra, India, is valued at 100 times the net month ,'income, asdetermined f'rom an average of'the five vears before expropriat ion. Moststatutes provide for the incilusion of' ca mages in addition to market valuein the valuation. 11it few provide guidelines f'or calculating damages.Guatemala, by contrast, adds a flat 30 percent for damilages to the illket value of land expropriated in Cuatemala Cit.:Various standards for valIui ation can be combi ned in a single s .u e.This may be done by listing the standards as alternative indices, as wehave seen in the Brazilian statute. It may*)e accomplished also by us ingtwo standards as alternative ceilings. For examin ple, in the Philijpp ilies,there is a provision defining just compensation as the lesser of marketvalue or assessed valtie. Finally, a list of, standards nav he providedas shifting buidejls of proof. In El Salvador, the )I\\, directs valunationto be set l)y a panel of' experts. If the experts cannot agree, the valueis set at the declared value foir taxes. It'the owner tails to productcdeclaration, the government has the the ;glt to, a V' Uat iol set at the p"icethe owner paid (if he bought the property ''it i i: th,, previous two¢ years).If none of these methods works, another expert is appointed to resolve
the dispute in the original panel."At the other extrenie is tle Nicrraguanii Law of' Ex piroprli t ion, which
provides no standards for valuation. And theie are statutes thLit inluIdtde
negative standards, that is, items not t Ie considired in valuation. Forexample, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Philippines have provisions pro­hibiting consideration of the owner's sent imental attachment to tile land 
or the expropriator's urgent needl for the lid 
Time and Form of Compensation 
The typical compensation provision requires prior compensation in cash.
"Prior" here means prior to the transfer of' the property from the owner 
to the expropriating agency. 
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Quick-Taking Statutes. Exceptions to the prior compensation rule 
frequently are made in the form of quick-taking statutes. Such laws allow 
the government to take possession prior to compensation, when an urgent 
need is shown. As a practical matter, every expropriation statute shculd 
contain some form of quick-taking authority for emergency needs. Other­
wise, any landowner could delay the actual taking, through litigation 
as to proper value, to the point that it would undermine the expropria­
tion. The disadvantage of quick-taking is that projects may be commenced 
before the real cost of acquiring land is known. 
As we have seen, other purposes beside urgency may alsojustify quick­
taking in some countries. For example, roads and highways are cited 
in Guatemala. Also, the urgency requirement may be broadly inter­
preted, allowing quick-taking in a high proportion of cases."' 
A number of examples of quick-taking statutes in developing coun­
tr;es are in effect. In Thailand, there is a special law for expediting 
acquisition for highway construction. In a particular case of highway 
construction, work can begin before there is a final agreement on prices. 
However, the portion of highway construction must be considered to be 
of a priority nature. In the Philippines, upon filing a petition for expropri­
ation and deposit in the Philippine National Bank of an amount equal 
to 10 percent of the declared assessment value, the government or its 
authorized agency acquires immediate possession, controlling disposi­
tion of real property."' Peru has plocedures for quick-taking. After a 
supreme decree of expropriation is approved, the government occupies 
the land, usually within three months. 
Even Indonesia, which has laws that may be characterized as fairly 
weak regarding the powers of the 3tate to expropriate, has a quick­
taking statute. In case of an emergency, when lands are needed immedi­
ately, the minister of internal affairs can issue a decree authorizing the 
agency who applied for the expropriation. to take possession immedi­
ately. Although the expropriation law defines emergency as an epidemic 
or natural disaster, in practice the meaning of an emergency is broadly 
interpreted to include the implementation of development programs. The 
taking of possession of land for the Jakarta sports facility for the Asian 
games of 1962 was based on such an "emergency decree. "62 
In Ecuador, there is no quick-taking authority. The issue of compen­
sation must be settled before the government can take possession. This 
has rendered the device of expropriation of little use, either directly to 
acquire land, or indirectly as a potential weapon to make voluntary 
negotiations proced more smoothly. 
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Deferred Compensation. In addition to the quick-taking exceptions
to the prior-compensation rule, there are rules allowing payment of com­pensation in installments. For example, in El Salvador, for expropria­
tion cases involving war, public calamity, water supply, electricity sup­ply, housing, and highways, compensation may be paid in install­
ments spread ovei 'not more than 20 years." A similar exception isprovided by statutes that allow payment in the form of bonds. This alsois an exception to the requirement of cash payment. These provisions 
are especially common in agrarian-reform laws., '
 Whenever there is form
a of' deferred compensation, the question
remains: When should compensation be paid? Frequently, under quick­taking statutes, the expropriator is required to deposit with a court -ome
security against the eventual compensation award. The law may requirepayment of compensation at the end of the valuation proceeding (as isoften the case), at the end of the final appeal (as it once was in Mexico),
when the emergency passes ( as in Panama), or sonie time after the emer­gency passes (two years in Costa Rica.) Most provisions allowing bond 
or installment payments place a time limit on the conipensation plan.The issues involved in the time consideration include the urgency of'the expropriation, the ability of he government to pay, and the )urden 
placed on the andowners by the delay.

In some instances, the form of 
 payment is related to the reason for
expropriatio,. In Ecuador, the Municipal Regime Law says that it isthe prerogat:ve of the municipalities tc: explropriate land that has notbeen put to a socially efficient use. This prerogative is awarded to theEcuadorian Iousing Bank (BEV).* Payment for ext)ropiation in these cases is to be made at the municipal assessment value wit h 30 percentdown-payment and 70 percent in 20-year-bonds carrying 8 percent
 
interest.
 
Trade or Exchange Provision. The most common exception to the
cash requirement is the trade or exchange provision. Such a law allowsthe owner to be compensated with another piece of property. In Malay­
sia, the collectoi' is given the authority to make equitable arrangementsin lieu of monetary compensation. The collector also has the authority
to make an oral offer and to conclude the nonmonetary awards whenthe land area is small, the number of'persons ai'e f'ew, and it is expe­
'dient to do so. 
In Cameroon, where plots acquired are more than five hectares, the 
* See chap. 2 ("Selected Regulations that Facifitate ILand AcqUisitian"). 
Eminent Domain and Expropriation / 57 
families are to be given other compensatory plots to live on, plus some 
indemnity for resettlement. This also is true in Indonesia, although it 
is not clear that these barter and exchange provisions are a practical 
alternative to monetary compensation. 
PROCEDURE 
Authority 
Expropriative authority may be allocated in two ways: (a) horizontal 
allocation, which determines the balance of power between the three 
branches- legislative, executive, andjudicial- of government and (b) ver­
tical allocation, which apportions power among the various levels of 
government and nongovernment agencies. Thus, authority may be allo­
cated to federal, state, or local governmental entities, to quasi-govern­
mental entities (like utilities and land-development agencies), or to 
private entities. 
In Nicaragua, the vertical allocation of'authority depends on whether 
the expropriation is part of a plan. If it is part of a plan, then the plan­
ning agency (whether local, regional, or federal) is authorized to make 
the declaration of public utility or social interest and to designate the 
particular parcels to be expropriated. When there is no plan, and when, 
or village will benefit, then the municipalfor example, only one city 
corporation makes the declaration. If more than one locality will bene­
must, be made by the national district.;fit, the declaration 
The horizontal allocation of authority in Nicaragua is more typical. 
The legislature sets out the procedure, including the vertical allocation 
of authority. The executive decides when a project is of public interest, 
designates the property to be expropriated, and appoir.Lb an expert to 
evaluate the property. Then, a judicial proceeding resolves any dispute 
over the "indispensability" of the particular parcel and the amount of 
compensation. There can be no judicial review of the executive declara­
tion of public utility or social interest."7 
In Venezuela, on die other hand, the declaration of public interest is 
ordinarily made by the legislature. Thereafter, choice of the particular 
parcel to expropriate is left to the executive. Thus, the legislature retains 
control over the decision to expropriate and broad control over the amount 
of land expropriated. Although the executive undoubtedly has some dis­
be permitted to expropriatecretion in the latter regard, it would not 
100 acres of urban land for a legislatively approved project to build an 
elementary school. The executive has disci'etion to choose the location 
of the property. FurtE2r, the executive's discretion is greatly expanded 
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by an exception to the legislative declaration requirement; in an emer­gency, the executive may make the declaration of public interest in lieuof the legislature. The authority to declare an emergency rests solelyin the executive, and so it is difficult to imagine how the executive's 
emergency power is checked.Like many other countries, Venezuela has a list of specifically approvedpublic purposes in its Expropriation Law (highways, schools and air­ports). For these purposes, the decision to expropriate becomes an execu­tive decision, because the purposes have been generically declared ofpublic interest by the law. Otherwise, the legislature has a role in mak­ing a declaration of public purpose. The legislative declaration also iswaived in cases in which the expropriation is part of a city plan."It should be apparent by now that there are two kinds of authorityinvolved in an expropriation procedure: the power to make a decisionand the power to constrain the decision-making proc;ess. When we speakof authority here, we genet-ally mean the power to make a decision. Powerto make the public-purposc declaration, to designate the particular par­cel to be expropriated, and to determine valuation are, in a larger sense,allocated to all three branches. For example, an executive's declarationpower may he constrained by the legislature's power- to make a list ofpermissible purposes and the judiciary's power to interpret the list (aswell as check it against some constitutional standard). Designationauthority-which land to take-is also, typically, the executive's deci­sion. In the case ofcomprehensive planning, as in the Netherlands, desig­nation of the purpose for each plot of land may be effected through aquasi-legislative process of' public hearings and council votes." In SriLanka, citizen comments are solicited, but they play much less of a rolein determining the outcome than in the Netherlands. Thus, the linebetween legislative and executive branches is blurred. By comparison,
the designation power is clearly legislative in Guatemala, where both
the declaration and the designation must be made by act of Congress.Y7
We found no 
countries that allocated to the judiciary decision-making
power with respect to declaration 
or designation.
Valuation authority is generally the power of the executive. 
Whenthis is so, the valuation process is firequently assisted by a panel of out­side experts, like in Guatemala 7 Alternatively, there may be itafrorganswithin the executive to evaluate the property. In Indonesia, an evalua­tion committee is formed with members drawn from the tax service, pub­lic works, the land-registration service, and the provincial assemblyY.7In Guatemala, where the legislature makes the declaration and desig­nation, the executive handles the valuation. In Indonesia, the executivedoes all three.
The valuation may also be made by the judiciary. In Costa Rica, the 
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amount of compensation is fixed by a judge ol tile basis of opinions of 
experts appointed by each party. The value may be lower than either 
opinion, but it may not be higher than the highest opinion. 7:' We found 
no country in which tie legislature was given authority to make valu­
ations. 
Vertical allocation of authority is chiefly a quest ion of centralization. 
At one extreme, Indonesia requires each expropriation to be approved 
by the President. At the other extreme is India, which has a system of 
well-developed political subdivisions, each with broad land-acquisition 
authority. In India, the public's expropriation authority may be invoked 
by both public and private persons or bodies that can provide sufficient 
assurances that the land sought will be put to the uses specified in vari­
ous land-acquisition laws. 
Brazilitn law offers a typical example of vertical allocation. The execu­
tive normally holds declaration power that is delegated sometimes to 
the level of government that benefits from the expropriation. Thus, if 
the expropriation is for the benefit of the nation, the declaration is made 
by the President (or his delegate). If expropriation is for the benefit of 
state or municipal subdivisions, the appropriate state and municipal 
authorities make the public-purpose declarations. In addition, conces­
sionaires (public utilities like telephone, electric, and gas companies) 
may initiate expropriation proceedings in the courts. If good cause is 
found, the couIts may direct the appropriate level of tile executive to 
make a declaration. T' 
In most developing countries, concessionaires probably (to not have 
this power. In Argentina and Chile, private persons and concessionaires 
may not initiate expropriation, although they may be th beneficiaries 
of it. In Honduras, a private company may both initiate and carry out 
an expropriation.7" 
Some countries have centralized the expropriation power to some 
extent. This may be done toienhance uniformity ofstandlardls, to achieve 
a coherent state or national land policy, and to increase efficiency by 
establishing a centralized body of expropriation expertise. In the Philip­
pines, provincial and municipal governments and public corporations 
may exercise expropriation power only after approval by the central 
government." This approval system mainly serves tile goal of coherent 
centralization. India's Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976 
centralizes the valuation function.:' This also serves the goal of unifor­
mity. The central land expropriation committee in the Republic of Korea 
has jurisdiction over expropriations that cross provincial boundaries. 
* See Appendix I), which lCl'rIltes the Centralized funct ions pertfimead bY collectors of 
revenue in India. 
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Expropriations of purely local concerntire the jurisdiction of local com­
mittees. Both the central and local committees are composed of expropri­
ation experts and together they comprise a federal system serving all 
three goals-coherence, uniformity, and efficiency." 
Procedure 
There are two main types of procedure in expropriation: administrative 
and judicial. Administrative procedure may be quicker and more effi­
cient. Judicial )rocedure tends to be somewhat mo'e formalized and bet­
ter equipped to assure fairness. But, in some cases, the only difference 
between the two is that one takes place in the executive office building
and one takes )lace in the cout'house. 
A single expropriation scheme may use both ty)es of' lIrocelure. In 
Peru, expropriat io) procedures consists of' two stages. The first. stage
is administrative and results in the declaration of' pulic purpose, the 
designation of' the particula' parcel to be expropriated, and an initial 
appraisal of' its value. The second stage is judicial and results in the 
final valuation of the property and the order transt'erring title. 
The judge iMist notify the owVner within 24 hours after- the fiirst stage
is completed. If*the owner cannot he tCound, notice is given by publica­
tion fbr three days in the newspaper of the provincial capital. lI'the owner 
fails to respond within three days of'either the delivery of'actual notice 
or the last publication late, the execut ive's appraisal is dleemed accepted.
If'the owner responds within the three days, he has eight (lays to submit 
a counterappraisal. If'no coonterappraisal is submitted within 20 days
after the court's first notice (either actual or by publication ito the owner,
the executive's appraisal is deemed accepted. If a ti, nely counterappraisal
disagrees with the state's appraisal, the judge appoints two experts to 
resolve the discrepancy. The judge routinely approves these experts' valu­
ation and orders the expropriating agency to deposit the amount within 
three clays. Failure to do so constitutes an abandonment of the expropri­
ation, and the agency must start anew if' it still wants the l)roperty. If' 
the compensation is deposite(d timely, the coui't will orde' title transfer. 
If the original owner still occupies the property, he must leave iinmedi­
ately. Th ii'd-party occupants have 60 days to vacate, if'residentia! prop­
erty is involved, and 90 days for commercial 'nroperty. Before the court 
will release the compensation fundS to the owner, all secured creditors 
must be paid and claims against the proper'ty must be disposed of.T 
Honduras employs a two-stage expropriation procedure similar to the 
Peruvian model. The administrative stage in Honduras, however, pro­
vicles for notice and hearing for the owner. In the judicial stage, each 
party appoints an expert, and by agreement they appoint a third expert. 
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Inthe absence of agreement, the judge appoints the third ex)ert. Ifthe 
thst two experts agree on a valuation, it is accptld. lfthey do not agree, 
but one agrees with the third expert's valuation, then that valuation 
is accepted. Ifnone of then agrees, the valuation is fixed at the aver ; 
of the three, subject to the judge's di.scretion to modify itaording to 
fairness7 9 
In both Honduras and Peru, third parties are given rights against the 
compensation ind only. They hive no rights agriist the l)rpneity or 
the state. This is a particularly useful provision inl countries where title 
records are inadequate. It, tends to quiet tit'e and facilitate the transac­
tion. In India the law is similar, in that land conveyed ander the expropri­
ation statutes takes clear i te to the a'quiring entity. Pesons claining 
a former right to such land may not seek to attach the land or otherwise 
challenge title of the new owner; their right of' redress is liinited to the 
Feller. Assuming proper notice to third parties is given in advance of 
an acquisition, it seenis fair and usefM'l to have IlWs that produce a clea"ar, 
noncontestable title in land comvev~d. Such laws are recoinmended for 
all developing countries. 
Some expropriation procedurV-' aie pri marilv administrative in nature. 
In Singapore, tie declaration and designation are made by the Presi­
dent. Then the collector of land revenue, a pc'esi'lential appointee, gives 
the ownei and the other interested parties not ice, conducts an inquiry, 
pays the coinpensat ion, and takes possession. The function ofthe inquiry 
is to determine the rea of the land, the compensation, and the appor­
tionment of the comllpeosation amnng the parties iiitTesttd in the land. 
The collector may at any poinut ask the Ii igh Coirt to answer any quvls­
tion. The entire process usually takes about one year.", 
Other countries have mo'e judicially orin ted piocedures. In Nicara­
gua, for example, both the indispensability of the piropeirty to the pro)ject 
(the designation) and the valuation are the subject of a judicil proceed­
ing. When the expropriating agency begins its initial liaing ithe 
demand), the court with jurisdiction over the piroperty notities the owner 
and other interested parties and puts a not ice of the act ion in the Pu1hlic 
Registe'rf/'inmoah/h'Property.Soon t hereaft er,a hearing i.sheld. The 
owner appoints an expert; if other interested Ia'ties aie iWNvolvtc, they 
inust agree with the owner's choice of expert, oi th, cout will appoint 
one for them. The owner then challenges the indispensability of the prop­
erty, if applicable, and makes any 'inadequate remainder" aigiment 
he may have if the expropriation is only partial. An inadequate 
remainder, as noted before, is the renmaini ng portion of the owner's prop­
erty after a partial expropriation, which is practically useless. Under 
Nicaragua's and many other countries' law, the owier may insist tinder 
these circuinstances that the expropriation include the whole property. 
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Under Peruvian law, urban expropriation must include the whole prop.
erty unless the owner agrees otherwiseY 
The hearing phase of the Nicaraguan procedure is limited to threedays. It is followed by a proof phase, limited to eight days. If the parties'
experts disagree on valuation, the judge appoints a third expert, whose
opinion is conclusive; the judge has no discretion to change it. The judg­
ment phase follows: If the expropriating agency fails to deposit the com­pensation within 30 days of the court's order to do so, the expropriation
effort will be considered abandoned.12 
Nicaragua also has a retrocession, or reversion, provision. It gives the 
owner the right of first refusal if the expropriator fails to use all or part
of the property and wants to sell the unused portion. This type of'provi­
sion is common. Many countries give the owner the right to demand
such a resale of the property if it is not used within a statutory time 
period or not used for the declared purpose. In Brazil, the time periodis five years, if the pr')ject is of public utility, and two years, if the proj­
ect is of' social interest. Honduras and Guatemala permit the owner tobuy back the property, if it is not put to the declared use for expropria­
tion. in Honduras, the owne. pays the same amount he received in com­pensation. In Guatemala, the former landowner pays such compensation
as he received, plus the value of'any improvements, less any damages.":,Some laws require the expropriating authority to attempt to negoti­
ate an agreement with the property owner before commencing the For­
meal expropriation procedure.". In Indonesia, obtaining land for any 
purpose, whether by private person or the government, must be carried
out through negotiations with the owner of the title."' For governmentpurposes, a pernmanent local committee of' government officials is incharge of conducting negotiations. Should there be no agreement, the
state is entitled to take land by force, provided the land is required forthe public interest. The Indonesian law states that expropriation mustbe a last resort, to be used only if negotiations really have failed. ThePresident alone is authorized to declare expropriation; he acts by decree,issued following consultation with the minister of justice, minister ofinternal affairs, and the minister whose jurisdiction covers the opera­tion or service for which the land is required. These consultations deter­
mine whether there is a public interest and whether it is possible to
acquire the land in some other way. The presidential decree fixes theform and the amount of compensation; it is based on the recommenda­
tion of a committee of experts, which consists of governmental officials
who act under oath. Compensation need not be in the form of money,but may be in the form of facilities that can bring material benefits tothe former owners. Presidential decisions to carry out expropriation may
not be questioned, although the compensation issue may be litigated. 
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In Argentina, negotiation is not forced, but it is recognized as an alter­
native preferable to the expense of expropriation. Unfortunately, the 
law limits the state to offer no more than the value of the land as speci­
filed in tax records, plus 30 percent. Because this is always below mar­
ket value, negotiations are never successful and are no longer even 
attempted."" In Sweden, preliminary negotiation is encouraged and has 
been very successful. This is because of Sweden's strong expropriation 
law and the strong public suppert of the law. Landowners are induced 
to negotiate in good faith, since they are assured that the government 
may expropriate the land with reasonable dispatch if negotiations break 
down." 
The Constitution that the Solomon Islands acquired with independ­
ence in 1978 aimed to make compulsory acquisition of customary (tribal) 
land more difficult than it had been before, but to make compulsory acqui­
sition of land owned by non-:-olomon Islanders easier. Chapter XI of the 
Constitution allows compulsory acquisition of customary land only if' 
there has been prior negotiation with landowners and they have had 
access to independent legal advice. The law further providles that, as 
far as possible, only a lease should be compulsorily acquired. Customary 
land must be registered before it can be sold or leased to the govern­
ment. The process of fieldwork, adjudication, and survey required to reg­
ister customary land must take at least seven months to allow for appeal, 
but in fact it takes several years.'" 
In the Cook Islands, the government can acquire land by various means. 
The first procedure is by warrant. The High Commissioner (pursuant 
to section 357 of the Cook Islands Act, 1915) can take land for a public 
purpose. The purpose needs to be specified in the warrant and, once taken, 
the land becomes absolutely vested in the government and free of all 
estates, r ghits, and interest from any other person unless expressly stipu­
lated in the warrant. The following procedure is used: When a govern­
ment department requires land (for a road, for example), it checks the 
title with the land registry and the survey department, and makes a 
submission to the Cabinet outlining its proposals. If favorably viewed, 
the proposal is referred to the advocate general, the legal advisor of the 
government. After consultation with the appropriate government depart­
ment, the advocate general files an application with the land court call­
ing For a meeting of ovwners. If the results of the public meeting are 
favorable, the appropriate wai ;ant is drawn and submitted to the Cabi­
net for final approval and recommendation to the high commissioner 
to exercise his authority for this purpose. Lands taken are subject to 
compensation and lands can be given back to the owners by simply revok­
ing the warrant. A second method used in the Cook Islands is acquisi­
tion by order of executive council. The procedure is the same as for 
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warrants and is applied often for customary land when titles have notbeen ascertained. Ihe consent of tlie persons who are understood to bethe owners is ohtained. The legislature may also exprol)riate land bylegislative decree. However, this device has not been used since 191 5 ."'The government of Tunisia has the right of eminent donain in accor­dance with tile Law of March S,1939), which is exercised for projectsinthe public interest, including housing projects. ('ondeain:tl ion proceed­
ins can be institated by the ministry of pub!iC works and housing, Withthe approval tof'the minister of interior and Lie Prime Ninister. Acqui­
sition is accoipl isledl through a decree of'the council of inin isters signedby the P'esident of the Repaidlic. Armed with this decree, the acquiing
agency exercises the right of eminent domain by paying the value of'the property taken, as detelmined by'its appraisal and as stijM at d inthe decree. Property owners may appeal thet,compensatimn to a Court.Under the al)l)eal prticeedings, the court appoints three experts to miltke 
a final determinatiotn of' \'vatle. (overnment application fIm' the right
of'eminent (omin is difficult inTunisia, prim'rily because of a basicTunisian philosophy against depriving Cit izens of' their prtl)erty under 
aly circunstance. Because of' this basic attitude, it is difficult to get
the numerous officials' signatures to activate tilet roceduire.'''
The gilverninelt of (ithon Illaycquire land by expropriattioni S ipa­lated ina legislatiin passed May 10, 19(61, for public ises that mast 
defilned or t ermined b)y tile Supreme ile Court. The in in istry securing orinitiniting al exprlopriatioi action lmust obtain all ordinance fi'oni tie 
court. 
Judicial Review 
•Judicial review is a coistraint on decision-making power.The three mostilportant decisions ill expropriat ion are the decision to expropriate (thedeclaration , the decision of' what to expropriate (the designait ion ), andthe decision of' hO\w Much to ct)nl)ensate (the valuation). Following is 
a discussion ofthe circ llnst aces under which these three (lecisions ari'e
reviewable: 
The dechlrttion of puthlic put'pttse is gentrally either unreviewable ori
reviewabhle (nly f'For gross f'lltiSe fdiscret ioni (orden'strablebias. InAi'gentinlt, tile test is "serious arhitrariness.''' IllI3ri'ilialn explropii­tion l)r'ceedings, the cturi'ts imay not considei' the question of the exis­
tence ofputhlic utility or social interest. They may, however, cancel an
expropriation if' it is shown to be a miere pretext to seize the p'(opelty
of a particular individual!" In the United States and in Mexico, thereis still some rooin fi'r challenging the (lecla'ation, on the grounds that 
it ser-ves private purposes mtl'e thltn public ptlrposes. Courts and legis­
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latures, however, are gradually diminishing the significance of this argu­
ment.?' 
Less judicial deference is sometimes paid to the designation decision. 
In El Salvador, the court may review whether all ow p art of the property 
is necessary and whether other property owners should share the bur­
den of the expropriation in question. Mexican law puts the burden of' 
proof on tile expropriating agency to show the particular property is 
"suited and necessary" for the purpose declared. In Indonesia, the Presi­
dent's designation "is final and irrevocahle and is not justiciahle." The 
result is that its designation, like the declaration, is largely viewed as 
a matter outside the jud1icil ieal of coipet eince. 
The valuation lecision is most frequently h(1d to bejudicially review­
ahle. In Peru, tile an iou lit of coipensatiou may he attacked in a new 
judicial proceeding within six months of the original determination. Any 
'
such review, howvevr, is )'ocedural only." In Nicaragua, tile valuation 
may he reviewed "f'or fraud, (oreT'rorS illthe ineaSUi'enle1s, 01 for IlOtO'i­
ous aInd serious errors in calculating the amount of indemnification."' 
In Honduras, til'vI uatiolj udgmlnt may he appealed as may any (Ither 
judgment (pursuant to the Code of Prcedurek the appeal tloes nit stay 
the effect of the expropriation order, but if' the appeal is successful, the 
" property revests in tile owner. '1hiere ai'e coluntiries, ton the OleL'hlThand, 
in which the valuation proceeding is administrative and therefre,judi­
cialily unreviewabhle. Nepal is such an example."" Normally, when tile 
valuation proceeding is judicial, some opportunity for judicial review 
is available. 
In Iany countries there are extrai(l'imlr'y leall oI'securing judicial 
review. In Guateinala, there is the r'CC hr-so d' in'ostitfctniaididpr(ce­
dure, which raises constititional quIIPstions to tile court. Not surpris­
ingly, however, that extraordinary rehwedy is rarely used, unless there 
is an extraordi nar'y injustice. In 20 years there has been no recurs' review 
of an expirpriatioll in ('uatemala."' 
SUMMARY 
Insummary, niost develiping countries have fairly extensive 
laws for expropriation. And while they vary a great deal in terms (f' 
power and autho'ity, tio many exist inname only and are raiely used. 
One theory for the hesitant or infrequent use of expropriati(mi statutes 
is that many have been imported and enactedlalone, without the sup­
port of a broad scheme of complementary powers of' acquisition. In such 
cases, the expr)priation laws have been undermined by private opposi­
ion to pubhlic land acquisition. Skillf'ul advocates for private-sector 
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interests have been able to use the safeguards in expropriation statutes (the public-purpose doctrine, just compensation) to frustrate and delay 
the use of' such authority.
Our recommendation in the,e cases is much the same as our reconi­
mendation in chapter 2: A serious, comprehensive, exercise to revise
acquisition laws should be Undertaken in most, developing countries and
should result in broad-based laws that do not rely unduly on compul­
sory powers. 
Chapte- 4 
Institutions for Land Acquisition
 
INTRODUCTION 
Public agencies responsible for acquiring land need more than 
a broad array of instrumer.ts, powers, and authorities to act effectively. 
They also need properly constituted institutions with trained person­
nel, as well as goals and plans specifically designed for the country. In 
developing countries, land acquisition often is performed inefficiently, 
on a hit-or-miss basis, because for a variety of reasons, there are no well­
developed institutions able and willing to implement the land-acquisition 
requirements of the public. Thus, an orderly approach to land-acquisition 
is stymied for lack of the first step. 
A country's fundamental policy on land acquisi tion is the major deter­
minant of what types of institutions are necessary, or even desirable. 
If there is no national consensus on goals, and if public land purchases 
are sporadic events-by individual agencies for specific projects without 
consideration of broader objectives-there will be no effort to create 
specialized institutions. Individual government agencies will exercise 
such land-acquisition authorities as they now possess. They might go 
so far as to set up subdivisions or bureaus. In time, modest institutional 
reforms, to increase efficiency, could be expected in some countries. But 
generally, the existing institutions will handle land acquisition in addi­
tion to their regular functions. 
This is the prevailing pattern in most developing countries. Existing 
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ministries (such as those engaged in health, tdCic:it imll, def'cnse, hous­i11g, a1unthe IIke)Ieach Iiatla , t heir owIi I81I(I acqIis itioii fIiiII)c,,d fromCurrent opert ing hlid(gets id rest ricted to current and iiniie(liate proj­
ect llee(ls. In suc'h caz.-;,-, the il:.tit tit inns (lien are po(oly orgaiz(i.td and
stafled to excute thu occasial lInd acquisition anl are' easily IUrns­
trated hy private lan+downe,,s who might oppose them.T createuef'ect i listi tit ioti()nspeCif'ically deitigne'(l f i lln aCttlii.ii
tion, it is best that dteveloping Cotntries first athopt, foIrnillv or illf'oi­
mllyal, p0licS that di'il'v the piuilic control over lind use. But, oven
whenl national pllicies 'morInd ac,tltliSiti(oI an contril)l ale ill fhirned,
orfavor im(lest project-hi fio)ject approach, it is still prl(,lent tol)thill
an in.stitcitioinail Crailiewoik for the piur.pose. There re ample reasons,for exaiiiple, to st iiintle tli, l(inf-ac'tii-it ill iioii(lfthe Nat onali \'nty.o llhailain, (Veil ihil<,Ills! niit' '" h tlt. igelwtV, nilal(lniteltii '+,,' ot lIo icin 1 0 1(1 ',t. l e't l l it i.s; to tl etf f o rl (hf tfi i d hll u .i i i g Pllt et ,st. Ixis t­
in"' insttiltl1tl ;tl)(hivlsioiis like, the NI\IA iotld alt lacking. Iltal)powe. atn(l atlh:)rity to to;l'lit the train' crr their gonls. wvhl collditiolns 
chuiigy'.III--tItLuti()n~al S'tI'1(_'n 0 1 ill (h0vCt iI,f<li()0Itii,-; Vill ht)( )IMI I';ir MoreF( 
impojirtlint .\, Ili1i lS faCl ('Xti'iIl)rI'ii iv gI-(Vt I()i I'trli i a'reas dII­ij g the nte t ( ,,.i . I hk clo -icts(I' how to Iiga li:: , 'st lf'', iii l fiiiliiC(,
niecessairy in.stiltlt itw will h , critiCal: -;0oIlrl )rI it(, , all (hCV( ltItries-will re'alize, till, lwc((l oIMuto) tretlglllcl the(ir iln.;titui()1n0-I to)at'qUi'U 
ni~d(,dl i (l. 
INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS 
%\Vielnl i(levellling cillllt "' dec'ides toiPlengage S-TiOUSl ini lan1(a~cjuiiSitioin, the f'irst tuOStioll., ai ::\l( I)' Oxi.tilig iil.;tilttiii ()r­
gall ize(l well 1n(1l gh toI) cc(nll)! ish ill i tilt oaI ? ( )I shll) Id lIecv' listi1ution.s he s ahi sh-.,' Tlht, (t''liioli to) ai~ih ;llV li(w ins titutioin
 
'vilti'lrie Liin! liaikanl 
 d ((,evloliiiiit ;igilc, or aiiv
nu *llo ](i )(,c(Iin. 11,i.(,(I hastlilyv. In d v h lill offher entity,
lievetit t o r tI)5I'iil 1i 'ili '(i w ir ,,kI 114i liit iil. tl it it io)ni t('nlI trls li eat , l~the 
cleati on( ,1 %f :VI111 ill.i Ill lii l ( ii I noti tl.tqlail ico lileiti le(I. Ytl ifthe goals ;irt, i'-al. Ilie g (V 'lllilitsllll s iilliisl, v (I)lisidli"establish­ing ai i) .it ittlt ll .whoseso ii i't il is to ictui i'ic, dtvellp, and Ispose 
of lurid fbi I)1ul1ilic itlirposs. 
' Sul disusK iolllot' Th: Iillid'. Ni LA It, Alnl dix B. 
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Newly Developed Land Institutions 
Ideally, such an institution should be self-financing, once capitalized 
with assets in the form of' cash or excess government land. The institu­
tion should be large enough so that it can assemble an experienced staff 
(appraisers, lawyers, financial analysts, and all the rest), who are experts 
in all laws and regulations affecting land. including zoning bylaws, build­
ing codes, property-tax laws, and landlord-tenant laws. Moreover, the 
institution's scope of operations should be broad enough so that any 
failures are outweighed by successes in land )urchases. There is little 
purpose in creating an institution so sinall toat it. will not achieve econ­
omies of scale and specialization, oi even have an impact on the very 
problems it was created to solve. 
The chief officials of, land institutions should e decision makers, or 
at least have a voice in government decisions af'fecting land markets­
such as, for example, where water lines and sewers will be located. The 
capital budget of an urban area, particularly in developing courcries, 
can be the single most important tool in land planning. Infrastructure 
location is a powerful tool in the utilization of' unserviced, marginal lands 
az the fringe of urban areas. The ability to control, influence, or at least 
predict the installaion of' infriastructure is essential to a successful land­
acquisition pro ;ran . It is expected that land agency officials who are 
part of the capitai budg'et pi ocesses of' govern-'.,it or who have access 
to decision makers woul argue for the right decisions and, through com­
ni:nication with other agencies, would assure setting budget priorities 
to the maximum advantage of everyone. 
Common problerr.s associated with many land-development agencies 
can and, of course, should be avoided. These include: uneven sources 
of financing, limited goals not linked to national-development priorities 
and strategies. less-than-fficient administrative mechanisms, and lack 
of \videsprt ,-dpolitical support within and outside the government. 
In developed countries with established land-development agencies 
empowered to engage in broad land-acquisition programs, a major issue 
has been whether to organize such instititutions on a municipal level, 
or whether to create national orI regional entities with broader jurisdic­
tional bases. Jurisdictional authority becomes important when a rapidly 
growing municipality is considering land at its periphery. If' municipal 
institutions lack autho-ity to expropriate land outside the municipal­
ity's legal borders, a maJor function cann-t be exercised. In countries 
such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Norwpy, and Denmark, which have 
a long history of municipal agencies for land development, the lack of 
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regional authority is regarded as an obstacle to the rational expansion
of cities and towns.' 
Advocates of maintaining such agencies at the municipal level argue
that this is the only way to know the local market, keep track of prices,influence the government's capital budget, and make effective decisions 
at the local level. Proponents of regional institutions argue that only
regional units would be able to assemble the expertise needed. They say
that only national or regional institutions would have the resources to
make the necessary economic, sociological, and statistical assessments
required for long-range decisions and that funds usually can be raised 
more easily on the national or regional level. 
Both sides have valid argumens, and it is dangerous to generalizein this area. However, in many developing countries, the municipal
government itself is characteristically weak, and national governments
dominate. Often, municipalities have limited taxing power and do not
control their own capital budgets. In these cases, it seems clear that newlyformed institutions would best be formed at the national or regional level.The major problems faced by land agencies in most developing coun­
tries arise on the periphery of cities, where rapid urban growth takesplace. If, as we predict, most of the larger cities will double in size dur­ing the next decade, it will do little good to invest major human andfinancial resources in municipal agencies that are powerless '.o act out­
side existing municipal boundaries. Further, the national role of trans­portation and issues increasingly pointsenvironmental to nationalinstitutions for land use control. Finally, acquisition and control of land 
at the !ocal level by many independent authorities may increase adminis­
trative cost, duplicate efforts, overwork scarce personnel, and flrustrate
creation of comprehensive national or regional policies. Organizing atthe local level tends to perpetuate many of the problems faced by multi­
ple institutions today at the national level. National or regional agen­
cies inevitably conflict with those at the local level. 
Single-purpose land agencies with broad authority to act for all public
agencies would avoid current inefficiencies arising from the prolifera­
tion of ministries with authority to acquire land for individual needs 
and vying to discharge the same functions. 
Coordinating Mechanisms 
As national policies begin to coalesce, some countries, at least as aninterim measure, may opt for coordinating agencies rather than seek­ing to merge land-acquisition offices in various ministries into a single,
new institution. Such an idea has been recommended for Thailand. Theidea was recommended at a January 1982 conference sponsored by the 
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Asian Institute for Technology. 2 The Asian Institute for Technology has 
suggested that representatives of Thai agencies with experience in 
land acquisition form al advisory group to assist all agencies. Such a 
group could coordinate the activities of various agencies and avoid dupli­
cation of effort. Also it might help promote a national inventory of lands 
already owned by various public agencies and Fbster barter and exchange 
transactions among them. Such coordinating entities could arbitrate 
itagovernniental disputes and encourage cooperation in acquisitions. 
Planners in this institution would be expected to bring a broader per­
spective to the process. 
It would seem advisable in nearly all cases to establish some form of 
coordinating mechanism. Enormous benefits could be derived from avoid­
ing duplication of effort and explaining to landowners how public acqui­
sitions will work. This could prevent whipsawing landowners between 
competing agencies. 
Government Body Acting as Agent 
An alternative to a coordinating body is a system by which various 
government bodies have the right to contract with another more-expert 
government hody for purposes of relying on the latter's personnel and 
skills in land acquisition. This practice, sometimes called a "Joint Exer­
cise of Power" practice in the United States, generally is based upon 
legisiation that allows any government agency to use the resources of 
another to accomplish its legitimate goals. Transportation and road 
departments usually have the most experience in land acquisition (in 
the United States). They maintain large staffs of surveyors, appraisers, 
lawyers, and engineers who are expert in land acquisition. Their laws 
and powers generally are most up to date. Under a joint exercise of power 
agreement, a government agency with only an occasional need For land 
acquisition-say, the health ministry-could agree to send all of its 
requisitions for land to the transportation ministry, providing it with 
a budget for the desired work. The health ministry could reimburse the 
transportation ministry for its administrative expenses and have 
approval rights at various stages of the land acquisition. In effect, the 
land-acquisition division of the transportation agency, using its own laws 
and procedures, would serve as agent for all other government agencies 
that need to acquire land but lack the necessary manpower skills and 
procedures. 
Specialized Quasi-Public Agencies 
Several issues need to be determined: Should any new land agency be 
72 / Land Acquisition in Deelofping Countries 
totally part of the public sector? Should its employees be civil servantsdrawing the same pay as othei' public servants? Should its off'icia',s he
obliged to operate within the same bureaucratic and regulatory fraeIC­
work as government agencies in general? Land acquisition in mostdeveloping Countries is now performed l)' offices or depart.ments already
vvithin a number of public ministries and agencies and by regular civil 
servants in accordance with established putblic procedures. But coun­
tries establish ing specialized institutions for land purposes often createquasi-independent corporat ions or authorities with vary ing degrees ofgovernmental trappin gs. The Ma lawi lIou Iing Corporation, the DelhiDevelopment Authority, the Tunisian Agence Fonciere de l'Habitat(AFH), the Urban levelopment Corporation (UIDC) of Jamaica, and theUrban Improvement Cori'poration of Chile C() R\IU) are examples of' 
specialized land agencies that possess stafting and operal ioial flexihili­ties not generally accorded government 19ieiic ies in those coun0 tlies.One advant age of' a specialized institution that is not wholly publicis that it avoids salary and recruitment 'esti'icti ii: coinmn0 to the pufb­lic sector. 1n most developing countries, civil servants' salaries are woe­fully inadequate to attract and retain qualified personnel. There is a
tremendous turnover rate as more able civil Servants are lured into tileprivate sector at salaries oiten triple what they fomnierl'v received. EveTlif' government salary scales were at ani'acceptal)le level, governmernt­
reci u itment practices can cripip the staffing efforts of a new instil t.
tion. Neither civil service examinations nor politically oriented job place­
went results ill hiring the kind of' expertise thilt is needed. Yet, these 
methods predominate in typical government hiring. Land agencies, deal­ing with large sums of' money and highly sophisticated markets, need
 
a 
high-caliber staff. Furthermore, the opportunities fbi' corruption and
ftvoritism demand a staff' with sound morals and high morale. The tech­
nical skills of'lawyering, engineering, and api'aisirg reqi'e that a sIlaff
i'emainri in place long enough 
to gain experience and earn public confi­dence. Many believe that on ly specialized agencies that set their own 
personnel policies can attract and retain such qualified personnel.
Equally important are workable, flexible procedures. Land institutins
need the tools to operate in highly secreti,,e, competitive land markets.
They need to haye their ow furnds to free them frml t ime-consu mingi'eq uests to legislative oi' budgetarv authorit ies. In addition, they need 
to be able to move quickly and to act. confidentially through agents so
that sellers and buyers will not take ad van taige of't ie ii' pu)lic mandate.
In a survey conducted in the summer of 1982, members of the Interina­
tional Federation of'Real Estate Agents located ill developing countries 
were asked (a) if'they had ever represented public agencies in land trans­
actions in which their principals' identity was held secret and (h)whether 
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such a s ,cret procedure, if used, would havc produced a more advanta­
geous price to the public agency. None of the brokers responding indi­
cated having served in such a manner. Most, citing custom and precedent 
among large, private iand developers, who act secretly through nominvees 
assembling large tracts of land, hypothesized that this procedure would 
be advantageous to po blic agencies. 
Governments generally require tlat Ill ;)urVe': ,:;es of personal plop­
erty be accompanied by public notice, and to the extent Practical, by 
)ublic bidding or auction. When apl)lied to land, these procedures are 
most often costly to governments. It might be said that this higher cost 
is simply a burden that governments must bear and should be accepted 
as the price for assuring fairness and honesty. However, land is differ­
ent from other government ptw"-hases; it is highly expensive and unique. 
If other safeguards on honesty and f'airness exist, institutional proce­
dures that allow secret acquisition and assembly of land on occasion may 
well be the better choice. Specialized agencies are better able to gain 
such authority than generalized public agencies. 
If specialized, quasi-public inl"'itu0ions arc to be established, they must 
be kept faithful to their public mi.,date. This requires a fairly clear artic­
ulation of the public intention (acquire sites for housing and indtstry, 
help influence city growth in desired directions through infrastructure­
related acquisition, and so on). 
It also calls for checks and balances on the authority of' these special­
ized agencies. First, any such institutiom should have some degree offinancial self'-sufficiency, with la'ad or finds. It should be ,tructured to 
acquire and dispose of' land to avoid the need for extra budget supple­
ments. Normally, this will entail borrowing authority, with borrowings 
collateralized by property :icquired and government backing. An index 
of how well the market approves of the unit's operations is if the banks 
are willing to lend on the land offered. Another safeguard could be broadly 
based boards of directors or advisory committees. Coordination with 
government agencies having capital budgets is important. Therefore, 
land-institution boards should include key decisioni makers in public­
works agencies, as well as other powerful government officials. Adequate 
representation from the private sector is also indicated, of course. Reli­
gious and business leaders should also be included in broad citizen par­
ticipation. Finally, when secret transactions are necessary, and when 
public confidence in such transactions may be historically weak, the insti­
tution could adopt special procedures. These could include (a) sealed court 
orders issued upon application, and affidavits ruling out conflicts of' 
interests, (b) com)ulsory publication in the news media of secret court 
orders within six months after a transaction is completed, and (c) indepen­
dent audits by government or private experts. 
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INSTITUTIONAL MODELS 
Chile-CORMU 
The Chilean Urban Development Corporation (CORMU) has been viewed 
as one of the most important public land-acquiring agencies in LatinAmerica. Established in 1964, CORMU is part of Chile's newly created
mini.stry ofhousing and urbanism Its main function was to acquire anddevelop urban land in conjunction with housing and urban projects. It 
was given wide powers of expropriation. From 1964 to 1967, CORMU
acquired approximately 1,500 hectares per year, half by outright pur­
chase and half by expirG_ iation. 
Jamaica- UDC 
The Urban Development Corporation (UDC) of Jamaica provides another
example of a centrally organized agency with extensive land-acquisition
operations.4 Its current portfolio comprises more than 38,000 acres. The 
UDC engages in a wide variety of activities; it has senior officials
assigned to land acquisition and a competent legal department, plus tech­
nical offices employing engneers, architects, and surveyors. Projectsinclude land planning; subdivisions; land development; sales of 1inished"
parcels (serviced with infrastructure and ready for construction of suit­
able buildings); and ofFee, meeting, and auditorium structures. The UDCis called upon at times to operate as a public-works agency, construct­ing elements of infrastructure, such as roads and sewerage facilities.
In some instances, it also manages and maintains the infrastructure 
systems it installs until resources can be found by the local parish coun­
cils to enable them to assume maintenance responsibilities.
The estato department of UDC periodically appraises the value of UDCholdings. At the end of the first quarter of 1980, the valuation stood 
at Jamaican $93,776,000 (approximately US $33,000,000). The UDC five­year capital-investment program, covering the period April 1982 toMarch 1987, comprises 15 on-going projects, 26 new projects, and main­
tenance of public facilities in five locations. The projected cost of the 
program is US $300,000,000. 
In essence, UDC develops (or redevelops, as in the case of downtown 
Kingston) raw land into serviced parcels, through the application ofdevelopment funds and professional management. This process is sup­ported by market demand, which sets the pace at which development
is feasible, and by the participation of commercial lending institutions,
international agencies, and the government in the necessary financing
arrangements. In terms of its projected 1982-87 capital budget, UDC 
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is looking to inc,'ease its accessibility to commercial lending institutions 
and private joint-venture investors, allticil)ating that ablout one-half'of 
its requirements would come froi these sources. The UDC, while pur­
suing broad land-acquisition programs, carries out many other types 
of programs as wvell. It is a prime example of a fully integrated, muli­
tipurl)osa institution in this field. 
Tunisian Agencies 
More than most developing countries, Tunisia has perceived that avail­
ability of' urban land, in appropriate locations and at reasonable cost, 
is a critical element in urbanldevelol)ment and a legitimate subject for 
national poi icy. Ton isia has established a basic approach to ensure land 
availability and dampen speculation. An array of'org anizations h-harged 
with l)el)ling land for' eCO1rnomic lctivity, housing, and common itv facil­
ities has been oterating for about a decade. The agencies differ some­
what in their missions and methods of finance, but the two principal 
organizations, Agence Fonciere IndLustrielle (AFI)and Agence Fonciere 
d'Habitation (AFIL , share tile following basic characteristics: 
1. 	 Entrance into a community at the common ity's request or in 
response to national-developmient objectives endorsed by t he com­
munity prior to entrance. 
2. 	 Site selection in accordance with the community's development plan, 
but modification of that plan if'detailed feasibility analysis proves 
first-choice sites impractical. 
:3. 	 Land acquisition through direct purchase, preemption, or 
expropriation. 
4. 	 Site planning, site assembly, and developiment on their own account 
and by coordination with other central agencies and municipal 
authorities. 
5. 	 Disposition of"finished sites on a cost-recoveiry basis at prices that 
set the pattern For area land sales ail(, seek to block :peculation. 
In addition, each agency has tested its methods on projects in the 
greater Tunis region, but has increasingly moved into the secondary 
cities and smaller (ommunities. Each is now being regionalized in some 
fashion, with field offices in various parts of' the country. Each wvill be 
relied on heavily to meet objectives of' decentralized development dur­
ing the sixth five-year-plan period. 
Before reviewing the missions and ooerations of*these agencies, it is 
important to underscore their role as the creators of netc development 
areas. They operate on undeveloped land in and outside of existing 
urbanized areas, and with the single exception of AFI's present upgrad­
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ing of an existing industrial park in Tunis, they are not being deployed 
to redevelop existing urban areas at all., 
Agence Fonciere Industrielle, Industrial Land Agency (AFI).
The AFI was created in 1973, (as was tile AFH) with the express pur­
pose of assembling and developing land for industrial parks throughout
the country. Since then, AFI has completed w'rk on approximately 1,000
hectares of land, partly in Tunis and partly in the secondary cities. The 
sites are strategically located to take advantage of existing transporta­
tion systems, proximity to commercial areas, and concentrations of'popu­
lation. 
The AFI began with 3,000,000 dinars of capital fr'om the state (approx­
imately $3.4 million) but receives all other financing through borrow­
ing. Most recently, it negotiated a seven-year, $20 million loan at 
commercial rates. Although AF1 is a nonprofit institltion, it is charged
with obtaining complete cost-recovery fIor its investments. As a quasi­
public agency, it can pay its employees wages above the normal govern­
ment scale and thus has assembled a highly skilled managerial and tech­
nical staff. 
Typically, a municipality asks AFI to initiate a pi-oject. Many such 
requests are the result of the activities of the Industrial Promotion 
Agency (API) of the ministry of industry which has the dual responsibil­
ity for promoting industrial investment domestically and overseas and 
for conducting surveys in communities to identify their industrial poten­
tial. In the course of these tasks, API meets with governors and munici­
pal councils, and they in tu request the intei-vention of AFI.
 
The AFI begins its site-selection process by reviewing the 
area's 
development plan. Land suitable foir industry (either within the munici­
pal boundaries or in the peripheral area covered by the plan) is targeted
for initial investigation and discussion with central government and lGral 
authorities. Before definitive selection, howexer, deploysAI its
engineering staff or consultants to periform detailed feasibility analyses

of candidate sites. In 
most cases, suitable land in the amount desired 
is identified fr'om the plan. 
The AFI and the other parastal als have land-acquisition poweis. While 
they can negotiate directly with landowners, they routinely invoke a 
right of preemption foi- the desired site and surrounding area. This deci­
sion is approved initially by the municipality and then goes through
central government channels, including the ministry of justice. Once 
AFI receives the right of preemption, it can effectively stabilize land 
prices by exercising first-refusal rights on any offer of sale. 
It is at this point that AFI begins negotiation with landownels. Appar­
ently, mast owners come to term..wing this negotiation period, since 
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most sites are in agricultural use, and the only buyer for higher value 
is the AFI. The negotiation process may take several months, however, 
because the AFI and the other parastatals are reluctant to exercise 
po)wers of expropriation. Although expropriation procedures can be pur­
sued through the courts, the AFI has done this rarely. 
The AFI begins detaile,1 site-planning, once the land is identified. The 
process includes coordination with other parastatals (water, power, and 
the like) and the ministry of equipment and housing, which will provide 
trunk utilities and access, if required. Within the agency itself, AFI han­
dles parceling; builds internal roads and sidewalks; and installs elec. 
tricity, street lights, and potable water, according to set standards. 
Telephone and teletypewriters are installed as well. 
The AFI usually builds for specific industrial clients or proceeds on 
the basis of a market assessment that identifie; a reasonable demand 
for flnished land within the near future. Because of its cost-recovery char­
ter and its limited capitalization, the agency does not have the capabil­
ity to operate a land bank. 
Agreements are negotiated with specific customers in accordance with 
a basic formula. Total costs, including land acquisition and site­
development, are roughly the same thlroug.out the country (about $10 
per square meter). Finished prices for the customer are set, however, 
at three levels, depenling on location. FPor the most-preferred areas 
(Tunis, Sfax, Sousse), the price is fixed at about $40 per square meter. 
For the least preferred (Beja, Jeiidouba), the price is set below cost, at 
roughly $7 per square meter. For c,2nters in between, with some viable 
economic activity, the price is about $10 per square meter. 
Thus, there is a cross-subsidy for the least-developed centers in the 
most-dynamic urban areas-a practice completely in keeping with 
national policy Lo discourage continued concentration of industry in the 
major cities and to distribute it elsewhere. 
Because the municipalities have responsibility for building-permit 
approvals, the AFI follows through wvith a client to the final-permit stage. 
It coordinates with other parastatals and ministerial agencies to ensure 
that all services are in place. And it works with municipal authorities 
to obtain the necessary permits. 
Once the plants are completed and the ownership is transferred, the 
finished properties are eligible for municipal taxes. These revenues 
become a major resource for the economicail., deficient towns. Officials 
of AFI say there is no reluctance by the owners to pay these taxes because 
once the services and facilities are installed, people understand the need 
to maintain them. 
By setting the selling price for finished lots, AF has a secondary objec­
tive of controlling speculation in industrial land. When the agency began 
78 / Land Acquisition in De'eloping Coiintries 
in 1973, raw lant sold by the private sector for industry in Tunis anlSfax cost about 12 dinars per square meter (about $5) and was so highit deterred devel ol)melnt. The agency assembled and finiished certaingovernment-ownle( sites at a tot al cost of'2.5 dirnars per square meter.The agency then marketed these at 6.5 di Oars per square meter, slightlyabove half the price of u nfin ished private lots. New plants noved oatothe government sites, and private owners were Forced to drop their landprices. N,\v, there is a rough equilibrium. Priv ate finished indcIustriallots are running about 31.4 dinairs per square meter, versus the 28.5dinars of AFI in Tunis. Clearly, AFI intervention has worked.\Vhile speculation has been dampeened, the three major cities cntitiueto attract the bulk of' indLust ial gi'owt Ii. Even the considerable differen­tial between site prices in the ne:xt tier of the major cities (a factor of'fbur) is not sufficieint to move a significant portion of' new i ndustr-ialgrowth to the less-devoped ai'eas. This redistrilbution, clearly, is anissue that AFI will be confirmting under the next five-year plan.Major AFI decisions on land sales md site planning continue to bemade in Tunis, but the agency has beguii to decentralize its operationsinto five regional offices Sfax, Sousse, Gabes, Be.ja, and Gafea), eachconducting liaison with three to four goi'('rorat(,s.The objective is todirect growth out of'Tu ais amd to provide the closest possible ( i-site coor­dlination of' proJects outside tht- capital.A June 1981 in1dUstril-i ncen tive law is geared to the most importantobjective of' the new five-year plana, creation of iad1I:Ii aljobs. There aretwo incentives: One will be applied to all firims, regardless of' location,that create new .jobs- a tax reduction based on the i nmber of newemployees hired. The seconrd incentive is direct capital grants to firms,based on the number of jobs created and the location of their sites. No
grants will be forthcoming in the most-preferred areas, but at the estab­lished sliding-scale, the direct capital assistance available for the lowest­income areas would represent a sign if'icaat subsidy incentive f'oir decen­
tralized ilSdtistrialization.
 
Agence Fonciere d'Habitation, Housing Lands Agency (AFH).The AM- is also a land-assembly and land-development agency, createdin 1973 (at the same time as AFI), wit!: .imilar initial capitalizationof 2,000,000 dinairs. Its purpose is to prodIce housing sites For citizensat all income levels who can afford to repay the land and services costs.Thus, it focuses on middle- and upper-income production-although 60percent of its output is to be for "social housing," roughly synonymousto the public-housing activities of Societe Nationale ' hnmobiliere de 
Tunisic (SNIT).
Although SNIT is a major customer, it handiles most of its own land 
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assembly and development. The AFH differs friom SNIT in that it does 
not build shelter; nor does it continue to maintain projects after develop­
ment. It merely prepares the land and supervises its servicing for trans­
fer to private and public home builders. 
Like AFI, AFH is a parastatal with a skilled technical staff that it 
can pay at higher wages than typical government scale. Unlike AFI, 
however, it is not empowered to borrow for development financing and 
must, therefore, finance its development activities through adva . sales 
and cash payments of its programmed output. 
One of AFH's greatest strengths is its commit,,ent to design and to 
develop "communities." Each project contains provisions for a range of 
income levels and housing types, from apartment blocks to private builder 
subdivisions and individual lots upon which owners build their own units. 
Each also-depending on the project's scale and proximity to existing 
residential areas-has space for commercial services and a complement 
of community facilities, from dispensaries to schools and mosques, along 
with land for parks and recreation space. 
This agency is a powerful organizatiozi with a broad mandate. Thus 
far, it has exercised that mandate primarily in and around metropoli 
tan Tunis, although it has begun to expand in secondary cities and to 
decentralize. Undo- the forthcoming five-year plan, the AFII is expected 
to operate more extensively outside of Tunis and shift its emphasis toward 
greater acconmodation of lower-income households. 
Normally, the provincial governor or the municipality initiates 
requests for AFH services. In practice, most of the agency's activity has 
been within the Tunis district, where the greatest unfilled demand For 
middle- and upper-income housing (xists. During 1977 and 1978, for 
example, AFH developed sites for 33,519 housing units, of which 22,245 
(72 percent) were in the Tunis area. AFH also works within the city's 
general-development plan and normally selects a location within the 
programmed residential zone. 
The AFH acquires land by a method slightly different from AFI but 
with similar results. Decisions are made in consultation with provin­
cial governors and local mayors, and sufficient land is identified to meet 
an estimated two-year production schedule. Once the site is chosen, AFH 
asks For a preemption decree covering both the desired land and a sig­
nificant surrounding perimeter of land (a means of blocking specula­
tion). A special commission then establishes a price that reflects market 
conditions; this amount is put in escrow by AFH, pending negotiations 
with the owners. 
If the owners challenge the asking price, they have redress to the spe­
cial commission on the amount of compensation, but not on the transfer 
of ownership. The AFH has what is termed in the United States a "quick­
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take" power, which provides for immediate expropriation and posses­
sion of the property. Meanwhile, three independent appraisers assess
the land for court proceedings that will award a final sumin. The quick­
take power reflects tie urgency of AFH's mission, and the agency tries 
to proceed with development within the two-year period.
In the case of sinaller, less-favored communities, the physical project­development time tends to he longer, and AFH, whether by design orby accident of market, must act as land banker. Even though AFH mayhold a fairly large parcel, it develps in the short run only those sections 
for which it has definite buyers.
Once land is eNWtilied, AFH's stafl' prepared detailed site plIans forboth the residential units and associated services. ('oordination mustbe maintained with the infrastructurv' agencies, because they handle
construct ion of both off-site and on-site facilities. They too are responsi­ble for naintainingi the utilities they have built and for levying user 
charges when the projects are completed.

The scale of' the AFII 
projects- and their strategic locatis on Un­de'eloped land attract addit ional urban g'owth on private land nearby.Sometimes, inant icipat ion of this, the infriastrttre agencies size theirtl'unk systems to accon0iindate future development oitside the AFIT 
projects. In such an event, landowners bordering the trunk lines arecharged a proportionate shir,, of the cost, refioct ed illan increased prop­
erty tax. This periits recapt ure bly the nluniip.,itV of' some benefits 
fronl the original pubiic-capital investnent. 
The AFiH has a particuhuly interesting approacw to land sahs. Evenbefore developiet , the agen.. (stabli. h(s pricesifor lite
v'arios sites,
from la'ge-scale subdivisions and apartment land to individual home­
owner plots. The land is thel presold, with all the pri'ate buyers paying
the f',ll stipulated price inadvance.(()ni'' SNIT is empowered to make
installment payments.) This permits AFH t.) utiilize f'unds for actua] prj­
ect development, especially iimportant because AH iflcks access to loans.
Housing demand in Tunisia has been so high that pirospect iye developers

willing to make such prepayments. This system
are is, ,'fconise, self­limiting, for in Cffect, it narrows the range of'available buye'rs )t hose
who have suflicient capital resoirces. In add itliii. the payieilts are provi­
sional, and ifdevelopment ro,;ts prove higher tihan the original est iintes,
additional charges are levied oilthei!bicl-S before thev call gain access 
to the land they have purchased.
If demand for subdivisions or apartment sites is sm irnt.
nse that there ismore than one prospective buyer, AFI draws lots to select the slc­
cessful bidder, rather than pe'nnit the land to be hid up beyond the estab­lished selling price. When demand exceeds supply for individual houselots, AFH asks the municipality to choose the purchasers. Such choice 
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is generally based on chronological order of buyer registration. All the 
finished housing sites (including those earmarked for SNIT) are priced 
at cost plus 10 percent, which covers AFH's operations. 
On commercial sites, the agency is allowed to make a profit. These 
sites are sold at auction above a minimum pr:ce. Sites For public facili­
ties, such as hospitals and schools, are transferred to the responsible 
ministries at cost. Meanwhile, the municipality receives, at no cost, parks,
parking areas, and finished streets. As with AFI, all privately owned 
land then goes on the municipal tax rolls. 
Despite professed efforts to complete all work in two years, AFH projects 
have been subject to delays that have distressed buyers, who put up the 
entire purchase price in advance. Now, tile agency is trying to hold proj­
ect development to eighteen months and is encouralging builders to use 
that period to prepare consru(';ion drawings for implementation immedi­
ately after transfer of fi.i ,.'ed plots. 
Countering hind speculation is one of' AFH's most important tasks, 
since inflation in residential land was one of the precipitants of*its crea­
tion. Here, AFH claims considerable success and contends that its pric­
ing program has caused private landowners to cut back on their profit 
expectations-or risk being left with unmarketable sites. 
The considerable success of AFII has been in the major cities, prin­
cipally Tunis. The agency now has two regional offices (in Sousse and 
Sfiax , which can negotiate land sales but have limited develop)mental 
authority. Further decentralization is expected. The agency has been 
criticized ror concentrating oii serving highe.'-income groups, to a great 
degree - result of its limited capitalization. It contends that it will seek 
ways to acconmmoodate low-incomne groups and has begun to explore cross­
subsidies from higher-income purchasers. 
The AFH is expected to play an important role in the decentralized. 
development program, but like AFI, it is struiggling to figure out how 
this can he accomplished in view of the restrictions in its charter, lack 
of'significant experience in the outlying centers, and the constant prob­
lem of' finding a paying market for* its output in smaller cities. 
Africa-Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB) 
One of the early land agencies in Africa is the Lagos Executive Develop­
ment Board (LEDB), created in 1928 in Nigeria by a Lagos town plan.
ning ordinance." The immediate cir-cumstance resulting in its creation 
was the bubonic plague that broke out in Lagos in 19'_1. There were 
many unsanitary conditions and conse(uently the LEDB was set up to 
pe-rform some urban planning and solve problems. Many powers and 
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duties formerly exercised by the town council and the director of public
works were transferred to the board. 
In its early clays, the board was designed to improve physical infra­
structure conditions in Lagos. In 1958, a series of amendnients to the 
Lagos Executive Development Board statute brought in the deinition 
of public purpose and marked the beginning of the board's entry into 
major, direct industrial and commercial developlent, in addition to 
residential and general town planning. Under the 1958 acts, the board 
could designate and recommend that a land area he declared a tovi­
planning scheme. This enabled the board to acCuirle lands Within the 
area. The board could then :acquire land for a specific planning scheme 
or for general public purpose. It was au thorized to acquireI lann compoIl­
sonily or by agreement. It also has power to lease, sell, or exchanige any
land it acquired. The public Lands Acquisition Ordinance (seC.. 6 and 
7) gave blanket powers to tihe LE1)B to take control of' any land for pub­
lie purposes "not withstanding any native lawi"orcustoms to the contra'y."
The board has departments responsible for administration, legal issues, 
town planning, engineering, arcA{tecture, land surveys, real estate man­
agenIent, evaluation, and finance. These depart ments :,llow the board 
to act as a self-contained developer. 
The LEDB is principally financed by government loans and grants. 
It also has borrowed limited monies f'rom commercial money markets. 
Funds never were certain because of'golvern ment difficulties. A signifi­
cant solrce of the b)oards internally generated revenue is knovn as the 
"general development expenses." Tbis is a fixed percentage charge that 
the board levies oiall capital work and land acquisitions: that is, a cer­
ta in percentage fee is charged on all work the board undertakes for the 
government, whether on bhalf of othe' agencies oirau tho'ities or even 
thi rd-party individuals. There is a G percent surcharge on the cost of' 
acquisitiol of' land 01' buildings and ,a15 percent suiclharge oin the cost 
of civil-engineering works and building construction. (For example, if 
the total cost of' the capital works of' a priject is 100,000 I)ponds, the 
board would add 15,000 Nigerian pound,s isthe general development 
eXpenset. Other fuIcls are raised by lease inucone iVl peity o' ned and 
leased by the board. 
The board is requiied by the federal government to pIr(wie ceriin 
subsidized social sei'ices, such as irChousing. Thus, the boaird cannot 
charge the econonic price for all of its services. Leases do not return 
cash quickly. 
The hoard has had a histor'y of' inancial probleis. Its dependence on 
collecting general development expenses is in turn dependent on tile 
government's willingness to carry out expensive capital pl'(Jects. If the 
government cuts back, as it does periodically, tihe Imard's income is 
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reduced. Further, the LEDB is not good at collecting it:; debts.7 One 
observer credits this to a "combi ned" problen: People (1o not like to pay 
debts owed to governments, andi government em)lovees do not like to 
collect such debts. Another problem of the board is that it cannot oper­
ate on a large enmgh scale. Its purchases have been isolated, uncoordi­
nated, and incremental patterns of acquisition. By not having e1nough 
land at one time, the government tends to raise the price of the sur­
rounding land. When the board receives nione, later to purchase such 
land, it findcls that its own actions have caused price increases." 
In 1967, with the creation of' the Lagos state, the board underwent 
a tiansforiat ion- from housi ng juaisdict ion fol tihe capitaI territory of 
Lagos alone, to(jrisdiisict I(-for the state, as a statewide cirbana develop­
ment agency. This gave tile boaid a exlanded juirisdict ionalI area for 
operations, and it also provided more autloritv to horrow. Moreover. 
it continued its industrial, commercial orientation, which was consid­
ered more profitalle. Not surprisingly, fimancing improved at this time. 
The LEI)B did not attempt land bankiilg. however. Rather, acquisitions 
were foi- p)'oject-speciftic purposes. 
In the 1928-35 period, the LEDBI acquired land and then returned 
80 percent to the original holders: the emaini n 20 percent was (levoted 
to infrastructure, which has results sii1 'ilr to Ian(l-read'just ment tech­
niques. For soirie reason, the board stopped this practice ev en though 
it appeared to have l)tili c support. 
I "d-Acquisition Offices under the India Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894.* Perhaps the most unusual institutionIl model of1a land­
acquisition unit is ,hat created 1) the India Land Acqu isition Act of' 
1894, as amended. In this Act, and in various auxiIiary authorities, 
special laind-acquisitionl offices are createl at the district level oi' 
rovern1m ent.1, 
To understand the role of laid-ialIcLuisitiOn officers in Indili, it is useful 
to describe their relhttioiiship to the various levels of political organiza­
tion. Th Indian state f' Miharashtra, for examIle, has a numbeT of' 
departments, including finance: law and jud:ciarv iiiclustries; energy 
and labor: educat ion and eiploVment: riiral d(evelo)ment: I'C\einie. 
forests, and rcliabultationl: and ,o onl. The i(,ve'le, forests, and rehabili­
tation depart ment is iml)ortant fir purposes c, '-Id ac(fuisil ion. It has 
changed over the Years, but its ioot; are in IeV, tie-e,,l lecting at the 
village level. T'odaY, Maharashtra state is partitioned into seven divi­
sions. Eac'-, division is f'urther divided into several districts. Each dis­
trict is neacled by a collectoi, who is in charge of' revenue administration 
. ,''e C AZI, -tidy 0n tIdia in App ,dix I). 
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in the district and, historically, has been very powerful. His revenue 
functions include collecting taxes, providing relief and rehabilitation 
in floods and cyclones, and storing and distribut ing faod, among many
other functions. Districts break down politically into subdivisions with 
deputy or assistant collectors. Subdivisions include sialler 0iits offvil­
lages, with village officers called 7bthis, the i)tgi oning links in the 
revenue-adninistration department. lth/this mairotain records of rights
and titles, inspect crops, collect level-te, and S) forth. 
The collect or and his deputy collectors perform a vide variety of reve­
nue, magisterial, statistical, welfare, and coordinating f'oIoctions 
-
inclding headiig the state's Iland-acquisitiom imachinerv. The collectol 
in each district reports to divisional coln il issioners, who act as chief 
executive officers fol the division. Fiial awards under the Laild Acqui.
sitioi Act are made hv divisional (immiislontvis on the i'('rCillllt'lord.i­
tion of' the collectors.
 
Each collector has a lannl-acqttisiti 11 unit in hi:; o'gainization. These 
units are headed by special Iand-acquisition officers, who report to the 
collector. The uniits generally have seveni to ten employees xxith train­
ing and expertise iin land surxeyi arid alpraising, ard adIuioist ratixe 
and clerical skills. There aie more than 250 special land-acquisition 
.fficers illthe statf, each heading his Ivl land-ac(qtiisitioli unit. 
The acqiuisitio'a officers and their staffs acto reqnisit ions f'roio cen­
tral governlment depart statelerits, governlieint departmerits, senlri­
goxerlnllot organizations, pai'astatals, aind fl'(l0 private corporatiins,
which on occasion, may ilnvolke, certain rights to acqui'e land tin(ler the 
India C(ompaniy's Act. The law ceotralizs ill c(mpulsory lanrd-acctUisition 
powers inthe hands of the cullectois and their spTcial land-acquisition
Units. In1dividual departinets may Co.cltde volunta'y purchases ofland 
from the prixate sectoi (i tthoi' owIVn0, directly, but even in these rare 
cases, the purchse price OlIust he approv,,d by the C)llector to assure 
unif'onIit'. 
The equisit ion t ) tecllect(o contains a (escript ion of the land t he 
petitiOlle' Wishes toac Iquire, details ahillt the Ct1tirent iOd(11t icipated
use (t he land, and a certificate regarding tile ax ilahility of flds that 
the petitioning (ep:1'tillent will pass thol',,tgh the cl lect~ll to pay the 
necessary com pe'isat io1i.The collectlrhlas noodsund( landIc (ctisiti(o
budf-teeed directly to him. Rather,eaIch petitioning depa tment xvill use 
capital-bIdget furds this ptirp,)se, wit !.f'(l the C(ollector acting as agent
for the acqtuiing department.
The strength of this celltralized systeil is that it avoids pr'ovidinrg each 
government depi tment with its lxvii mlachin Ivy for land-acquisition,
xith attendant ilefficiency, duplictat ion, anod conflicting policies. It cre­
ates one, presumnably expert body that ma lages the entire land­
acquisition process. Furthler, the W'rk is performed relatively close to 
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the comnnmity (at the district level), thereby avoiding some criticisms 
that centralized institutions are too remote to perform effectively. On 
the other hand, despite the long history ,of this organizational approach 
through the powerful and relativelv flexible Land Acquisition Act 
administered by the collectors, backlogs of unfui ifilled requisitions are 
enormous. In the state of Maharasthra, in :'ecent vears, the land­
acquisition officers have not even met the quota set for each officer, let 
alone handled the larger numbe' of' requisitions received. 
Reasons given fur the backlog include lack of' manpower and f'unds, 
llus apathy among government emt)loyees (ue to low wages. Interest­
ingly, institutional weaknesses are not cited as a cause of backlogs. How­
ever, there is at least oi,.a, hint that, the institutional framework inl India 
may not be so trouble-free; that is that many government, departmen s 
have set up their own land-acquisition offices, to back up the collectoi s' 
special land-acquisitions officer';. Still, other requisites for a successfu'l 
laad-acquisit iol program- political Will and broad statutory poWers­
exist in a)undance in India, which makes it worth special study. (In 
Sri Lanka, there is a similarw centrcalized land-acquisition institut ion 
which services the needs of' various public bodiest. 
DISCUSSION 
It is difficult to leconilnenld any model as cleai'lv superior. Too 
ma111ny variables aff'ect the ut iility (It'each. H istorical and cu ltolai prefer­
ences often combine with more tallgiil, variables to diclate what will 
be most successful in a nV specific cou itry. Forexampi)le, when a govern­
ment d(oes not have the will, the legislative auth Wity, o, bth, to 1on lit 
i Se'i(1(s pr'ogl'am of'conipoulsl'y acquisitiOli, stIccess will elude a wVhtl 
pl)lic institution with its staff struggling to negotiate voluntall'y pill'­
chases. Ill such a siituatioln, govermelits should give seliOlls colisidela­
tioln t private or sel ip,'i vat', specialized land-acquisition o1lits With 
the att horitv'- to act as t liei prilVate-sectol' counterparts would act. IIo'­
ever, when 2oupu ls()I'y aicq ulIisition is a inajor tool in the pu(bli iilven­
tory, it will nor'allI(, bedifficult to (,hlgate compulsory. public-purpose 
depelidenlt lox e'S t tilithall f'll1 Ix Ll)l ic instit utio s. In slcl cas-, 
the public-lgency model, perhps wit h soie degree of 'celit ralizat ill and 
specialization, is in order. This is not to suggest that vesting a private 
M seliliprivate corporation with i('iinent-domain authlrit' s vwrong. 
Indeed, there are circcLu lusta Ic(,s in which, With safeguards and piitpiI­
legislation, it would maake sells(, flor ministries to delegate their eminent­
donlmil authority to .s)ecialized iand-deveilpmeiit c(l'pol'atiols-su'ch 
as Ja maica's UrbalI Devtlolpment (op'l)oalio ("oTunisia's A'1l. More 
likely, a govel'ii Wnlet citld con t'act With such corporalt ions to hind le 
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the details of'site appraisal and valuation as agents for the public minis­
try, limiting to itself the necessary public-puirpose findings and formal 
decisions. 
Such a contract might combine the efficiency of private or semipublic 
land-acquisition corpoiationls and the )1)1ic ministries' use of'eminent­
domain authority. Contractual arrangements for implementing compul­
sory purchas3- might help public officials be more willing to exercise 
their powers of en :,ent domain. They ight feel a lot more decisive 
if they knew that day-to-day confrontations with landowners would be 
boirne by somebody else. Costs sa-ed by the presumed efficiency of such 
agents should cover lie fees the gMovernllments would have to pay them. 
In the United States, private land developers assein ing lIand for maji­
urban projects routi nely employ the services of' private contractors as 
real estate brokers. Ift his is cost- and time-efficient for privat developers,
it would seem that it should be equally product ive for government 
developers. 
Ally ailangement betwteell govein ment and private contractors, for 
land-acquisition purposes, could cven go beyond this. Government could 
theoreticallY contract with real estate professionals to perform a iinmi­
be of services--- locating parcels of land that are purchasable, checking 
on titles, securing o1)t ions to purchase (which government could exer­
cise or not), and providing survey, appraisal, and legal services, and more. 
The demands fbr land in new area of heavy population are growing
at an unprecedented rate throughout the wvorld, especially in the dcvvelop­
ing nations. So Flu', there is no comncomitant urgency )ythe government
 
to confront this i inp( idi ng crush. 
VMinis pJul)lic agencies try to Conl­
tend with the problems of la,, ndus
a d land ac(luisition by using avail­
able, "catch-as-catch-can" bureaucracies and half-trained 
 and largely

unskilled staffpersonnel. The inefficiency and wasle are enoimous. These
 
agencies are finlding that, fbl"from influencing the overall growth of their 
cities, they are not even able to meet their own internal needs. 
A centralized, specialized, land-acquiring institution, servicing a govern ment's vM'iotis n illistries with some as apowers to act private
corporation engaged in land developing, would seem to )Irovide the hest 
answer for many developing natiolns. When there is a p(litical will, a 
national consensus sup)oI't iilng land acquisitihl, 1mnl strong la's to sup­
port them, such a centralizedlant hority can act with speed and efficiency 
in a climate of acceptance. 
Finally, for those countries in which a single centralized institution 
for land acquisition is not feasihle, sei'ious considerat ion sho ld )e giv'en 
to the alternate device that accomplishes many of the goals of' a new,
specialized unit: One governmuent agency can contract for the sl ills and 
nmanpower of another, miore-expei't agencyIIO a ollre -less regula- basis. 
Chapter 5 
Financing Land Acquisition
 
In most developing countries, land-acquisition functions are car­
ried out independently by the various government agencies (education, 
health, housing, defense, and so forth) and are financed out of' each 
agency's annual operating budget. These annual budgets are almost 
always less than adequate for ordinary and usual recurring costs. Land­
acquisition expenditures, costly and generally extraordinary, are hard 
to justify when they are competing against such recurring, nonpostpon­
able expenses as salaries and supplies. In other words, s.-laries must be 
paid, but a parcel of land can be purchased now or put aside indefinitely. 
The result is that land acquisition often tends to be financed only when 
it can be postponed no longer, when an emergency need exists. Of course, 
that is exactly when the price of the land will be 6he highest. A primary 
goal of public authorities, therefore, must be to make sure that neces­
sary financing is available for land acquisition in a timely manner. 
Officials responsible for devising national land-acquisition programs 
face two broad financial problems. The first is how to accumulate enough 
cash and noncash government assets to pay for specific parcels of land, 
and second, if the government is determined to begin a major acquisi­
tion program, how to mobilize financial resources on a continuing, self­
sustaining basi. 
To find the resources to purchase land, governments have relied on 
a number of techniques. Tax laws can provide incentives to sellers and 
can permit the government to pay compensation to landowners by tax 
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forgiveness. Many developing countries in -'f'fect f'orce the landowners 
to help finance the govenment's purchose by tak,ing bonds as part of' 
the government's purchase paynwnt. Scnt cot nti &es use a conilitiat ion 
of debt and equity financing to support anl acquisition. Others have 
experimented with a wide v, I'iet' of additional techniques, if cludinig
tax exlenditure.,
, 
debt minclng, e(lnitv financing, Z:onirng variances,
and extenal financing. In the pages that fllow, we will discuss so e 
of the financing tech ni(fUts Used in developing ('Contries. 
TAX EXPENDITURES AND OTHER TAX 
POLIC!-S 
When a goverfnlent or. iinistry pays cash to an1owner 1,61.his
 
land, the funds usl for this payient, in il st cases, will collie from 
general tax reve',nues previously collected by thit government. Usually,

the landtowner will have to rturn to the goveln, nnt part of the pay­
mnit received, in the lbrii oftaxe,: onIf the pro(fit froml 
 the land sale. 'ell
 
taxes paid cll e used hv the government to buv nIIo"t land, thlie profits

froni which will be taxed, and the c\'cyt will cootilue. Tlixes-r'eceivalble
 
are assets that the governmient lla' t5.(; ill lieu of'. or in aoldit ion to,
cash
 
t,, finance 1i lalld purchase. 'he gove l'llinlit, 'or t'xalllile, IllaV forgive 
a landowner's ohligat ion to pay taxes of'a specitied value, as part ((ftie
 
pul'chlase package. ()r tIlte gov'l'lllI('l 
 lay defer taxes to soll' extent. 
It mlay also, as part of the collielsat ioll. isue prloiilissol' lIotes or'11011(

which na v be used 1y t he llndfowler ill sat isfn ct liol of his fl tire Ifrexist­
in! tax bills. The deht (bl s iinly Ie ted atipr At
lgat or a prealli:

1or example. a landowner is permittted to -atisfV a tax liabiiltv of'$100
 
)Nthe 5trl''rndtr and c ilcellation of' govelrn nulit bonds. with a 
face value 
of $90, which was given to) thliellfor(fwliel' 'i10'l itI tii ll(l acqui­
sition. 
Whe(li a g(('lueltt hiioligf taIx dIefIr'll IA ('w n ion, seeks to ulsethis asset to pay rl V , lll(l5;iiilser\ices, the trill is "ti: 'xp(ilditIlIre
In countries where tax collection is highly (',i'l('ic llt the 'uist oftolli'pell. 
5s t Ing a landow ner h),v pIlvillelit orI' fv ll equal tax r'idtii'a(irect c-ash 
tion should be llilit tiehe s:i '. Ii Ift hr taxwords, I'(l'givelless an(1 t axl'tbattes',asa+ source' I'm.zh flll i l ig h lid~ a lu isit iont 1:o !lt ord l'i I *lyre~p­
'ese'nt il'n-w lsollces. Yet ill devc'opiti countries c'i's- hy afialcrizid 
weallk tix adiinist rat in and taxpay('l' tax. v idalic' , the use of' tIx 
exp'ndi itIl"',', lllli\V indeeid r'iepl' esent a Irl'ge'ly cst free.,or additionli , asset 
with which fov''rlillll'lts ('il lilly colin(sailte inowiwrs. Such coull+ 
tries lacking revetlil atcquir('e il,'lded lanlid ilial' a 
tures as an1illip(Itallt Slullrc' 0tofo Ij i'li, at ion. Li ,s ale rolt iielv 
t lnturn Ito 'Xl('Iidi 
if> a 
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collected and a tax eXl)fclituietu. tibe ustf tl'tisdevice 
11111Y ,e'Vt va Iid I)1i'pio:as whe,,'I is ill t't Ig flitgov('rlIillelIIt e'ff lorlimo\'i fire 
income that is dtin, to lmeit, an immediate need. N Ist developing cotn­
tries, however, haIt tkO litht taxing pwer to makt tax eXl)vndlitures Imr 
land ac(Illisitim a o', of lBnt dtveloli­nIator tice cmnipensat ion. evi'y (N 

ing country should give caret'ul consideraiioll to) this potelntial s.urce
 
of kinds in planiing, forIland acquisition.
 
In Korea, the ust ot tax policy has beell chselv and carefully coiodi­
n11t,,d w'ith land acqilisition, through the KmrTan lxi,d l)evlopment 
Agency. TIel tax svsr.,ll gives ;Iseller incentives' to do husiless with 
th' goveirnlt'nt ani tiso allows tiegv iiitgenIcy*ltl a source of lon­
cash ctlllpcisisat ion with which to car'y tlits pr)IramI. The tax henefits 
take the fiiw'i of a deduct ion oo ,xelipli on real estate transfer tax.,:,, 
residence taxes, and sJpe'cial excise taxes. ''he tax breaks allow a total 
exenipt ion from soni taxes and a ,()per~endt teduet i n trom ot he taxes. 
'cuado is t'xpetriilenting\witl) tax for1giv(eess for govI'llnnien t pur­
ch . (*laemaila has mi niftt'iiial .',,s ti alholri­vstenleru iwhichltx 
ties 'ill coperalte illaIprivate sale o land to a government atgtiic: A\ 
the tilm o' th l vernmlt tilie seller's investfnlit insalt', th list 
ile lao d ttI 'tqlm l til ;i 11ll~ t ttt11f Sh,l price'. Il this \;,. tilt seller 
cxjperilices In ta;thle g;il I1" ti iltlite sale te the goveruiiieiit, 
b'cats' lit' it't'ei .'ds11m state that ie( ,tcqtlii'td the land at tthe ,ait 
price at which itwls stdd' 
A se set( l'cIlilidt,'';i lt s i'i-se' hiotwi' ,:,I\' tIli l 'sharlte o lit clelte 
1 ,5-t'iIl'iti' taIxt ll llrHt anil it~lilisit ion?. ,littttu revenuek'll~l !'i'oiii" ctalY;in 
existing taxes such asM Ioq r t',capital gains, landsaltS, Io real 
'll)ert.v traiist'e,s hl'segregated and liiitmiiid in a separate fund'.' 
Should g 'r'nmenI1/11ts create sootI ing dvtlopnielntil like aI "new m-;ias 
tax," tifit '' l it',. us'' iipohl ic acuisition t' lamI, st 't t h ,'t'ces 
value cleated lv) thei rla izailit tf"hiids? Siu h itlt,;is tl'd toocmi pli. 
cat''I ltx adifiiii1itrtii anid ''tlls specild treat Iiit'it tol filioritit's. 
segre'g t i e 'l 'til a specil'ic -;( 5111c l i tIItYtt, llIl c ilt a I acquire
hl d chem-lY hcI(fit.; ;I I:111d ;wcp isilill pn r iilll. 1- p4,wcidllv wlw,. it is 
just gettingv iitftr wa. 
Tax pttlicy in ,'tniitrit's %%fil a; airlv lta' cdthcsn ic .'sst'iil l sttIt'v I; lx 
liol may a indi it'l, i.; dirt'ct, limlhii,'v,sliiitaii %\.11 as t'tft'ct t1n 
~iefaiit ttefinainlg. ( tvt'riit'iits fliii\v be ilbtt sttit't mt'is tto linaii 
IN IM IlICyVI)I'(dH 'C c Ihm t ('111 Imi IliI;I ti ()l '(I t ' iild Ir,l pi ,.s::urf,-s fi 

Costs (d, thI I;In Illficy C; , il O,.
lc ;I'qI sit itll. FM'w O,NN h, tiI V l Ill 
surc, th p ice'0,t' lnd a g(v' rchast'. 
lilandowners pay littlt' ,'nt innial p'tlitt taxes ind lia' iiegligihlt, 
hlir Il'v - hi' irniuitnt miy,wish t I 
'Set, IKnremn and lcc;t, ,a:;.. Ill \ l,dit, .'l.,y. tmhw .. A\mid C', 
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carrying costs, speculators and hoarders may force up land prices. Con­
versely, annual taxes on land rnight discourage speculation and hoard­
ing, and 'oter niiod'ratt, prices. Great caution is advised in this area. 
Land markets are comple,. anld tax policy usually is hut onw determinant 
among Inuly influencing land prices. 'ui'ther, taxing land could boostprices if'owners pass tax costs on to the pui rchaser. Carl'till Ianalyses of' 
land nrkets and tax policy is indicated lifore any action is taken. 
DEBT FINANCING 
A nutrnia'i of developing ('oilitries have used debt financing to 
seCure I'soIr'ct's for a(Iliring land. T'Cn1iqtls vary flrol colntry to 
country, but a coum'nln practice is to borrow the purchase price fr-om
 
the seller- of'ten involunta,'ily-Iy issuing g'ove'rniment bonds 
as part 
or whole coilpelsation fior aln expr'priatiol. Tlh're stoemos to he general 
ac pt'l)tan((' oft iie govel'ttili I'Slct it if colllpt'iislt ilg lntlowne's with
 
iute'rt'st -bearing bonds4, ;It liast in part. Wei 
 the property sought is 
excess land Ifolr exanlt'ph, as India's I 'hallwitll Land Ceiling Act) or 
is va;itlt or undert ilized, the lt'gitinlitacy f paying in the f'or'ni of'boI ids 
"(11.15'l\'(t' l great l . 
(;\Ve'el'l lltll 1ayv 'hlhoose also to r;is hillds low la(l actuisition
 
through gener;Il tie, IissueS. which M-' tloll l u'gt,
sll i lid icit and
 
tvll
rou h q Iic than th,eins t n intrli al in I or,ban1 kIiigl i sti ­
tions. T rai iia, fgi 'isuchint'i ' ' i ,'i:ts' w ' ('vland, f casharily
 
to hI ;I ove nlintwi 's ]w fl'i)l' t ed e 1k, 'h purchist,plus th,
Nl )tnd 

luilm & hi ghhiiai'i c('t'tuin'I lht tie Bords, pte tht
ot'. rs ;('liltici 

the annual icrase i vamounflshit la ii land io. with ohrowed fays

will 1w ,attitot h1 the m
i' illit Iiltcte 
le ppl'li to ilit' a loalls. 
IoTaiwan whn tlInt gov'erinint ep' priates lind, ittpstCash up1)to the tnnoun t' Bet ween&NT$,;100.000. NT $I(0.€)00:11nd NTI;$.101,000, 
tpiinmilInt honts uscin a nIl t i ab'land iii Pi'utina t'o n O 
typeItt ';llst 1c iniliaci' iii g o i'iiilion iids),e'i'tds Nhot ,
 
Illpt hil ip nl)()'(,
tiit liloo i'iil e 'in Ind ol s w. escwhtids Illa 
he discounted nm the o 'n'rk't,Ind lt' y appear to e, fairly liquiid;1nd negoti'llde. In °T",iwaln. sonl, clss,(,; ()I'holds ;if-(,lied to,the (*(,St
of,intlllioll (h-pendenl f'(rvallue 11pwil Hwl jricf ,ofrice :111d s.ve poln 
IllMlahin , whell collnlilu l().tribal klnd i : colpulsorily acquired, 
tr'iball O '(l011111t111llH n-'l ] inlst'llin11ents of, intler'est (11!' 'ceiv'e annal 
go eri\'lenl]honlldsNtll I inlImp1n1toI .IO ndo(\\'mt l'r-inl[ ru WM I he ( nl­
peonsalted hy.tilt,isswliic f' ]lho)'g er\i~rlllln d., too. 
Illthe I'llilIippinles. under agraarhalu relforil laws. owners whose land 
has been laken inay elect to rew'id', 10 tperced ofconpvnsntivo dhie in 
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cash, with the rest in tax-free bonds issued by the Philippines Land Bank. 
The bonds mature in 25 years and pay interest at a rate of 6 percent 
per annum. Other forms of compensation authorized include offering 
owners shares of common stock in the land bank. 
Debt financing 'o acquire land in developing countries is probably 
unavoidabl(,, because fewv ot' the countries have sufficient capital for ia l­
acquisition programs of any al)preciable size. Yet, dlere is great poten­
tial for undercompensating landowners by using bonds that fail to 
engender investor conlfidence. When this occurs, and such bonds are 
viewed by holders as virtually worthless, the puLlic consensus needed 
to support a government's expropriat ion powers is seriously unodermined. 
Landowners may then find ways to Ilock government acquisition, or 
to del ay compulsory acquisition until it. no longer is a useful tool. Accord­
ingly, governments contemplating debt financing should first generate 
colfidence in their bonds. 
One way to do this is to keep the maturity of such bonds within rea­
son. Bonds with 25-year maturity dates, at fixed into-',st rates, are hardly 
reasonalble securities. Developing countries are notorious for high rates 
of inflation and weak credit markets. Except perhaps in expropriations 
based on un dertilization of Iand, governnin t bonds probably should 
have mllturities n(o longer thaii 10 to 15 years. Interest rates should also 
be reasonable. Rates cold1 he a(ljilste(l based on an Idlex of the cost of 
living or as in Taiwan mnd Chile, linkage to certain cemmodi ty price 
scales. E]very effort ';hould be made to make the bonds negotiable, per­
haps by designating them as eligible collateral for lons from govern­
ment hanks and as leglal terider for payiing taxe" a 0d other debts owed 
to the government. 
If public confidence can be estal)lished in OlndS issued to landowners, 
a general climate of 1)L)l1ic acceptance may lie create(l for other govern­
ment bond issues, floated to the plubl ic at large. The development of a 
solid local credit market For government bonds, based upon a good his­
tory in land-acquisit ion proceedings, would be of, inestimable v'alue to 
any developing country. 
EQUITY 
Urban landholdings in developing countries generally are excel­
lent investments. Land tends to keep pace with inflation, and indeed 
appreciates rapidly as urbanization gro,v.'s and infi'astructure develops. 
Thus, go;ernment cash nlay not entirely satisfy the landowner's invest­
nient motives. Expropriation, although compensated, forces the owner 
to forego his appreciatioi potential. The cunulative effect of disgrun­
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tied landowners is a dangerous political force: governments should be
careful that their land acquisitions renmain generally free of' such 
backlash. 
One way to satisfy hndowners' investment needs and still ease cash 
demands is to offer equity securities backed )y, landholdings. Land 
against which such securniies ale issued usually increases in value, which 
means the securities also increase in value. In this way, owners can ben­
etit. from lald appreciatiol, without facing tax payment on the land, hav­
ing dispo-'ed of that responsibility. 
This process cail be accomplished in a nunmber of' ways. (overnments
could create ]and-dev('CwUnient agencies or land hanks as public or semi­
public corporat ions. They could sell stock to the general public, and any 
profits could be distributed as dividends to stockholders, including land­owners who are given shares as wNvlolo or partial compensation for their 
purchased propetyv. Aiot her approach wotuld be the transfer of undivided 
interests in government land per se: certain public wouldland be
appraised by independeIt appritisers: ltnvot ing. undivided interests in 
the land would le sold to tle puhlic; all) It'lt ofra tract of government­
owned land would be (onveyi,,; a I)ospct us would describe the land,its locatiol, and the date and plcc of' its auctioning to,,the private sec­
tor; the prospectus also would di i'cst, other relevalnt facts, such as 
government budgets for tiibanizaticn of' the land and adjacent areas,
for road bu1iling, and so fo)rth; and trustees would distribute proceeds
ofhte salo. hI lw'lic and privatt- stockholders accordi Ii.t tot heir interests. 
The underlying assumlption is that individuals woL hI pay a plemiuma
above al'ket val ue ift [thev were assured that grovel'lllllnt decisions and 
actions would inclease the value of the land. If the gov-ernment is a stock­holder in the en terprise -as is recoalmended-it could easily ensure 
appreciation of the land affect ed by targeted bue(tlkr irg of public funds 
for road building, water, tnd so (,In.
With equity financing, a government cala raist eeded cash for land
acquisition without spending its limited cash or incurring more debt. 
The pricilples and decisihns leading to the issuance ofstock can be much 
the sa e its those it a private corporation. Few private corporations
relish opening th'irihooks and sliaing ownership with public. But. 
to acconplish wl't hwii, goals, some seek fudiag from fie p)1ic even 
at lhe cost. of' sharinganticipated pr)ofit s. If successful, such a venture 
henefits everyone. If'nt, the loss is shared more widely than it would 
have been otherwise. The same principles can apply to government.
Hong Kong uses a form ofe((uily financing uld(,r which sellers of land 
to the governnent may opt folr rash or "Leiter Bs. ' These Letter Bs are
seculrities that entitle the seller to an interest in other land owned by 
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the government. The Letter Bs are bought and sold in securities 
markets.* 
Probably it is unrealistic to expect that such equity devices would be 
used to finance ordinary acquisitions of land by regular government agen­
cies in the course of business. But when special land anks, or other 
parastatal or quasi-public corporations, are established to facilitate land 
acquisition, equity financing may well be an important device to capital­
ize s'uch institutions andI assure their success. 
OTHER FORMS OF FINANCING 
T're goals of developing countries seeking financing to acquire 
land generally will he the same: to acquire as much land as can be pur­
chased with limited funds to I ox'ide sufficient compensation to land­
owners so as to ,issut'( fairness and Speed lip atqeisiti(Al; and to Cut, down 
on cash outlays as much as possihle withoot creating citizen ill will. 
Tax expendi tures, debt fin a ncing, and equity fi na ncing are useful alter­
natives to cash paynlellt s. SO are Other dCvices, all morthy Of con­
sideration. 
One such alternative involves governmental regulatory po)wer. A 
government could grant a landowner variances from building and zon­
ing codes, applicable to Iis other property holdings. 'lhese variances could 
be of significant value to the landowner. It is nm usual for a government 
to use its regulatory pomer to accomplish broader purposes rather than 
solely to achieve heal! h,safety, and other specified ends.No doubt, laws 
and regulations might have to be changed toallow list, of zoning powers 
in land acquisition. But in limited circumstances, and under adequate 
safeguards, governments can grant or withhold regulatory permission 
having significant value to the pi ivat e sector, depending at least in part 
(i the government's financial interests. 
The Saskat'l-,ewan land Bank in Canada finances some of its pnur­
chases through a purchase and lease-back arrangement. Under th is sys­
tem, sellers have the first option to lease back the land, but if Ihey elect 
not to, others may rl it. The incone from the leases helps: defray the 
pllrchase price Of' the land. 
Also, the direct sale of excess land can helpIfinance government acqui­
sit ion of needed land parcels. In I-long Kong, the government raises con­
siderable sums through land sales. In Pakistan, after their independence, 
lands that vere formerly controlled by the British Crown were sold to 
Recently, however, the goverinnent has stopped using this technique. 
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private persons on a large scale. Mexico celebrated its independence in
much the same way. The United States also has sold public lands fbl 
general-revenue purposes.

Furthermore, the city of-Toi'onto has finiced much 
 of the cost of' its 
subway system through sales of excess land it purchased along the sub­
way right-of-way years before construct ion began. After the lines werebuilt, the value of* land adjacent to the subway appreciated greatly. There­
after, the lease of sach adjacent lands to the private sector brought sig­
nificant profits to the citV." 
Some governments have sought to create special f'tind.; to finance land
acquisitioi. Tunisia is considering a contract-savings scheme for land
called "Ipargne Terra ins." Th is woul ,l he modeled a long the lines ofllunisia's contract-savings system for housing. Under this system, anindividual contracts with a han k to deposit a certain fixed sLIm eve:y
month or so for three or four years, entitling him to borrow a predeter­
niled amunLIlt from the bank. The assumption is that a growing base
of contract depositors, in addition to the interest earnings, would per­
mit the bank to meet its loan demands. In fact, however, the Caisse 
Nationale Epargne Logement, which administers Tunisi a's contract­
savings progra in for housing,has had difficulty in meeting its contrac­
tual obligations to make loans." 
Singapore is understood to have a lorced-saving scheme under which 
a percentage of elnl) loyee earu ings is deposited in a National LandDevelopment Elu nd. 'Ihis i u effect has many ofthe sa me characteristics 
inherent in a special tax for lnd acquisition. Presumably, if'land acqui­
sition is a top prioriyt, Veneral, unsegregated lax revenoes can be used 
for this purpose. The creation of' special funds for Iim ited purposes may
seem attractive to special-interest groups, but the idea should be consid­
ered carefully. 
EXTERNAL FINANCING 
General Policies of Donor Agencies 
In Germany, municil)al land banking has been financed by privatelenders. Municipalities with considerable experience in land acquisition,
such as those in Sweden and Norway, generally have relied on medium­
and long-term loans firom their central governments. But most develop­
ing countries cannot help their cities that way, because their national 
governments already finance municipal governments and have no addi­
tional financial resources to spare.
Instead, long-term financing fi-om international donor agencies and 
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development foundations may be a useful funding source in the future. 
To date, however, the World Bank and the leading regional develop­
ment banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have shied away from 
directly financing land acquisition. 
The policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are fairly typical 
of the policies of the other donor agencies. The ADB believes, for the 
most part, that the borrowing country should finance its contribution 
to the project with local currency. Since land financing involves the use 
of local currency as opposed to fbreign exchange, the ADB views its role 
as supplying needed foreign exchange to assist in project financing.4 
This view, which allocates foreign-exchange financing to the external 
donor agencies and local costs to the recipient country, is in part tracea­
ble to the perpetual scarcit of foreign-exchange reserves in developing 
countries and the interests of the donor nations to foster international 
trade. 
All donor agencies strive to secure the largest possible host-country 
financing in each project. Donors rarely like to have their share of all 
project costs exceed 50 percent. The prevalent view is that the greater 
the st-are of host-country resources to a given project, the greater the 
prospects for host-country concern and thus project success. Applying 
these policies (to maximize the host-country contribution and to assign 
first priority to donor financing of foreign-exchange cost), the general 
result is that the host governments finance the costs ofland acquisition 
as part of their-share of project costs. 
The donors also have general policies against financing the procure­
ment of goods and services by the host country when procurement has 
occur-ed before the project was authorized by the donor. In many cases 
the sites for a proposed urban project already will ha ,'e been acquired 
or exist as part of government-owned stocks of land. In these cases, the 
prior costs of land acquisition will not be eligible for reimbursement by 
the donor, even though some donors may be willing to consider the prior 
costs of land acquisition (or todays' market value of the land) as part 
of the host government's required share of project financing. 
In a Sector Policy Paper on Land Reforni, the World Bank expresses 
a broader view that compensation paid for land acquisition is essentially 
a "transfer payment" from the public sector to private landowners. The 
policy paper further states that since such investment does not create 
any new productive capabilities in the host country, international lend­
ing institutions have refrained from financing land purchases." This 
policy, however, was not repeated in the author's numerous discussions 
with key staff members of the World Bank and other donor institutions, 
and consequently, it is not clear how important this theory is today. 
The institution with the strongest policy against land financing appears 
96 / Land Acquisitio' in Deoloping Countries 
to be the Inter-Ancrican Development Bank (HI)M). We were advised 
by IDB officials that there is a stringent policy to avoid this area, due 
in large part to fears of corruption and political sensitivity.
Sone recent developments indicate a somnewhat more hivorable cli­
mate i.which land-finanicing decisions will be considered. The current 
Shelter Policy lhipc , issued by AID states that programs of strategic
land acquisition for low-income shelter will he eligible for financing under 
A!l)'s housing guaranty program.'; In addition, an increasing umnber 
of bilateral All) project agreements under this housing guaranty pro­
grain expressly inclode tihe costs of' land acquisition as "eligible costs" 
frtrei mlurseient. Undet" this All) guaranty p'r)gi'al, the US govern­
ment facilitates (lirect dollar lons from private lenders in the US capi
tal market to developing count iies for development projects approved
by AlI). Tlhe US h-en(ers are encu';iged to make long-term loans by
i'eceiving giarant ies of repiyi intfrom All). In niost of the AIl)-approved
shelter projects, local curreiy costs account for f'om 85 to 95 percent
of all projects costs, and All) policy is to freely permit the distourseient 
of private-lender dollars to r,:ieihu rse for these local currency costs. This 
is hot the policy f'ordiect-AID loans and grants but itdoes operate iii 
the guaranty programn to i'emove oe barrii' to donor financing of land 
costs. 
Obstacles to Donor Financing 
In fdition to the nm'e theoretical obstacles to donoir financing men. 
tioned previously, theie ar', soie l,'actical i'easons donoirs i'e reluc­0 bWhy 
tant to get involved in financing land trinsactions. 
The fiist obstacle, m ientioned by all persons intei'viewed, is lender ftars 
of corruption o"associated pit ical 'problems.Urban land sales typically
involve Iaige sums o' lotney. land is uiniCiue and there is a peiception 
among donoi's (argoally a misp'cept ion) that the tiue value of land can­
not he asceitai ned il iiiny developing co(1 .'ies.The loi.oi' institutions 
are afraid that th, cmnlpei'isator paid fir land will he eithe," too high 
or too low. If't he fiirst occurs. the don(or will hav f'inanced a vindfall 
fir a few, plrobably well-co-n ectel, individuals at the tXl)eise ofthe pub­
lic. lfthu, lattei occurs, tle donor will have galjgred those same few polit­
ically powef'ill individuals-a prohll,,n that conlId seriouslv affect the 
donor's overa1; countiry goals and prograIns.The filiiiy typical occurrence 
of'litigation in Ild nxpropriation cases reaf'firms the lender's fears that 
differences of'opinion fair price fori land always exist.over a will 

Unfortunately, corruption and favoritism 
are a f'act of' life in every 
country. Yet, with protective controls, donor agencies may find the risks 
manageable. This author believes that, the donoi agencies hich we 
FinancingLand Acquisition / 97 
forced t ) see these potentials in their everyday dealings in developing 
countries tend to exaggerate the obstacle of corruption for land deal­
ings. The price of urban land is fairly well known by the general popula­
tion of' a city; even the most humble slum dweller often has a fairly 
accurate understanding of the worth of' his land. Clearly the public at 
large has a greater interest in and knowledge of' the domestic land nmar­
kets than the external markets for goods and services which are the 
major recipients of' donor financing. This knowledge should tend to check 
extreme incidents of corruption so long as the donor agencies exercise 
the same degree of' supervision over the procuremelnt of land as they 
do For their other donor-fina nced procurenients. Lenders will have stand­
ing to police a land purchase they are financing when other local insti­
tutions may not. The number of'partiCs to a land purchase are generally 
small, the sums involved are large, and with pioper appraisal techniques, 
the problems Of' corruption should be fairly manageable. 
Lenders also fear involvement in realistic political problems related 
to land tenure. As stated previously, mften those who own large amounts 
of' land also hold considerable political powel'. For such persons, continued 
control over land may have political as well as economic raimifications. 
Both the international (onor and the national development agency can 
antici pate sign ificant political problems in transferring land owned by 
the powerful a id,wealthy into public ownership. Undoubtedly, the ulti. 
mate price paid for such land as well as the amount of' time needed to 
carry out the process of' acquisition wi II underscore such a probleni. There 
are cultural probI lems too, that donors f'ear. While lInd in deveIoped coun­
tries may have important cultural values, such values are usually not 
a serioas hInpediment to acqllisition. For example, in the United States, 
when a family-run farm is condemned for publ ic purposes, a very good 
opportunity ustiall_ exists for an attractive farm to be acquired else­
where. Thus, the strong attachment to land felt by the owners often can 
be overcome by the availability of' other reasonably priced lands else­
where. In developing countries, attachments Lo land may be historically 
based, and the land itself' may hold important cultural valties to its 
owners. In these situations, other parcels of land eqtually suited fori farm­
ing may not be an adequate substitute, even when adequate compensa­
tion is made for acqouiring such land. Donors will need to learn to find 
solutions for these prol)lenm. 
Another constraint is the lack of experience in land transactions among 
the professionals who staff the donor agencies. The traditional educa­
tional background of' professionals Utilized by international lending agen­
cies are in the areas of' housing, engineering, planning, economics, and 
political science. Few people who come from the public or private sector 
into international development have experience and familiarity with 
98 / Land Acquisition in Developing Countries 
land transactions. For example, in the United States, where there are 
large nurbers of trained people in the development professions, only 
a very few are in tile position to be directly involved in real estate trans­
actions involving large tracts of land. In the public sector, the role of 
principal in land transactions has been reserved for highly specialized 
groups ofprofEssionals. Often because of their high degree of specializa­
tion, such professionals have not been brought into the international 
lending community. Furthermore, since the termination of urban­
renewal programs in the US and new-town development in Europe, there 
have been relatively few opportunities for the professional to gain
experience in this field. This lack of experience also exists among the 
professionals of the borrowing cotuntry. Given the absence of resources 
for land acquisition, there have been relatively few opportunities for 
local staff to develop the skills and confid&-nce necessary to undertake 
land transactions. In view of this lack of training, it is understandable 
why the conservative donor agencies are not eager to enter this new 
area of lending. 
Until recently there has been no compelling need for tile donors to 
finance land or otherwise get involved with land-acquisition problems.
Land for urban l)rojects of the donors has not always been a serious prob­
lem. There is, however, always a certain amount of inertia in the donor 
agencies that makes it difficult to change policies. No one like to be first. 
There are risks to land financing, and it can be expected that donors 
will move slowly before policies change. Likewise, in developing coun­
tries, the processes of efficient land acquisition will be curtailed by a 
shortage of trained personnel. Not only is there a severe shortage of' 
professionals trained in the science of' land evaluation and appraisal,
but any new program requiring the reallocation of manpower resources 
for this purpose usually has an adverse impact upon other essential pro­
grams which require these same prof'essionals. In addition, personnel
with specialized legal training in the process of land transfers are 
required. The process also requires that an effective system of ident iy­
ing and recording title to land has to be established. Experience in the 
United States has shown that it takes a substantial number of years
to establish a sufficient quantity of' personnel to operate this system.
The donor agencies need intermediaries in the developing countries 
to actually cariy out the landf-acquisition processes. The donors cannot 
act on their own. Unless and tintil the donors have confidence in the 
host country professionals, they will not be inclined to include ad hoc 
land acquisition costs as eligible components in their urban projects.
Of course, this attitude will change when the object of' the donor' 
assistance is to improve the machinery of land acquisition per se. 
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Potential Role of Donor Agencies 
Assuming international donor agencies both recognize the need for land­
acquisition programs and are willing to finance these programs through 
loans and grants, there are a number of important contributions that 
the donors can make. The first is the transfer of the funds required for 
land acquisition. These funds can have a wider and more important effect 
than that of solely acquiring tne land needed for specific projects. The 
timing of funds' availability and the promise of a fairly certain supply 
of funds over a long period of time-aspects which only donors can 
assure-will permit planning actions that can make programs of land 
accuisition truly successful. Assured funding sources will permit the 
procurement action to occur when the time is right-not (as is often the 
case) the moment when scarce funds are available. The sustained avail­
ability of funding for land acquisition is important to strengthen local 
institutions. Without committed resources, a program of land acquisi­
tion in a developing country cannot succeed. 
Donor agencies can mobilize the private sector and arrange that their 
knowledge, skiiz, Find experience with land acquisition be available to 
developing countries. While the methods used for land acquisition in 
developed countries are not necessarily the best or the most effic'ent, 
the very substantial body of knowledge developed through experience 
can be highly useful to developing countries. In the Untied States, for 
example, there are a number of periodicals and professional organiza­
tions which concentrate exclusively with this specialized activity. At 
the university and professional levels, there are a variety of professional 
training courses, both in short- and long-term public land acquisition, 
designed to train public and private-sector personnel to carry out vari­
ous roles in public land acquisition. From an educational point of view, 
the utilization of experience in the field of land acquisition in developed 
countries can save a very significant amount of time and help to avoid 
potential mistakes that can occur in the development of institutions for 
land acquisition in the developing countries. 
At an operational level, assistance in the field of land acquisition for 
urban projects could be enhanced by drawing upon thi! body of experience 
and by including some of the following co.iiponcnt;.. First, personnel 
trained in land acquisition, both on the administrative and technical 
levels, could be made available to the developing country. Moreover, 
operating methods developed by local governments in developed coun­
tries could be reviewed and in many cases adapted to fit the needs of 
similar institutions in the developing countries. By making adminis­
trative procedures used in the lending countries available to the develop­
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ing countries, local institutions can be developed in shorter periods of 
time than would be otherwise possible. 
Donors such as AID would be interested in facilitating the skill trans­
fer of private-sector land-acquisition techniques. There are individuals 
and organizations in the private sector who have developed successful 
techniques for acquiring land in the complicated and risk-prone real 
estate market. Understanding such techniques may well provide some 
lessons for similar ventures in the developing countries. While assum­
ing the same degree of risk may not be suitable for governmentally 
directed activities, some of the methods used by the private sector, as 
pointed out earlier, may be suitable for government-directed acquisi­
tion prog-rains. It may also be possible and even desirable that in certain 
instances the private sector be utilized directly as an agent for large­
scale land acquisition. 
An important general concept of the private land developer (with some 
exceptions) is that no one piece of land has all the attributes of a perfect
site for shelter development. However, a large number of land parcels 
may contain at least some of these attributes. By conducting a multiple­
acquisition program, and negotiating for many sites simultaneously even 
though only one parcel is to be purchased, the private sector is able to 
determine the realistic market for land at a particular point in time 
and is thus more likely to find that seller who, at that particular time, 
has the greatest incentive for completing a transaction. 
Another method of land acquisition used by the private sector is the 
purchase of rights or options to buy land at some later period of time.* 
By employing the use of options to acquire land, the land buyer is able, 
with a limited amount of resources, to control far more parcels of land 
than if he employed the technique of outright purchase. Since there is 
a high 1'gr'ee of risk in determining the future use of the land, this meth­
odology can help to reduce risk by controlling many parcels of land simul­
taneously. In addition, the use of 'he options allows the buyer to drop 
a particular project when it becomes apparent that the parcel is not 
suitable for development. Normally, since land values increase rather 
rapidly just prior to use, the cost of the options plus the prem um on 
.,e site itself', are usually offset by the rapid increase in the site's value. 
When land acquisition for future residential development is an impor­
tant part of a national housing scheme, these as well as other methods 
of land acquisition by the private sector may well have useful applica­
tion. The public sector accordingly can undertake programs utilizing 
*For further discussion of multiple acquisition and the use of options, see chap. 2, under 
"Voluntary Bargain and Sale." 
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some of these techniques. The donor agencies can help to bring these 
techniques to the attention of developing country officials. 
A potential role for donors in the land-acquisition process is to be able 
to have an important effe," upon the sensitie political aspects of land 
acquisition. Donor agencie; should investigate the possibility of work­
ing at higher governmental levels and political structures in a land­
acquisition program. In many instances, the international donor is in 
a better position than local administrators and technicians to work with 
the existing national or regional governmental and political structure 
to build the necessary institutions and to train the required personnel. 
This role would be particularly u' efo fbr housing programs for low­
income families. The internationa! donor can help to demonstrate to local 
governments that land acquisition, in combination with the appropri­
ate institutional structure, is essential to providing shelter for the lower­
income population. 
The donor institutions can pl,,v an important role in dealing with ipe­
cial problems of corruption and favoritism. As stated previously, donors 
have a unique standing for treating the problem of corruption and mis­
use of funds which lccal institutions may not have. Local governments 
are especially concerned that lending programs, through international 
donors, be accomplished in an effective and efficient manner to main­
tain a good relationship between bcrrower and donor. This concern can 
be utilized by the international donors in land-acquisition programs to 
deal with the potential rlisuse of public funds. 
Precedents have a1 :'eady been established for international donors to 
ovarsee the implementation of local projects. Since land acquisition is 
an important and visible part of any project, local borrowing institu­
tions are likely to agree with this role. Finally, because the process of 
land acquisition involves highly specific values, it lends itself to just 
such an arrangement.. In exercising its supervisory responsibility, the 
international donor can make a significant contribution to improving 
the process of land acquisition. 
Overcoming Obstacles/Future Prospects 
The obstacles to donor financing for land acquisition will not disappear 
overnight. Although the policies and practices of the major donors are 
similar, it is not reasonable to expect that changes in their attitude will 
occur in a similar fashion. The following, however, is a discussion of 
the kinds of practices that in various combinations could persuade the 
donor agencies to take a second look at proposed land-acquisition projects. 
First, to attract the interest of a donor, the project proposed to the donor 
must involve more than a request to transfer funds to finance a one­
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time land-procurein ut exercise for a given project. Donors do not like 
to engage in mere resource transfers without being able to inluence 
policy, effect technology transfers, and engage in institution building.
Adding v fourth 4enerA- category of onivate-sector involvement, All)
refers to these practices as tile liliars" of'development. In this sense,four 
all donors will look for an opportunity to contribute something of lh,t­
ing va'ue to the overall processes of land acquisition, making theii m'ore
effici( nt and equitable. This presumes that there is a demonstralble need
in the developing country for an improved urban 1and-acquisit ion capa­
bilit? caused by increasing scarcity ofhld, poorly trained officials, imlade­
quat- laws, or inadequate policies.
Moreover, prior to financing a ld-acquisition progrni, donors will 
want to study tile land markets and other land-re lat, d i.,sues to better 
set development goals and priorities. One methodology f6r t his, recent l* 
developed and published 1 All) is its "(Guidoli nes forIlmrban Lanl 
Studies: Issues, Data, andIMothods. ' ' Th is met hodi )logy , amoog (it her 
purposes, is designed to produce information from which a land­
acquisition strategy could be develo)ed.
 
Other conditions of interest to the donors 
are (a) a climate con(licive
to law and policy reforrm; (I) an attitude of' accepltanc( o outside advi­
sors; (c) high-level political support for the goals of' the land progrln;(d) a prospective intermediary institution with which the donor could
work; (e) a willingness to set u t) the interniediary with at least some 
private-sector powers to p1lav the land market; (f)a plan u deu which 
the intermediary will seek a stat us of eventual financial self-sufficiency;(g) prospects for the irtermed1iary institution to be a plaver in urlban
capital-ILudget decisions:ih policies in ti he country that favor low-inloMe 
urban ftimilies; (i) prospects for StUdlyiig the (lomeStic land markets to 
learn the ftcts; (JI)prospects for donor influence on capital-budget deci­
sions (which dramaticallv affect the value of urban land); and Ik) limitedinitial goals of the intermediary to acquire lanl fi projects planne
rather than for general land-banking purposes.
If'the projections oil high urlban growth in devel op ilng coon tries are 
true, and if-[.-'rent trends conit inue, both (ono-s andI tle developing coiiu 
tries increasingly will face pro)lems :ls(ciated with the inabilit ivof' t h(
l)ulIic sector to cootr'ol land use ou1acqui(i, urban lanl fCor essellt ial puh­lic projects at l)rices and within time periods that are reasonable. 
It is logical to believe that developing countries increasingly will ask 
the donors for assistance and that these requests will le increasingly
honored-as the (hlors themselves acquire the necessary expertise to 
respond intelligently. 
Moreover, external finoncing need not ibe il the form of' direct loans 
and grants. It couId be in tile form of' guaranoties attached to govern­
FinancingLand Acquisilion / 103 
ment bonds, for example. Full subscription to a bond issued hy a newly 
f'ormned land bank or land-develop-entt agency cmdld be assured by the 
donos guarantee of full or partial repayment of the bonds. The donor, 
of course, im1ust have a good reputation in the countrvy involved. This 
guarantee might insUte full sales through a corn parat ively inlexpensive 
act of( d ll" assistance. 
Donor loans fr"carefully organized land-acquisition pro jects in iany 
devhloping countries can lie "bankable." After some experiences point 
the way, it is probalile that I'vat e hankers can he induced to foI low 
the lead of the donor agencit's in underwriting self-i'inoincing land acqui­
siti on. 
In the neanltime. tlthe to hear of the press­donlor apenvies w il clt ililu 
ing need for such finncing in tdeveloping countries as rapid urbalniza­
toin gives way to deiantis for strategic land acquisition to manage the 
citis' growthI. It is believecd that, increasingly, the dollnor agencies will 
respond with tihe lleals to ,illnnce land-aCtlliiiti loneeds. 
SUMMARY 
Inacdequate financing for land acuUisit ion is expected to be a seri­
ous obstatcle for developing couni't ies illthe foieseeat,alef'uIltt. Nlllny 
such countries simply canlnot fi llance inviin ediate necessit ies, such as food 
and fuel, let alone consiler purchases when the benefits are realized 
in the f'ul.ure. A long-termi inveslienlt in]lnd. no imatterlhow attractive 
the investment may be, is simply beyond t he reach of nllny countries. 
Th re al', howvt'er, Sonie promising -eas to explore: The first is the 
use of noncasfi colmemisation, such as hartier of excess land, granting 
zoning waivers and development rights to sellers. and giving preferen­
tial tax and land-titling treatment. Anot her device, called "excess con­
delnatioin," also Oeserves comsidteration. Under this device, the 
governtinent will acquire slightly illore land than it nee'ds alol corridors 
wmen roads allid infiastrUctlore conslltUrlioiu are' l)arli'ld. Tht'resale of 
such excess land, after it his appr'ciated significant ly frolni gov'rnment 
invest ment in infi'stucture, will help fiainc'e otIi tie oiiginal acqui­
sition lnd sole of'te ilii-ovements. Foi'exalmple, in tlit' United States, 
the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority sold lensed parcels 
of land alngsidt its n.wly construllttd subway tc private developers 
f'or abot $1.5 million lt'r yai'. lfgoverilnents can ICtiir' the, seed cap­
ital for the first excess acquisition, the profits realized viiight cleate tile 
capitalization for a contin ued, illling effort. A third avenuie tti explore 
is seeking external donor finticing fon the World Bank, regional 
developiient banks, nd tile hilhteral donor ilgelcies. 
Chapter 6 
Advance Land Acquisition
 
As urban growth soars in developing countries, enormous quan­
tities of new land will be required for public purposes-roads, housing, 
schools, hospitals, parks, markets, and other public facilities. Planners 
who seek to control where and how new urban centers will grow will 
make even greater demands for public land accumulation. Government 
atithorities must contrive efficient acquisition strategies to carry them 
past all the difficulties certain to arise. One of the first questions to be 
answered is this: Should future land needs be anticipated through 
advance acquisition and is this possible'? It is common knowledge that, 
if governments wait to acquire land until the need is imminent for a 
specified purpose-for example, as the site for low-income shelter-the 
most desirable land will have been preempted by the very population 
pressures that caused the public's need for land. 
Understandably, if a developing country's government delays its deci­
sion to acquire needed land until it is drastically needed, acquisition 
costs will be significantly higher. Also, the administrative time and effort 
expended to consummate a hurried purchase will be considerably greater 
than for a timely one. One answer obvioutsly is to anticipate the needs 
for land and to parchase it in advance. 
It may be useful at this point to explain the term "advance land acqui­
sition" in this context. We are considering here the strategic advance 
acquisition of limited amounts of land. The purposes of such acquisi­
tion-"are primarily to acquire the best sites for planned public facilities 
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at a time when such sites are within tile f'inancial reach of the govern­
ment. A term sometimes used to describe this is "project land bank ing."
A secondary purpose, which is dependent upon a strong and skillful 
institutional base, is to acquire land along grovth coridors and thereby
(with targeted budgeting of' capital resources) ef'fect growth and land 
use patterns in a nrodet roanner. We are not considering in t his chap­
ter advance land ac(fuisition that could be described as gmeral land­
banking act iviti es. When the term connotes large-scale efforts with a 
serious goal of affecting land prices, we are not sanrguine about general
land-banking activities in developiing countries. Few it'any developing
countries will have t t% will, 'iriaricil resources;, or expertise to carry 
out land-banking activities in a creditalile scale. 
For all kinds ofladvace land acitiisit ion, a caxelt is recessar'. Regard­
le.ss of't l:, rapid esCal-tior of'land prices in rafpidly growiig urban areas 
in (hevehping count ries and the general coierinsus that it is (lif'icult for 
iurchaser's to lose great amounts of money through improvident acqui­
sitions, each )roposed advance land acquisition Sheuld le subject to rig­
orous cost-ernefit analysis hef'ore decisions are ma(e. Nothing in this 
Chapter should be const rued ',o (fowripla. the ilmportance of'careful eco­
nonic analysis. 
A major obstacle lo st ategic ailvance land acquisitior is t prevailing
public ittitUde that land ac(]Lisition and dispfOsition is particular'ly sus­
ceptible to fraurd Or ftailur(, aid theref'ore Major initiatives ilr this area 
are to b- avoided. Th is view is shared bv many nd deserves sorle seri­
ous invest igation. ''llis anut hor', however, does not subscribe to this view. 
Official in developing countries rrnnage their annual fIurdgets and 
engage in sophisticated procur'enirt act ivit it's nil v. They purchase food 
on international commodity markets, they sell raw mnaterials, they pu'­
chase sophisticated machirery and textils, arid Hey generally purchast
items that are sold in highly specialized external mr'kets. Critics, on 
occasion, may point to pr'ocure'eent err''r's aid 'or-ri'pi ion, firl fe\w sug­
gest that sophisticated gove'rnment )r')ctr'ement activit ies should cease. 
Contr'ary to external nmar'kets For goods and services, the dorr(ist ic land 
markets are generally welriunderstod by local buyers and sellers. 
Gxovernment official and indeed even the piorest sluIm ldwellers, k now 
the donestic land rmr'ket frhfips better 11h:rrr rily other mr'ket. fi .;oci­
eties where corruptior is endemic, the possibnilities for frud n( corrup
tion in local mr'kets that are well understood (f"or example, land) are 
pr'obably cons;derably iess tihan in exte'rnal mr'kets. Ilomewners in 
developing countries, as they do in the West, have an uncanny knack 
of' knowi ng Ihe lue of parcels for sae. So long as proper puficrty is 
ssuremd, it xill be urlikely that, highly inlated i11d purchase prices
will be paid to powerfui private citizens without tile general pIblic being 
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aware of it. With publicity and at least moderate democratic traditions, 
it is believed that government officials will conduct land purchases with 
equal or gr'eater knowledge and skill than other large government pur­
chases and that they will be held accountable for their actions by an 
intelligent-equally knowledgeable-public. The skepticism that nour­
ishes the fear of corruption in land transactions is not to be dismissed, 
however, but probably is exaggerated, particularly when viewed in the 
broader context of the daily procurement responsibilities of developing 
country officials. 
ADVANTAGES OF ADVANCE LAND 
ACQUISITION 
Surplus Value Benefits 
A strong argument for advance acquisition-and the earlier the better-is 
that land prices go up increasingly as the time approaches for the 
intended public use. Darin-Drabkin estimates, for example, that advance 
land acquisition could cut two-thirds from the percentage of land costs 
compared with the total costs of public housing.' Therefore, the finan­
cial implications of advance land acquisition are enormous, and they 
affect every aspect of urbanization, which is essentially a wealth-creating 
process. 
Land at the periphery of'urban areas, onc,' it is urbanized and improved 
with roads, infrastructure, and parceling, may appreciate in value at 
a 1ate of' tw or three times (or more) the actual cost outlay of these 
improvements.2 II most cases, the roads, sewerage, electricity, and the 
rest are installed at public expense: Thus, the dramatic appreciation 
of privately owned lands is the product of public investment-"surplus 
value" that is reaiiy ar "unearned increment," as economists describe 
the phenomenon. In si mplified terms, the process is as follow,;: Popula­
tion increases and migrations frorn rural to urban areas r; sult in larger 
urban populations that require land for settlement, social facilitiesjobs, 
commerce, and an almost endless list of other municipal needs. The 
amount of'land available in cities (particularly land with urban services) 
is limited Thus, he-ivy demand affects a limited supply, forcing dlra1stic 
increases in prices. Increasing the supply (,furban land, by extending 
transportation lines, and servicing new areas with water, sewerage. elec­
tricity, and the like, is costly and slow. In almost all countries, govern­
nents have not been able to increase the supply of urban land at a rate 
equivalent to the demand created by natural increase and migration. 
Supply has always lagged behind, and prices always have increased 
accordingly. 
-- 
----------- 
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Urban Plot$$$ Plot Value 
Installation of "fifth" "Z" is !he "surplus" valueId5 "
 service facility* created when service 
-- "facilities are installed 
InstJlation-4f "fourth" 
service " "Surplu," is defined as 
difference between 
"D" represents increase in increase in market value 
value from installation of"% ("D") and actual costD public services 
' ("N ") 
("infrastructure") 
d2 Installaion of "second' ''N"represents the actual 
service N cost of installing service 
..
 facilities** 
dl Installation of "first" "Y" represents theservice "surplus" created by 
subdividing, primitive 
'' represents increase roads, and primitive 
in value from 'sbdividing: I services 
C primitive roads; enough- ';" represents the actual 
primitive services to make "so----II cost of subdividing,plots salable jMj primitive roads, and 
- --- -.-. primitive services 
"B" represents increase in : 
value from oilcial I "X" represents theB recognition landi, ii incease invalue arising 
'urbani hb 'i rmr official reclassifica­
"A" represents increase in tiul from 'Agricultural" 
A value iecognied by to "Urban": "The
I. Planner 'sGift" $ market even though land
 
Undivided officially still
 
Agricultural

Land 'agricultural"
 
*Weassure five services in this diagrtm. An actual project nmy have many nmore (or fewer).
"*Like "D," "N" and "Z" May occur in steps, with ei'ch service. (Each step not shown, as 
inthe case of the "five" steps represented in "DI.") 
Source: W IIiam A. DoebeIe (fromimat'rials prepared for- an AID-sponsored workshop held 
in Washington, 1).C., January 1980). 
Figure 6.1. Schematic diagram of the increase in the value of land 
(per square meter) as it proceeds from large, undivided, unser­
viced parcels of agricultural land (base line) to small, subdivided, 
serviced plots ready for urban construction (top line). (Actual
proportions of all items will vary greatly in different countries, differ­
ent cities, and different projects.) 
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It reveals thatThis process is presented in more detail in Figure 6.1. 
urban land markets are extrenitly imperfect: Demand 
is very high and 
continuous, and suldividing (C and M) falls far behind demand, 
compli­
cated by speculat ive withholding of landi i,the 
expectation of even higher 
and by Iailure of public authorities to grant permlits prices in the future 
cases, clouded t itls and outmoded recording 
sys­
fast enough. In some 
tems also constrict supply. 
'he demand-supply discrepancy is great between 
demand for land and 
availability of parcels subdivided into lots. 
But the discrepancy is even 
greater between the demand for serviced urban 
lots, which require the 
actions of many pulic agencies as well as 
the developer, and their sup­
n:ikjoi" city in any developing country has 	been able ply. Virtuallv no population 
provide . erviced lots at the rate denmanded 
by urba i 
to 
increases. Thus, while the cost of installing 
services, is high (especially
 
resulting increase in mar­
for sewer systems)-see N in Figure 6.1 -the 
a ways much higher, causing surplus value 
(Z). 
ket value is almost 
If N, the cost of installing public services, is 
borne by public agencies, 
no mechanisms for recovering these expenses 
from the land that 
with 
us (Z) (or profit to the owner or developer) is cor­benefits from it., surpl 
respondingly greater.	 when urbanvalues that occursis the increase in landSurplus X 
to perceive the possibilities of' future urbaniza­growth causes people 
tion: Not only are they willing to pay more 
for the land, but the value
is
when the original perceptioncreated inc'easessurplus that, is 
an actionl of the appropriate public land-control 
agency. 
legitimized by 
Designati ng on a zoning map, or official master 
plan, that a particular 
area is now legally eligible for urban uses--is 
the kind (I'action to cause 
land valies to soar. 
What is even more attractive to the landholder 
is that both-the install­
sur­
ing of pub'ic service and public prception 	
of'urb lnization -create 
or even investment by him, 
plus value without any cost to the owner be substantial. 
even though the financial benefits may 	 ason forThis is known as the "the planner's gift", and it is a maior r 
land acquisitiot. Earlyto emphasize advance government planners 
a major bonus to government negotiators. 	If' land acquisition can 1ri)-. 	 triggersto a point that 
c"n be bought efore urbanization p)rogress 
e s 
an upward spiral in real estate prices, savings 
to the government might 
well cover the initial acquisition costs plus carrying 
expenses of the entire 
parcel. 
All increases in land costs. whetlher caused 
by public decisions Zffect­
ing the land and public investient in it, or 
by the natural progression 
of demographic events, can be avoided to stome 
extent by early acquisi­
rea(liustments" proce­
tion. This is the principle behind Korean 	
'land 
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dures.* An owner whose land undergoes urlbanizatitnreap a wind'all inevitabl]y willas his land value appreciates. 'I'ls increase often willaccrue without e'f. r,trisk, or investment on his part. The public canshare in such henetits only by the speedup of laind ownership-that is,advance acquisition. Rel)eat ed UN resolut ions, begin ning with the Van­couver resolutions in 1978, a rlt str'ongly for such public gain.s fromthe benefits of the unearn ed i ncrement to laind values. 
Predevelopme., Benefits
 
Ihere are other ad vatages (ifadvancebefore it, becomes (tensely popu hit ed 
idl an iquisition. Land acquired 
or developed. for instance, canassembled more easi l into betracts lige enough foi' major development.Economies ofscale then can he realiwed in the assenhling, giading, andservicing of'large tracts. Public costs cal he minimized by providing infra­structulie l)etoi'e(other St iict tres It,, t
been built, often only to be torndown. It is almifost atlwayvs lesvacant OXpe,t) e t itopt vatei' and sewerage intofarmland than into developed slhus. The same is tiue for road­ways that, if installed lefore irge set t letn t activity, can he completedwith 
Fu'the'iore,
adequate rights-of-way.
acquiring land that islot of individuals, including ownmors, 
a ready de vheloped can upsetl atenants, and .(Jltattei tl Pe land­acquisition sdecisionlaunched, dlisrup~tio)n is nadeu at the saie timsuly.even mlor'e painf'ul. ai specif'ic inojectThe lantd being sotightis 
will have been prirviotisly levelopedl by the owners and occupiers, usually.Teinlas or squattCT's will exhibit considera)lte emotional olject ions, longwith a financial interest in the land. The result is that attempted 
.cqui­sition of'developed land generally is more economically boder,,some and
politically disrti ive than 
a case involving, say,develed land usedt soet eriph ,ral, til­nti i'ely t' agicture.WII n tht public acquiresagrictltolural land in advance, usually f'ewer p)rivate interests are at stake
and the solidii'ication 
 of' vested inteirests has not vet begu. 
Administrative Benefits 
Advalnce site ic(ltiisitiol can save tine and atdministrativye expense.Malnyl d]evelol)mlent projects involving intenat ioaI donors, such as theAgency fOr International )eveol)ment and the World Bank, haveexperienced costly delays arising f'rom ptrobltems of'site acquisition. Con­t'actor, equipment, anI sufl))ier costs coniacquisition procedures ue to escalate while site­lri;,10on. Often, sites i'e chosen to'" developnlent, 
<S('e
al ;ochap.2 and App',,,hx A. 
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not on pure merit, but simply because the government happens to own 
the land or can get it easily and expeditiously. This adds to project costs 
and often leads to forced acceptance o1 second-best sites instead of top­
priority locations. This unhappy situation might be avoided, at least 
in part, by well-planned advance aCluisitio(n. 
Impact on Land Markets 
Practiced on a large scale, advance acquisition, together with appropri­
ate land-disposition strategies, can have a profound effect on tie price 
Ofr land and on land tlalrkets in general. However, few developing coun­
tries with fre narket economies have the will or resoIurces to engage 
in advance acquisition to a degree that would influen.ce land-market 
prices. lut,this is an oution as a potential defense against unchecked 
land speculation. Most likely, advance acquisition will be used to pur­
chase site for projects that are planied fn' construct ion in the foresee­
able future, perhaps inl a two-to-five-year tiie spaln. This practice is 
sometimes called "project land banking" to distinguish it from more 
general advance acquisition program,,;.The benelits to government deriv­
-ng a purchase five years in advance may not he as great as a )ui'­from 
chase ten0 yer:; in advance. But then, too, the risks are not as great. 
Case-by-case cost-benefit analysis will guide the decision making about 
how early thL hla nd purchases should be made. 
Impact on Lind Use 
Advance acquisition also can be an inpiltint t(iol in cintrolling land 
use. As migrants stream into cities from the farmlands over the next 
decade, shelter and employment for these pople will be a central con­
cern to all developing countries. While urban populations are expected 
to double by the ear 2fl)(, the great 'st growil-, will occur in cities of 
seven million or more in piopulation. Indeed. s'ne inetropoli'an areas 
are expect,(l to reach well tver 20 million (Sao Pauhto or even in excess 
ofr 0 million GMexic) (ity) - l'he environment al, econolnic, and social 
impacts of rI)id tilan ge wt h are Coll(iinded Liy this c)ncentratiion 
ilrellt ively fw urbanll areas. 'T'l rate of urban growth and its skewed 
(listributioll thReatens to Overwheln urIban and national governments. 
Their capacity to plan and ilutence long-range changes will determine 
whether their systems can control land use and cope with unprecedented 
pOpulation piressures. 
' 
'Seu - gs . 1.1-1.3 ill te lltroduict i(il. 
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The tools available are fairly limited. Zoning laws in most developing
countries are eithec nonexistent. or poorly enftorced. Few, if any, experts
are confid'2nt that zoning laws can guide the growth of major cities indeveloping countries over the next decalde. Building Codes and tax lawsare sinilarly ill suited for land use control in the expanding cities ofdeveloping COtz1f'ies. The effectiveness of such laws dicectly depends
upon a highly literate, disciplined, and organized population andbureaucracy. Developi ig countries cannot meet these criteria.What are the tools, the:.? What instruments exist that can make adifference? Of all the possibilities for land use control, land acquisitionis the most proni 
-ng. By acquiring strips of land in corridors where 
planners believe growth can be better accomm,-dated and served, andby using capital budgets and other governmental powers to make those
expectations a Ieality, governments should be able to iiflulence gener­
ally the settlement of a large segment of urban migrants to areas acquired
by the government and deemed most suitable. 
Dramatic exaomples of advance ai,-(uisi tion to infl leiice urban growth
can he seen in new towns built in Great Britain, Brazi!, and elsewhere.By acquiring land and establishing housing, schools, churches, and trans­portation in selected areas, governments can control the direction of thegrowth of new populations. Moreover, by dedicating industrial parks
and providing other amenit ies, governments con divert growth to whereindustry will locate. It must be stressed, though, that, advance acquisi­
tion can have this eflect only if*it is done intelligently and ski!lfully. 
PROBLEMS OF ADVANCE LAND
 
ACQUISITION
 
Drawbacks to advanced acquisition in developing countries can
be summarized 
as lack of funds, lack of institutions that can correctly
manage the endeavor, lack of political foresight and will, and lack of 
efficient laws and powers. 
Lack of Funds 
It,
is simply too expensive for most developing countries to acquire large
quiantities ofhand in advance of perceived need. Many ofthese countrieshave difficulty in meeting their critical current seents, such as payroll
and import bills for food anid fuel, let alone budgeting for future invest­
ments. When a government is in this financial condition, investing forfuture profit and advantage simply is not a justifiable course. In sonC 
cases, the lack of funds will be insurmiountable. In others, advance acqui­
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sition may already have been tried and abandoned as a failure after 
unwise investments of funds. In these cases, ways may be found to bor­
row, seek donor support, or otherwise make adjustments to try again. 
Once the initial capital investments are made in land acquisition, the 
goal of the programs should be to achieve self-sufficiency, with profits 
from the first land purchases and sales going to finance succeeding pur­
chases, and so on. 
The costs include more than direct costs of the capital to purchase land. 
They also include opportunity costs of capital; loss of taxes in replacing 
private, tax-paying ownership with public, taxless ownership, and oper­
ating expenses of the program. A less tangible, but no less real, cost 
may be the adverse reactions of powerful investor interests, who may 
feel threatened by public intervention in the land markets. These adverse 
reactions may take the form of threatened or actual litigation, or the 
enactment of legislation designed to impede land acquisition. 
Lack of Confidence in Government Institutions 
Once the problem of initial funding is solved, the next p-oblem may be 
skepticism among land experts whether any government agency can 
manage advance acquisitions or land banking in a developing country. 
Problems of political fhvoritism, corruption, and simple bad judgment 
often arise. An often-voiced concern is that private land speculators will 
either corrupt or outmaneuver their puLlic counterparts. The fear is that, 
while government should have an advantage over private speculators 
to protect land investments, the reverse too often is true. The general 
ineffi-iencies of government in developing countries, it is argued, defeat 
the best efforts of institutions engaged in advance land acquisition. 
Experience in developing countries should allay some of' these fears. 
Many of the same concerns were voiced about the capability of develop­
ing countries to manage their schools, hospitals, and budgets. Yet, to 
greater or lesser degrees, agencies in developing countries manage these 
endeavors as well as their counterparts in developed countries. Seine 
may argue, too, for more dependence upon the creation of specialized 
institutions to avoid some of the more visible shortcomings of govern­
nient. Yet, on balance, if modest goals are sought, and the experiences 
and advice of experts freely sought, governments in developing coun­
tries can avoid the obvious pitfalls and can set up judiciously planned 
and wisely administered programs. 
It is true, nonetheless, that errors by public institutions and ufficials 
could defeat the purpose of advance acquisition. For example, paying 
too much for land could negate any profit at its disposal. The wrong land 
could be bought-land that proves unusable. The land could be sold or 
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leased for too little consideration, or for the wrong purposes. Moreover, 
officers might fail to develop or dispose oftthe land properly, thus con­
tributing to the very problems of vacant, underutilized land that govern­
ment ownership was intended to solve. And finally, corruption and 
favoritism are always threatening, ready to discredit and disgrace entire 
governments. 
Lack of Foresight 
Another problem has to do with time. Advance acquisition offers future, 
not )resent, results. By the time the advance acquisition reaps benefits, 
the officials responsible are unlikely to be in office to enjoy the approval
that their foresi,-ht and courage might deserve. Hence, an ambitious 
politician might fhid incentives for directing his energies elsewhere, in 
areas that are rewarding in the short term. But such a problem is con­
mon to all government decision making. 
Lack of Law and Authority 
Much more importa:tly, land-acquisition laws and other tools in most 
developing countries are badly in need of reform and revision. Many 
seem designed more to checkmate acquisition than to facilitate it. When 
each intended public acquisition of land involves years of litigation, only 
a truly optimistic official is cheerful about launching an advance acqui­
sition effort. 
STUDIES ON ADVANCE LAND
 
ACQUISITION
 
A number of studies have been performed on the results of land 
banking or advance land ac]uisition. Professor Ann Strong's book on 
the European experience is an e-.cellent example." Yet, it remains diffi­
cult to generalize on successes and failures. Too much depends upon the 
goa's of the government involved and the skills and financial resources 
available. When the major goal has been to control speculation and regu­
late land prices, the success stories appear concentrated in northern 
Europe. When the goals have been more modest- for example, to acquire
land for public housing, highways, schools, or other limited sectoral 
purposes-purposeful rerulIts moreappear widespread. Thus, Chile, 
Guatemala, India, Singapore, and Hong Kong, each has had some pro­
grams of advance acquisition and appears reasonably content to con­
tinue their efforts. Ireland attempts to acquire land for public housing 
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roughly eight years ahead of construction, and the reported continua­
tion of this policy suggests that the results are acceptable. 
In Chile, the various major municipalities have formal policies of 
advance acquisition. They hold their land reserves for public housing 
and other public purposes. The city of Manila in toe Philippines has 
a large land-reserve area. New Delhi and Bombay boast policies of mas­
sive compulsory advance acquisition.4 
When developing countries or their cities have engaged in advance 
acquisition, the record shows largely brief, episodic ventures, as opposed 
to sustained, carefully planned efforts. This is particularly true with 
fully public agencies, rather than quasi-public, specialized corporations. 
ANALYTICAL TOOLS TO EVALUATE
 
ADVANCE ACQUISITION
 
Any successful program of land acquisition requires rigorous 
technical analysis and a skilled and dedicated bureaucracy. Advance 
acquisition calls even more for these requisites, and no analytical tools 
are more important than cost-benefit analysis and land-needs 
assessments.' 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Purpose. Cost-benefit analysis is useful in its capacity to uncover, 
focus, and study the aspects of total benefit and cost of a proposed course 
of action. When fundamental land use and development decisions are 
based largely on political considerations, or when other noneconomic 
issues interfere, a cost-benefit analysis of advance land acquisition is 
indicated. Such an analysis cannot help but improve the quality of the 
decision-making process, the ultimate choices, and the resulting pat­
terns of growth and development. Any thoughtful analysis of alterna­
tive courses of action is better than none. The more data-supported and 
comprehensive an analysis is, the greater the chances for correct deci­
sion making. This discussion of cost-benefit analysis is not intended to 
be a formal methodology, but rather is offered to give a perspective on 
what concepts are actually involved in cost-benefit analyses. 
The benefits of advance land acquisition vary according to the objec­
tives of the acquisition policy and the scale of the program. These are 
related to each other and are primarily determineu by what the govern­
ment can budget for the program. Three basic objectives can be achieved 
by a government-sponsored advance land-acquisition policy: 
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1. 	 Acquisition of specific parc Isof land w public purposes in a more 
economical and efficient maiai.er. Actual land acquisitions, serv­
ing this basic objective, may be small or large, depending upon
whether their intended use is for sch(ols, housing, airports, and 
SO on, or for roads and other i ufrastruct ifre. The f'requeucy ofacqui­
sitions also will vary with the intended use. For example, exten­
sive tracts of land for Airport use would he acquired on a one-time 
basis, but small parcels for schools and roads night be acuuired 
on an aiost-cont itioIs basis tO provide fOir the needs ofa gro\vi ng 
population. 
2. 	 Control of the land market to infl uence land pijces. 1(achieve this 
objective, the governnent must control a subst antial portion (maybe 
as much isone-(liarteri of the developable land in and around exist­
ing urban areas. A land acquisition program of' this magnitude
would be extremely expensive and I)roal)ly beyond the financial 
reach Of most developing countries. This objective is not recoin­
mendedl. 
3. 	 Control of urban growth and hIitd use patterns. In programs
designed to meet this objective, the sale and disposition of' public
land becomes of critical importance in evaluating the lIenefits of' 
the original acquisition. An example of' acquisition to serve this 
objective can he seen in the city ofToront. It purchased excess land
in advance along the site of' a proposed suhway route, and then,
after the suwav was hWit, it so!d the excess lIand to commercial 
interests. The riofit fi oin these sales was significant and helped
to finance subway construct ion, ()'equal importance, however, was 
the efWct ofW transaction on direct ing the attutue growth of Toronto 
which was Judged to be beneficial from an urban-planning per­
spective. 
Often, there will he overlapping objectives. Land acquisition for future, 
specific public use can be 	planned and imph nmented in a manner thatinfluences urban growth, land use patterns, and prices. In fact, it is often 
the consideration (fsuch additional b(nefits thIat determine whether 
acquisition of land illadvance of' ned is cost-effective. 
A m1jor beneit, of advance acqu isition, serving the first olbjective noted,
is that it can lower the ultiniate cost of providing services and facilities 
for which a future need has been established. This is accomplished by
anticipating land price increases, as a result of inflation and specula­
tion, and by purchasing the needed land prior to substanti I increases 
in market price. Government thus captures the appreciation in land value 
caused by its own ac ions, as we noted earlier, by preventing new con­
struction and development on optimal sites. 
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In addition, by carefully locating infrastructure, services and facili­
ties, the government can control development patterns. Ut imateely, it 
offsets the cost of prov id ing such services, through el iI i nat en of urban 
sprawl. By renting or leasing the land acquired, and cont in1 ing prodluc­
tive agricultural use (or any ot her lse compat ible with the iIt ended pub­
lic use), the government can earn returns on the laudun,_, the period 
before public use. This will help defr'ay some of the holding costs. In 
formal cost-benefit analysis, the valtie of' these cost-reducinIg, aCquisi­
tion, and planning techniques must he established and compared with 
the costs of applying them in the social, economic, and political climate 
within the government. 
Even though a propose(l acquisition proves cost-effective, it may not 
be prudeknt to rush into acquisition. Other courses may be more cost­
effective. Or there may be instances in which the goveinl mellt !as 1O 
capital to invest, even at a high iate of' returi'n. 
The length of life of the program and the governmental unit involved 
may affect the choice of metlid of evaluating a program or part icular 
purchase. For example, it' the progriam is just starting, it may be desir­
able to evaluate its effectiveness step 1)v step. For an established, con­
tinuing progriam, averaging the resulIts over a period of' time may be 
more app'opriate. Further, when cost-effect iveness indications (liffer, 
peuhapF because of' the goverinment units administering the program, 
it may he appropriate to (1o at least two analyses to compare the benefits 
of one unit over alnothe'. 
Benefit Determination. The benefits of'gO(ve'nnnltl land aC(luisi­
tion, to be measured against costs, are t hose associated with the advance 
aspect of' the acquisition program. Some benefits and costs are easier 
to measure than others, and thus, easier to compare. However, all advan­
tages and di sadvant ages, no matter bow intangible, shoui be consiI­
ered and quantified in some manner. T( compare the '.': lue ,fcosts and 
benefits accurately, it is ne'cess;,ry to put a monetary value on them and 
to convert the valIes to a single point in time. A henefit receive o' a 
cost incuIrr'i'ed today is not equivahIt' nt to those Iece ved an( IIed inincur 
the f'uture. Thus, every benefit and cost sbiuld be converted to its "present 
value,"- that is, its valu, at the tin of decision making. luture values 
may be discounted at the local overnnwnt borrowing rate to reach 
present values. Once(tiscounted, bejefits and costs can be added and 
subtracted to give useful estimates of' cos-t-effectiveness. 
To justify a particu lar purichbase, tble benefits m ust exceed the costs, 
and the net benef'it must be greater than alternative actions. If' costs 
of' a proposed parcel are, for example, 15 pericet per year (10 percent 
interest payment plis 5 pericent lost tax revenuest, aid land prices can 
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be Dredicted to rise at least at this rate, or the cost of demolishing new
construction would exceed 15 percent, then advance acquisition is cost­
effective, since the benefits outweigh tie costs. The addition of any otherless tangible benefits would make the venture even more worthwhile. 
Furthermore, by assigning a monetary wv to benefits and costs andalItic 
comparing them, one can determine tile minimum monetary value of'
the intangible benefits (such as, better sites and improved planning),
necessary to make advance acquisition desirable. In making a decision,
the governmental authority shotlId have concluded, on the basis ofevalti
ations, that all the resuIts that are real possibilities are at least accept­
able, and the most likelv results are very desirable. 
Futu,reLand Valucs. As f't ure land valies may be partictulaly diffi­
cult to l)redict, substitution of'a range of land valuies, in place of a single
value, may help reduce the element of' uncertainty. Clearly, tile best
and worst cases should 1e analyzed. In addition, group land-acquisition
valties should be evaluated and distinguished fromn land to be evaluatedin isolation. This is because tile net result of'a group of' acqt isitions needbe onrlv cost-effective for the group as a whole, not necessarily fNirindividual acquisitions. When individual purchases are large or infre­
dtient, or both, tile success or failure of theiadvance-acquisition program,as a whole, lay depend on the result achieved in a single project. Thus,
the impact of error in such predictions is greater. To redluce the risk
of error, each elenment of the cost-henefit analysis should be measured 
in terms of' a range of' possible values.
 
Futtiuie land va tLies are (let erm ined 
 )v lbong-tern trends in land prices,
the rate of development of' rural areas, aild chance events aflecting pi'icesin particular areas. Long-term trends in prices are a function of the rate
of inflation and tile scarcity of'(appropriate) developable land. In turn,
scarcity is affected by population growth and migration as well as suchindicators as ecoonumic gro\ th and speculation in the land market. The 
act ual impact on land val ties of' any one of' these variables may be tinavail­
abl, because it may be inpjossibleh to separate cause and efTect. Ftir­
ther, the 'ate of' changing land values nu1ay vary
Vewhatsom over time
and aniolig localities. It is important to considle,' whether the price
changes are a product of location, size of' lot, develom)net costs, or raw 
land values. 
Ilnf'ormition regarding trends in )optlation gp'owth and migration, per­
sonal incoi-e, zoning, private development, and governmlient provision
of services and facilities willIbe compared against land-value trends.The statistical measurenent of tile relationship among these xariables
and land values could make florecasts more accurate. f'past trends regard­ing these variables are expected to continue, it can be expected that the 
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trend in land values also will continue. Even without specific statistica' 
information, it is possible for individuals who are familiar with the forces 
influencing prices and who have experience in the land market to make 
fairly educated determinations about the trend of' future land values 
For advance acquisition to be profitable, prices must be expected to 
rise over time, and they must rise enough to cover at least the costs of' 
interest and lost taxes. The more likely and greater the rise expected, 
the more advantageous advance acquisition will be. The presence of cer­
tain conditions n. ikes a rise in prices more likely. Thus, when there 
is a rapid rate of urbanization and almost permanent inflation, substan­
tial increases in land prices are common. The change from rural use 
to urban residential or industrial use will cause large increases in price. 
The change to commercial use would cause an even greater increase 
in price. In areas undergoing or likely to undergo rapid urbanization, 
the government would have to acqulire the land before the value of' 
development boosted its price to capture the ntire inc'ease in value 
as a result of its conversion in use. This usually requires that, the acqui­
sition occu)" fair in advance oi" 'he intended use, as we have discussed 
earlier. 
Preuvi(iono/'Dei,elopmnut. Governments that can prevent inconsis­
tent or premature private development realize savings on the best site 
available for a particular service or fiacility. That, saving is measured 
by the cost of' acquiring and demolishing any buildings on the site at 
tile time of its intended public use, discounted to the present value (this 
is in addition to the incireased value of' the land itself). This can only 
be considered a benefit for acquiring the lind in advance. Otherwise, 
the benefit might be more accurately measured by the amotint above 
tile price of the undeveloped land that the government might pay at 
the time of use, rather than settling for a different site (i.e., this represents 
how inti -h the one site is preferred over other viable alternatives). Fur­
therimo e, if the government were to consider changing tile scale of', or 
doing entirely without, tile proposed service or facility, the measu,'e of 
the benefit of' preventing inconsistent development is diff'erent; it. is that 
amount over tile price of the unimpi'oved land that the government might 
pay, rather than do without. Any of these three measurements of bene­
fit might be fur'ther reduced if'either private development of the optimal 
site is unlikely or ultimate public use is unlikely. 
Other monetary and political savings associated with the prevention 
of new constriction are those of' relocating the would-be inhabitants of 
the site. Depending upon whether tile land is purchased on the open 
market or expropriated by tile government, and depending upon who 
or what occupies the site acquired, however, costs of' relocation may not 
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be incurred at all. Thus,the avoidance of such costs would he of no par.
ticular benefit. However, ift le land is acquired at the time ofrits intended 
use, and new construction must Ihe demolished by tihe goVern Inmelt., pun,:­
lie and private resources are likely to be wasted. And moreover, the polit­
ical costs of such govern ment act ion niva be high. Avoiding these costs 
is a beacrit that is difficult to measure, but it should be considered. 
Land Use, Platning,. Ail advance land-acquisition program can be 
planned andi implemented to affect tile timing, location, type, and scale 
of development in and arotundtl urban areas. The government can influence 
the cost to the public and the lattern of urban growth through careful 
planning tfr the locat ion of future public services and facilities. (overn­
tilent participat ion in advance land aCquisition requires detailed advance 
planning, analysis, budget iil,, and policy making. The institutionaliza­
tion of these procedures isanot her benefit of advance land acquisition.
IL is difficult to rlelt'Sll'e the monet:ry value except perhaps to tile extent 
that it would eventua!ly reduce the cost of' managing the acquisition
proglam. Better hand-acquisition planning can reduce the piecemeal and 
sporadic acquisition and devlopimnt pract ices that drive up land pricesin the area of planned develp(ment. The more comprehensive the pro­
cess of public land acquisition, the hiss rapid and ste¢ep the increase in 
land prices-and the less the government will have to pay to assemble 
parcels fiw any one procwt )rgroup of [,'ojects. 
7Tntmorary /Use. ()ne acquired, tle land often can be put to or left 
ill priductive use lo biling in sono revenue (iring the period before it
ach ives its inted1ed use. Incone producO and us of the land become
 
more important if'the time of' intended 
use is distant. The land can he
 
leased back to the seller or rented to someone else, subject to use restric­
tions, depending oi its intended use. Farning or gi'azi ng may bring in
 
low vents. Other uses may reduce the likeiihood of squatters occupying
the land, which could sove tile political and economic costs of'evicting
them. Jowever, manageienlt costs may be incurred in collecting rnts, 
finding tenants, and maintaining the l)roperty. These must be subtracted 
from the rental incolt, to determine tht lit return oin the telmporary 
use ofthe pl't o Ineasure the present val ue of this st reaiii of pay­
ment s, t he annl a net returns eXpected Ius: be discoun ted from thle 
year in which they were generated, back to the date of the tcquisition.
If the land is put to a temporary public use, the valie of the benefit 
is more difficult to measure. There are two methods. For the first, the 
benefit ofpu blic use must be greater t hal. or at least equal to, the bene­
fit or return o the lanad in private use. The second methotd is used to 
determine the government cost to rent another site suitable fbr public 
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use. The first method sets a minimum value on the public use, and the 
second establishes the maximum value to be expected from public use. 
Thus, the benefit from public use of the land, on a temporary basis, can 
be estimated to be somewhere between the minimum and maximum 
values established. The estimate of annual return should then be dis­
counted to its present value. 
All the benefits of advance land acquisition-the diference between 
the purchase price now and the purchase price at the time of intended 
use, the amount saved bY preventing the acquisition and demolition of 
new and incompatible canstruction, bctter land use planning, and the 
return on temporary use-must be added together and compared with 
the costs. 
Cost Determination. The acquisition and holding of land for a future 
public use may well be a profitable enterprise in the long term. In the 
short term, the government may face some difficult financial problems. 
The larger the scope of the land-acquisition program, and the sooner 
the government acquires the land in advance of'its actual use, the longer 
the time period before the program will become self-sustaining. In the 
early stages, funds may be needed for land acquisition, improvement, 
administration, taxes, and carrying costs on government borrowings. 
However, to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of advance land acquisition, 
only those "advance" costs of acquisitions should be measured and com­
pared against the benefits previously discussed. 
CapitalCosts. Tie major cost to be incurred by the government will 
be the cost of capital, usually measured by the interest owed on money 
borrowed for land acquisition. As in the discounting of benefits, the dis­
count rate used to determine present value is the government's average 
borrowing rate during the landholding period. Thus, the total cost of 
interest is the present value of the stream of interest payments over 
the holding period. In countries where there are limited funds available 
for public projects and the competition for the funds is great, it might 
be more appropriate to use lost-opportunity costs (the foregone benefit 
to be derived from other public use of the money) as the measure of capi­
tal cost, rather than the interest payments on borrowed money. 
Interest rates will greatly iffect the cost-effectiveness of the projects. 
High interest rates will adversely affect the evaluation results of mar­
ginal projects and long-term projects compared with short-term projects. 
Total interest costs will be affected by land prices paid by the govern­
ment, which are in turn affected by acquisition practices (such as the 
use of options, installment purchases, and so forth). The method of finane­
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ing land acquisition, whether through government loans, ban. loans,bonds, or land-sale revenues, also vill affect tile cost ofcapit al. Payment
schedlles on lons rny be structured for the overall financial benefit
of the lanri acqlisition and development program. Por"exaniple, tile loanprincipal can be divided into port ions, to be associated vit icertain parts
of the development (basic infrast luct Are.s those parts are completed
and disposed of, the loan principal associated with those parts can be
repaid and the amortization installments reduced to reflect tile lowerprincipal balance. Another option would be to continue payments onthe entire principal ha lince and retain sales reven Lies fior ongoing oper­
ational and development expenses. A cieatiye approach t( financing cando much to reduce ':ipital costs, inci'easv the general flexii ity of theland-acquisition proganim, and thus iniprove its chances of' success. 
Lost Pro y 'Pox,s. lost property-tax i'eneities rum, he anot heir cost
of advance land icILisition that must he lll'su'ed. Whel privately heldland is subject to )i'ope'ty taxes, the transf'er of land from private topublic hands r'esuts in a direct loss of reveuies to the govern ment from 
property taxes. 
The alol int of taxes foregone when land is removed from tile tax rolilsis imeasui'ed b\y tle present 'alue of' the sti'ealin of' lost tax payments.Trhe amount of tax paynwts expo('ted depends upon the assessed value
of the land and the property tax rate. Agricultural or pastui'e lands shouldbe assessed at agricultural value, nolt developinlent valieu However, tax
assessments slhould be based on i'ising land valuc,. To accomplish this
evaluation, tile land viItlc expected at the nidpoint of'the holding periodis applied to the whole period, pioducing a conservative figu'e. It shouldbe noted that if' tLe land riiained in private oxvnershi improvements
might be made that would incrrase the land valie and consequently,
the aiount of lost taxes. Oil the other hand, the private development
might well he directed to another location, with no resulting loss in tax 
revenues associated ith the value of nexw const i'ction. Fuitherdnore,better government land planning and development might also imp'ove
tile quality, Or inciase the quantity of private development in the pro­
.ject area, thus adding to land Values and pi'opertx' tax I'eveiues. 
Adminisruliuce ,xtp'nses. In addition to catising tlhe loss of property
tax i'venues, advance land-acquisition costs will include administra­tion expenses. Administ ration expenses include tile costs of organizing
the institutional framexvork for tile land-acqutiisition pi'ogram; gather­ing staff and data, condLcting analyses; and preparing plans for acqui­
sition, mnanagenlent, and development; well nanagingas as and
maintaining property once it is acquired. Some of' these costs will be 
Advance Laid Acquisition / 123 
one-time, start-up costs, and others will be incurred as part of administer­
ing the acquisition program as a whole. All such costs are considered 
overhead, and should be calculated when evaluating the overall cost­
effectiveness of the advance-acquisition program. These expenses will 
vary, depending upon the level of organization and resources that exist 
in current agencies for performing necessary functions. Moreover, cer­
tain costs will go down over time, as experience is gained. Other costs 
are not attributable to overhead, such as those variable costs closely 
associated with the management of particular parcels. These costs should 
be charged to those properties as a means of determining the cost­
effectiveness of their acquisition. To determine this figure, the costs can 
be deducted from any rent obtained fi-om the land while in temporary 
private use or from the value attributable to temporary public use of 
the land during the holding period. If there is no particuiar use of the 
land during this period, the stream of futur,, payments necessary for 
its maintenance should ne discounted to its present value. Some expenses 
are incu:-red at the time of decisilon making and actual acquisition. These 
costs do not need to be discounted, for they already are at present value. 
Relocation and Demolition. The occupation of public lands by poor 
people presents special problems. The eviction of sqtlattei-s nay be 
costly -financially, because of the costs of relocation and demolition of 
houses, and politically, because of great local opposition. On the other 
hand, failure to e,'ict squatters would cost the government the value 
of property lost. It could also defeat the government's ultimate goal of 
providing better public services to the very people who have taken up 
residence on the government land. 
Corruptionana'!In accuratePredictions. Graft and corruption in land­
planning and acquisition processes will r 'ise government costs. The gn-eat 
value of advance knowledge about gnvernment land acquisitions and 
developments increases the !ikelihood of corruption and land specula­
tion. The government may be forced to pay increased prices for land, 
unless it can establish safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the 
planning and acquisition process, as well as to limit the compensation 
to a reasonable amount. 
Moreover, by purchasing land in advance of public need, the govern­
ment will always run the risk of buying land that is later found to be 
either inappropriate or unnec, ssi 'y, because of site characteristics, mar­
ket conditions, or unexpected ,,hi 'Ls in population and migration trends. 
If, at the time of the intended use, another site equal to the first is avail­
able for a price less than the first (at its expected value), the first site 
should be disposed of and the alternate site should be purchased. If the 
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land originally acquired is retained and used for the intended purpose,
despite the availability ofa cheaper suitable site, the government fails 
to earn the full benefit of the land's appreciation in value. The benefit 
is then limited to the difference between the purchase price of the land 
acquire(] and the market price of the cheaper equivalent land, at the 
time of use, discounted to present value. Since public needs and land 
values may be difficult to protiect precisc-Iy, government's flexibility in 
l'Inid acquisition and sales is a very important way to reduce the cost 
of inaccurate predictions. 
Land Assessments 
General Purpose. Cost-benefit analysis, as discussed above, will 
assist authorities to evaluate the relative merits of specific proposed
acquisitions of land. A land assessment is another analytical tool, which 
is broad in scope, and therefore allows for long-range planning in land 
acquisition. Ileally, a land assessment would be undertaken first, when 
a governmen is deciding whether a land-acquisition program should 
be part of its national policy. A land assessment will examine a broad 
range of forces affecting supply and demand for land. If the results of 
the assessment demonstrate that demand for land will fhr outstrip sup­
ply, then the officials should give serious consideration to a program
of land acquisition, as well as to the advance acquisition of specific par­
cels. When the latter is considered, then a cost-benefit analysis is also 
required. 
A methodology for preparing land assessments, as veli as research­
ing other land issues, has bee,- recently prepared by the United States 
Agency for International Development (AID)." This methodology will 
be field-tested in a few developing countries, to assess its usefulness. 
Information Sought. The basic information sought from an urban 
land assessment would center on demand and supply of urban land in 
a given area over a given span of time, for example, 20 years. The types
of analyses that comprise a specific assessment can vary widely.
It is important for officials to understond how much urban land is avail­
able now that can be used for mnajor categories of purpose, such as for 
housing, industry, schools, parks, roadways, and comlinrcial establish­
ments. A land asscssment, if performed properly, could tell how land 
currently is used and how much vacant or underutilized land is avail­
able in an urban area. 
An assessment also can inventory land already owned by the public.
Many developing countries do not have comprehensive registries of public
landholdings. A land assessment fill this need.can 
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Using sophisticated satellite scanning devices, together with some base 
data from cen6is reports, maps and overla.ys can he prepared to illus­
trate the current uses of land in an urban area and the current popula­
tion density. The ste (ata virtually can be produced by using band-held 
35-mm cameras aid light aircraft. By researching satellite dita, avail­
able back to 1972 for almost every city in the developing countries, urban 
planners can trace the growth of these cities and by extrapolation make 
predictions for future grovth. 
Predictions and projections of urban growth are -.n important part of 
urban land assessments. The methodologies for this nre well known to 
urban planners. Existing population densities, gathered from cens s and 
satellite data, will provide a starting poiat for determining how much 
land is required to hold the anticipated urban population growth in any 
developing country. The role of the urban land assessment is to calcu­
late population growth, urban migration projections, and otler data, 
and evaluate the implications of' such figures fbr lind-needs planning. 
More elaborate land assessments will discuss a variety of relevant 
issues, such as land tenure, land use standards, land pricing, inst it ­
tions and their capacity to influence land markets and land ute, and 
the legal and policy framework for controlling hand and land is,. H ow­
ever, regardless of the degree of complexity of the work, an urban land 
assessment is recommended for every developing country. Iinoncing for 
such studies should 5 e readily available from international donor insti­
tutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Ofte in the past, advance iand-acquisit ioln programs hiv been 
t
the result of energetic individual leadership, as )pposed to ca, oful cos
benefit or need.s analyses by land-planning ag +ncies. Today, faced wit h 
difficult eco:-omic conditions, developing counl ries need to prepare ,arefil 
analyses befor- emharking on any a(dvance hand-acquisition prog,1rm. 
It is certn'in that .trategic advace a1c(lUisitiOn of urbn: lnd can accoIont 
for significant sav!ngs for most mOfthese countri-ies. 3ut wht(h(r M'ven 
greater savings (or gain) will occur from public investments it W11t" 
areas must he 10f! to c11-efM'1u analysis. 
The experience (of'con ntries pI'actici ng a(vance hI.,;1.a.l i ;icq ita shows 
that such policies can cut down on public spending and provide m effec­
tive t'.)l foir carrying out development schemes.' The success ofl hitid­
acquisition programs as a whole, or the net benefit derived from pI it ic­
ular land acquisitiors, will depend upon the existing social, economic, 
and political climate in individual developing countries. Sliccess will 
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be greater when the program has strong public and governmental sup­port. The success of* public land projects also will vary with different
market condit ions. The economics of projects in fast-growth, high-price
markets may provide the government with larger profit with whicha 
to cushion experinmentation. 
 In slower market conditions, public land
activities will have less of a margin for error. The institutional frame­
work of the program also will affect its chance of success. The adminis­tration should he flexible enough to tackle issues of, overlappinggeographic and topical.jurdisictionis andI to view land use problems fr-om 
a regional perspective. Furthermore, the administrators must under­
stand that there are linits to long-range planning; they, must be willing
to monitor changes of public need and to reevaluate and modify unrealis­tic goals or tIfii-! ables. Clearly, decisions should not be made in a vacuum; 
nor should they be cast in cement. 
Decision makers sho(uld evaluate the costs and benefits of all the actions
considered, in li Alt of various possible economic conditions and theirli kelihood of occurrence. The net results of all alternative plans shouldbe compare(l. The decision maker should choose the one resulting in the 
greatest net bellfit (weighted by likelihood).

The decision to ilcq uire a particularIparcel, however, 
 is not tile end
of the decision-n:, king process. Once land is acquired, the conditions 
upon which the decision was based may change. Sui,, methods for
mitigating the inIpact of inaccurate predictions have tbeen discussedpreviously, such as: preserviing land by means other than paying thelull pu rchase price (through purchase options or installment payments);disposing of land, if it is no longer needed, or if'a cheaper, more appropri­
ate site is available; changing the basis of'evaluating the success of tile
 
program (evaluate purchases as a 
group, letting more profitable acqui­sitions counter the loss of less profitable ones); and purchasing land in
 excess of need, to sell off, I a profit to subsidize other intended land uses.
As needs have an upward trend, there are additional ways to affect the
results of a land-acquisition program. An original overestimation of'needs 
may turn out to be just the right amount, when the time for intended 
use occurs, or thereafter. However, overestimation of needs may addto holding costs. If there has been an underestimation of needs, theproductivit y of a liinited aniount of land may be improved by increasingthe fciilities on the land and intensifying its use. Thus, in many ways,
tile government can attempt to alter the ultimate results, through fine­
tuning.
The government also caon shape the conditions that affect what land
will be needed for public use. The results achieved by a particular policy
are a function of its effective implementation plus the impact of otherpolicies. Even though tile government may not be able to control the 
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forces of overall growth, it may well be able to influence the land use 
patterns where growth does occur. This influence may take the form 
of zoning controls, subdivision regulations, land and development taxa­
tion, and careful location of government-provided services and facilities. 
The government need not wait for the private market to decide land 
use issues. Affirmative public action can greatly impact land use and 
urban growth patterns. 
There is, as stated at the outset, very little time for the public and 
private sectors of the developing countries to engage in protracted ideo­
logical or political debate about land acquisition. Urbanization of the 
developing countries is moving so rapidly that, as municipalities begin 
to accommodate booming populations, each country must also decide 
rapidly which land will be for private and which will be for public use. 
Furthermore, each country must devise the policies, procedures, laws, 
and institutions to acquire the land needed. 
The main issue, though, is for all concerned to move, to make the hard 
decisions, and to carry them through to execution. The tools are out­
lined here, and in other works of this nature. All that needs to be added 
is a national will and the skill and integrity of dedicated public servants. 
The need is clear and present, and so is the danger. 
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NOTE TO THE APPENDICES 
The surveys and case studies appen'ing in the appendices were pre­
pared at my request. The authors submittee papers that were long and detailed 
on the understanding that the papers would be edited to meet the requirements 
of the publisher. In fact, most of the case studies were reduced considerably as 
a result of the editing process. From time to time, material edited out of the 
appendices appears in the text of the book. 
The case studies may not be of interest to every reader because oftheir detailed 
nature. However, they give a flavor For the realities of the land-acquisition pro­
cess in different settings and should be of value to those who wish to gain a 
deeper understanding. 
I was required to make difficult decisions in the editing process, often without 
time or opportunity to consult with tie authors. Iferrors appear or if the mean­
ing is less than fully clear, I take full responsibility. 
MGK 
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Appendix A 
Korea: Land-Acquisition Policies 
and Procedures of t Korean 
Land Development Corporation 
Gill Chin Lim* 
INTRODUCTION 
Scarcity of land is one of the most visible problems of urbanization anddevelopment in developing countries. The process of urbanization, industriali­
zation, and population growth has led to a phenomenal increase in demand forland. Unfortunately, limitation in land supply and imperfections and failuresin land markets have prevented many countries from providing an adequate
amount of serviced land efficiently. Furthermore, the issue of basic needs for
shelter and the distributional implications of land use have added urgency to 
the debate over land policy in developing countries. 
Policy responses to the problems of land use have varied substantially. Some 
countries have opted for a nonintervention strategy, while others have attempted 
a high level ofpublic control over land use decisions. One of the emerging institu­
tional approaches to land use in recent years has been an establishment of pub­lic or quasi-public agencies responsible for land acquisition and disposal. This
approach seeks to provide a large quantity of land through strategic planning,
and a combination of market transactions and pubiic intervention undertakenby a public or joint public-private institution. Neither the effectiveness of this 
approach to achieve land pol',cy goals nor the operationdl aspects of land­
acquisition practices has been subject to a detailed investigation.
The main objective of this study is to investigate the major issues in land usepolicy in the Republic of Korea, with special reference to land-acquisition poli­
*Assistant Professor of Public and lnternational Affairs, Princeton University. 
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cies and procedures. Specihcal ly the study nddrosses three distincthut related 
items. First, it examines the overall trend of uralniizat in a (dpipu lation growt h 
in Korea which has led to a substantial increase in demand for land. Second, 
it examines tilt, ,,taildaspects of' policies and procedures of land acquisition 
as practiced by the Korean laiid )evelopment ('orporat ion (Kl)(), lile single 
most important ipublic agency re.lsponsibule for land acquisition and disposal. Third, 
the study analyzes the effect iveness oft lie current policies and pract ices of the 
I'D(C within the overall context of land use policy in Korea. 
URBANIZATION AND LAND IN KOREA 
Koirea (South Ko'ea) had a phlultin of aliolt :39.9 Million in 1983 
with land area of 99022 silu"rt' kiloieters.' The population density wits ,10 
persons per square klieter -ole o'the highest in the world. The population 
of' Koreu is heavily concentrated along the urbani industrial axis connecting the 
tw' largest cities in tie country.- Seouil ani Busaii. ') the east of this axis is 
niostly nio)untainous Nud the west is agricult ural. The national capital, Seoul, 
had a ioulatioi ofleouut 8.- Milii in 19WS]t). The rest ol'the country is divided 
among nine provincial governments and the city of' l1usail. 
Korea has achieved a remarkable record )' econoiic growth during the last 
two decades. The real GNP grew at an annual rate of'8. percenti Iewei 19I 
t( 1982. l)uring this period, the governient implmented a Series ,f five-yeai 
,.conomic deveh)lomnt 1)1ai1S etiiilhasiv;ng indust ril development and exports 
of" nilluf"Icu'.ed goo(ls. In lte nieantilie, the( Korean govei'iiient hIls heeill s 
Vetsf'ul in slowieig down the overall populth ion growth rate to 1.5S percent by 
198:3. As alres'ilt of t his combined rapid economiic growth and slowing popula­
tio., increase, the per capita GNP tIas risen from $87 in 1962 to $1,678 in 1982. 
The growth anti st~ijctural shift to an industrial econoniN hasibeen accompa­
nied byi a hii'h concentration of population ill lairge cities;. In 1960 only 38.2 per­
cent ofthe total popuhltion resided in cities over 20,000 in population. In 1980, 
the figure reached i6.7 percen.; ahout 25 mi lio of the otal l Opulat ion of :37.. 
million liv,,d i irhan aireas. l"urthermore, urban areas, with advantages com­
i'g front scale and agglomeation economies, h(ave attrac'tel 'I large number 
of' rural-urllan mirants. The "net city inc'ease" -defir,ed is Ive growth rate 
(f city ')opulatil -is highly correlated with til growth rateo ('GNP. 
One ofthe imlort ant teat ui'rs of1m'-hainizat in in Korea as in other developing 
coun''ies is the phlloio,ml ro\t h of two majoir cities. Seoul and lusani. The 
share of' the poplatioun Ot Sod in thli nat iou was 9t0 perCeu't in whichW At;(, 
increased to 2213 Imercnt in ANH,. lHusan, th ec'.uid h'ge-t city has also grown 
fister than maii othl,,r cities. lusaii's sluan, of' population in th. nation was 
-1.7 prtcent in 1,96() and rose to .-I peircent ill 19i (. 'lu share if otlt.i provinces 
has i'enmiiid stuh or (eclined over the last twou'adus. 
A sharp increase in land plrics has been alsISO obsirved. ()n the aveiage hetween 
1963 and 1977, the land pricis iWKorea rose at an annual rate of 13.8 Ieicent. 
Th;- is fr faster than the giowth W'. ,'pc: capita GNI' ,ad lit,cousumer price 
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index Imr the period- less than 18 and 20 percent respectively. As a result, the 
price of* land increased beyond the reach ot large portion of the popuil, ation,ia
and the housing sector suffkrs fr'om a critical shortage of housing units, a multi­
ple occupancy, and a high residential density. In 1980, ol the average of'two 
pe,'ion s shared a roo i and 6.75 people resided in a dwelling unit.:'The persist­
ent prohlem of luotising in the midst of ecotinu ic growth hasIeconic, a fiequent 
topic fbr heated pu)ic (le ate. 
KLDC: EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION, AND 
PROCEDURES 
Evolution
 
In an effort to dea wit Ihthe prolIems associated with iand and housing, the 
Korean government oyelr the last two decades has fbi iii Ilited several nat ional­
level plans and imlplennted a variety o'policies and iprograms.' Overall, land 
policies iinthe 196()s and 1970s can he hest,characterized as a mixt ure of a'rket 
incentives and tihiic regulation to influence locational decisions of firms and 
households. A marked departure took place ini1979 with the creation of the 
Korean land )evelopment rorpiort ion (KLI)C). The K L)C was estahlished 
as the single most important public agency to engage directly in acquisition 
and disposal of lanad. The establisliient mithe KII )( reflects not uil!v t he i icreas­
ing concern oft ti( government over the probileis of land hut also the recogni­
tion of'the limited effect iv(ness of incentives and reguhtouy a)lpriclies to land 
Authority and Function 
To promote dCsiabhl national economic growlI, the KIl)C seeiks to facilitate 
efficient ts,iif'land liyacquisition, develoipment, and SUl)pIy of land. It can exer­
cise the pwr.- of pr-t mptiol, (elinent domai~in, and designation of idle land 
which are necessary fr atcquisition, develiipIment, and (isp(isal of land. The KLDC 
has lie fbi liiing powers: 
1.acquisition, (hivlhiliilit. and sales of land 
2. t)reeniptiv- purchase of* aind 
.3. residential siti.s dieveliiopment, industrial sites developnivnt, land­
leljtlist lu,it projects, and reclanat ion projects
 
,1.residential land dev-,hqopment
 
5. horrwing fuiids tlrmuglh the issuancev of'land dlebentures 
6. uiniig and selling aid i.imir ('est hy the national ,overnuent focal goy­
einleints. goiwirnueit-unieml igeiicels, private corpolritluisn. aid individltuals 
7. constructiin of public fIimcilitios within project areas 
ief'iscussiii of [uui-'uu lini;A policy us iieiiimd ilsiwliiri in this suiv.For adeiailed 
analysis of Koivan land uulic upp to W A. t)ocelf. and M( ICI iang,v l77, -ce liand 
tPolicies in t)f DtC Bank. 197S).knuit." uionui-aoinnl wephiific 
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8. collection of information, research, and consulting for formulation of land 
policy
9. 	 other activities which are deemed necessary to conduct the business items 
described above. 
The KLDC is authorized to deal with foreign lenders and loan projects offbfreign.donor countri'es. The initial amount of paid-in capital for the KLI)C was "38.9billion won in 1979.* Tb government gradually increased the paid-in capitalto 203.9 billion wvon by 1983. Total assets of the corporation also increasd from41.7 billion won in 1979 to 626.7 billion won in 1982. The government has madea total of 25 billion won of profit and paid 11.4 billion won in corporate taxes.Liabilities due to land(debentures reached .4.3-1 billion won by 1982. The legalauthorized capital of hie 	 KLDC (as of 1985) is 500 billion won, or almost $625million, based on January 1985 exchange rates. It is expected that the govern­ment will continue to contribute to paid-in capital to expand the operation of 
the corporation. 
Instruments and Procedures for Land Acquisition 
The KLDC uses several instruments to acquire land, including the following:(a) normal purchase; (b) purchase of nonbusiness purpose land; (c) purchase ofidle land; (d) preemlptive purchase of land; i,) consignment purchase; (1)eminent 
domain. 
Different procedures are employed to purchase land for the six differen-t instru­ments. The nori a purchase deals with acquisition (a'land through market trans.action procedures usiiig applraisal and negotiat iin. The procedure is as follows:' 
Normal Purchase. Normal purchase involves the following steps: 
1. 	Prelimiiary discussion between a seller and the KLDC. In 	most casessellers seek opportunities for a deal with the KLDC, although the KLDC
also searches for potential sellers. 
2. 	 Receipt of an application For sales from a 	potential seller.3. A survey by the KIDC of the qu al ification of the land. The K LDC studies 
the size, location, and marketability.
-1. A study by the KLDC ofrestrictions and regulations, such as zoning, which 
affect the land.5. KLDC notification to the al)l)icant of the KLDC's interest in further deal­ings. (At this step, the KLDC may (lecide that the land in question is not
suitable for purchase and discontinue the deall.6. Preliminary sales contract. Methods for price determination, means of pay.
ments, and conditions for sales are speci)ied at this stage.7. Survey of ha1d, upon request oF the KLI)C. Conducted by the Korean Sur­
vey Corporation. 
*$1 US = 484 wton in 1975-1979. For tlhe ensuing years, $1 US - 607 1980); 681non (1981): 713 won (1932); 778 o'n, 1983); 800 0oii (1985). 
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6. 	 Preliminary sales contract. Methods for price determination, means of pay­
ments, and conditions for sales are specified at this stage. 
7. 	 Survey of land, upon request of the KLDC. Conducted by the Korean Sur­
vey Corporation. 
8. 	 Appraisal, upon request by the KLDC. Conducted by the Korean Appraisal 
Board and a private assessor. 
9. 	 Negotiation between the KLDC and the applicant for a final price. 
10. 	 KLDC staff application to its board of directors to approve the intended 
purchase. 
11. 	 KLDC notification to the applicant of board of directors approval. 
12. 	 Sales contract. 
13. 	 Finalization by re ,.stration of the transfer of land title and payment of 
sales price. 
The entire procedure usually takes less than two months. 
Nonbusiness Purpose. Purchase of nonbusiness purpose land deals with 
the acquisition of land held by companies in excess of their operational needs. 
The procedures are as follows: 
1. 	The minister of treasury identifies a parcel of land as nonbusiness land. 
He makes a request for possible purchase to the minister of construction. 
2. 	 Notification by the minister of construction to the KLDC for possible acqui­
sition of the land. 
3. 	 Notification to the landowner. 
4. 	 A study of qualification of the land. This includes an examination of si'e, 
location, development potential, marketability, regulations, and other qual­
ities of the land. 
5. 	 Appraisal. 
6. 	 Negotiation for price. 
7. 	 Final contract. 
8. 	 Registration of the land-title transfer. 
9. 	 Piwiment to the seller and notification of relevant financial institutions. 
(These include banks which lent money to the lan6owner.) 
10. 	 Report to the minister of construction by the KLDC about the result of 
the .,ale. 
Idle Land. The third type of land purchase by the KLDC deals with acquisi­
tion of idle land in accordance with the National Land Use and Management 
Act. Idle land refers to land, held by a owner for at least two years, which can 
be used or developed. The purpose of acquiring idle land is to discourage land­
ownership for speculative rather than productive purpose. The procedure for 
this type of acquisition takes the following eleven steps: 
1. 	Identification of idle land by the governor of a province. 
2. 	 Official notification to the landowner by the governor. 
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3. 	 Designation of' a buyer for the land. The KLDC and other public entities 
such as the central government an d local governments may be designated 
as a buyer. 
4. 	 Field study of' the land. 
5. 	 A study of restrictions and regulations affecting the land. 
6. 	 Negotiation for price. 
7. 	 Preliminary contract for sale. 
8. 	 Survey. 
9. 	 Application to the KLDC board of directors for an approval of purchase.
10. Final contract signed. 
11. Transf'er of' fit le and payment. 
Preemptive Purcliase. 'Thefn-oth type of acquisition takes a form of'preemp­
tive purchase. Provircial governors can designate the KLDC or othe' public
entities as a buyer of lAnd to be used for public purpose. The details of the proce­
dures are as follows: 
1. 	A governor of'a province designates a piece of land as a possible candidate 
for preem)tive purc ,iase. 
2. 	 KLDC receives a request. 
3. 	 A field study is per'fo'rnmed. 
4. 	 Notificat im o "the KLDC to the landowner of the intention of the govern­
ment through th,, KLDC to purchase the land. 
5. 	 A study of' restrictions and iegulations affecting the land. 
6. 	 Appraisal of' tie land. 
7. 	 Negotiation for land price. 
8. 	 Preliminary sales contract. 
9. 	 Land survey. 
10. Application to the KLDC board of directors for an approval ofthe purchase.
11. Preemptive purchase contract. 
12. Transfer of the land title and payment fi'm tie seller. 
Consignment Acquisition. The I-f't hitype of'purchase by tht,KLDC is con­signment acquisitian. Undeir this type of laind aicqnisit iou, KLI)Che h.:idles 
the purcise of' land on huelt' of \'~ious li ,an(d pr-ivate ageots. The prce 
(lt1ie is as illows: 
1. 	Application for co:,signiient purchaso received by tlhe KLJ)C. 
2. Examinatiom .,f the application.
 
:s.A field study oi tht, lad.
 
41.A study of' i'estictions and regulations affecting the land. 
5. 	 Notification to the landowne,. 
6. PI'epi-a. ion 0f' consign ii nut contract. 
7. 	 Appraisai of' the land. 
8. 	 Final contract. 
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Eminent Domain. The last type of land acquisition is performed by emi­
nent domain. Tile KLDC reliov mostly on negotiation for land purchase. How­
ever, it may resort to the power o eminent domain to acquire land for public 
purpose when negotiation does not lead fo a success.'ul deal. Neverthule;s, most 
transactions have been made through negotiation. Until ,980, all purchasr-3 
were made by negotiation. In 1981, about 1.6 percent of l)Urchases were made 
through eminent domain, and in 1982 11.9 percent. 
To facilitate acquisition, sellers to KLDC are authorized to benefit from tax 
privileges. The tax benefits take a form of exemption on real estate transfer 
tax, resident tax, and special excise tax. 
LAND POLICY, PLANNING, AND
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KLDC
 
The KLDC is best characterized as a policy-implementing agency for 
the supply of land-particularly residential land. As an implemerting rather 
than policy-making agency, it is subject to the overall direction of the Korean 
land policy. Consequently, the basic direction of KLDC's land policy is derived 
from the residential construction plan formulated by the government. 
Master Plan 
One of the most recent and important documents for national land use policy 
is the Master Plan for Public Housing Construction and National Urban Land 
Development, prepared in 1980. ' The ambitious goal of the original plan is to 
increase the housing-supply ratio to 95 rercent by 1991. In order to achieve this 
goal, it aims at building a total of five million housing units between 1981 and 
1991, two million of which are to be built by the public sector and three million 
by the private sector. The government also plans to expand its investment in 
housing-to 6 percent of housing investment as a percentage of GNP. With respect 
to land suppjy, the plan proposes a price-discrimination system, to provide the 
lower-income population with residential land at lower prices. It also suggests 
zoning changes where inexpensive nonresidential land may be converted for 
residential purposes. 
In the :-"ea of housing finance, the plan proposes: (a) to increase the housing 
funds )rovided by the public sector and the private sector and to establish a 
secondary mortgage system, (b) to -llow tax shelters to residential construction 
companies, residential land developers, and individuals purchasing land flr their 
residential needs. 
Finally, the master plan discesses rental housing policy briefly. It suggests 
legal action to extend the current six-month lease period to over a year, and 
an enactment of a law to protect rental occupants. 
Long-Range Land Supply Plan. The master plan of 1980 just discussed 
was made when the Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan was being 
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drafted. In 1982, it was reviewed in light of the completed Fifth Economic andSocial Development plan; the revision of the master plan is called the Long-
Range Land Supply Plan. 
The Long-Range Land Supiply Plan is essentially an implementation scheme 
for the 1980 master plan with special reference to land supply. It provides abrief'descript ion otfhasic directions for land policy, summarized by the following 
four points: 
1. efficient use of land 
2. establishment of'a long-term plan for land supply to maximize the use of 
land for pulbic p (Ir)1OS(
3. establishment of an institutional system for a large-scale supply of land4. active involvement of the public sect or in lar development to achieve the 
system of supply of land 
As a planning docunent mainly concerned with land supply, the plan is devotedlargely t- estimation of demand for land up to 1995 and land availability. Thebasis f'-this estimation is the revised version ot the 1980 master plan, which
aims at increasing the housing-supply ratio to 84.4 percent by 1995. Using thisgoal and an analysis of population growth, urbanization, and household fhrma­
tion, the government has established target housing construction units for each year through 1995. Land-need estimates are made by multiplying average lot
size by target housing units. For private residential construction, an average
of 80 pvongs is used for need estimates.* For public coIst r-uction, a size of 25 pyongs is used to estimate land need for smaller unit public housing, and a size 
of 80 pyongs for larger units. 
Accor-ding to the above procedure of needs estimates, a total of 290 million
 pyongs will be needed 
 for the nation as it whole by 1995 to achieve the goal

of 844 ptrrent of housing-supply ratio. For urbanl areas, as defi ned by cities

and cups (rural towns) with populations greater than 20,000, a total of 262.64
 
million pyongs will be needed. This accounts f'or over 90 percent of the total

needs. The 50 large cities in the nation would need 215.1 
 million pyongs, and
 
cups would need -17.5 million pvonlgs. Land need for rur'al 
area would be much
smaller- about 27.36 million pvongs. (See Table A-i.)
An important and extremely useful I )ortion of this plan hears upon an an a ly­
sis of land availability in the 50 major cities. According to the data collected
by the KLI)C and the ministry of constructi(i, the total amount of land avail­
able for resident ial developmtent in the 50 cities is 114,751,000 pyongs. There­fore, using the urban hand-need projections described ibove, there will be a
shortage of' 100,349,000 pvongs of residential land. For 18 cities, deniand for
residlential land wil I le met solely by develo)ing available land in residential 
zones designated by the ministry of construction. if land in greeribelt oreas
converted for residential purpose, 20 other cities will be able to meet the esti-
is 
mated needs. Thus, the plan reconimends relaxatiou of'growth control in green­
*One pyong is approximtely 3.2,4 square nliettrs. 
Table A.1 Korean Land-Needs Estimates (in thousands of pyong) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 199 Totl, 
\ation 
Public 
Sm. units 
Ig. units 
Subtotal 
Private 
,rand Tria: 
2,000 
3,200 
3.200 
10,400 
15,600 
2,500 
4,000 
6.300 
9,600 
16.100 
2.750 
4,400 
7,150 
9,200 
16,350 
2.750 
4,409 
7,800 
10(000 
17,150 
3,000 
4,800 
8,450 
9.600 
1-,400 
3,250 
5,200 
9,100 
10,000 
18,450 
3,500 
5,600 
9,730 
9.600 
18.700 
3,750 
6,000 
9,750 
9,200 
18,950 
3,750 
6.000 
9.730 
10.000 
19,750 
3,750 
6,000 
9,750 
10800 
20,350 
4,000 
6,400 
10.400 
11,200 
21.600 
3.730 
6.000 
9,750 
12.400 
.2,150 
3,730 
6,0,0 
9.750 
12.40 
22,150 
,750 
6,000 
91,750 
12.400 
22,10 
3.730 
6,000 
9,750 
13.200 
22.90 
30.000 
80,000 
130,000 
160,000 
200.000 
L rban As",a, 
Public 
sm. units 
Ig. units 
Subtotal 
Private 
Crnd To:ai 
2.000 
3,200 
5.200 
8,480 
13,680 
2,500 
4,000 
6,500 
7.680 
14,180 
2,730 
4,4001 
7,150 
7.280 
14,430 
2,750 
4.400 
7,150 
8,080 
15,210 
3.000 
4,800 
.800 
7,760 
15.560 
3,250 
3.200 
8,450 
8,160 
16,610 
3.500 
i.600 
9.100 
7.760 
16.860 
3,750 
6,000 
9,730 
7,360 
17,110 
3.750 
6,200 
9.750 
8,1oO 
17,910 
3,750 
6,000 
9,750 
9.040 
18,790 
4,000 
6.400 
10.400 
9,440 
19,840 
3.750 
6.000 
9,750 
10,640 
20,390 
1.750 
6.00 
9.75( 
10.64( 
20,390 
3.750 
6.000 
9,750 
10,640 
20.190 
3,750 
6,000 
9,730 
11.520 
21.270 
50,000 
80,000 
130,000 
132,640 
262,640 
50 Citie, 
Public 
sm. units 
Ig. units 
Subtotal 
Private 
Crinrl Twj.! 
1,906.5 
3,050.4 
4,056.9 
6.848.8 
11,805.7 
2,384.2 
3,814.8 
t,,199 
5,833.6 
12,034.6 
2,623.3 
4.197.6 
6,821.1 
-, 32 ,2 
12.148.1 
2,622.2 
4,195.6 
6,817.8 
5,973.2 
12,791 
2,861 
4,577.6 
7,438.6 
3.467.2 
12,905.' 
1,0148.2 3,338 -
4,957.2 5,341 6 
8.005.4 8.6,30.1 
i,608.4 i,095.2 
13,663.8 13,77i.3 
,575.7 
i-72t.2 
9,296.9 
4,596.4 
1.,893,3 
3,376 
3,721.6 
9,297.6 
3,235.2 
14,;32.8 
3,574.7 
3,719.6 
9,294.3 
5,881.2 
15,175.3 
3,813 
6.1008) 
991i.8 
6,017.6 
13,911..-
3,76 
5722.8 
(299,5-
7,11; .6 
164i31.1 
1.576.5 
5722.4 
9.29.98 
,15.8 
16.4"31. 
3576 7 
;722.4 
9,29B 
7. 12.8 
16,4"3t17 
3.570.7 
3722.8 
9.2q19.5 
,791.6 
17.091.1 
47,680.2 
76,288.4 
123,968.6 
911134.8 
215,103.4 
Public 
sm. units 
Ig. units 
Subtotal 
Private 
Grand Total 
93.5 
149.6 
243.1 
1,631.2 
1,874.3 
115.7 
185.2 
300.9 
1,844.4 
2,145.3 
126.5 
232.4 
328.9 
1.952.8 
2,281.7 
127.7 
204.4 
332.1 
2.106.8 
2,438.9 
'.9 
222.4 
361.4 
2,292.8 
2.654.2 
131.7 
212.8 
394.3 
2,3 1.6 
2,946.1 
161 . 
258.4 
419.9 
2.664.8 
3,084.7 
1-42 
278.8 
433.0 
2.763.6 
3,216.6 
174 
278.4 
452.4 
2.924.8 
3,377.2 
173.2 
280.4 
435.6 
3,158.8 
3,614.4 
187 
299.2 
4.86.2 
3,422.4 
3.908.6 
171.2 
277.2 
431.4 
3,488.4 
3,938.8 
171 
277.6 
431.1 
1.487. 
3,938.3 
j13" 
277.6 
451.1 
3,487.2 
3,938.3 
1732 
277.2 
450.4 
3,728.4 
4,178.8 
2,319.7 
3,711.6 
6.,111.3 
4 i,505.2 
47,336.3 
Rural Area, 
Public 
sm . units . . . . ......... 
Ig . units . .. .......... 
Subtotal . . . ........... 
Private 
Grand Total 
1,920 
1,920 
1,920 
1,920 
1,920 
1,920 
1,920 
1,920 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,840 
1,760 
1,760 
1,760 
1.760 
1,760 
1.760 
1,760 
1.760 
1,760 
1.760 
1,680 
1.680 
27,360 
27 .360) 
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belt areas alnd development of areas in the vicinity ofcities with limited quanti­
ties of land for residential devopnient. 
Implementation: Land-Acquisition Record 
By the end of 1979, after about nine months of oper,ition, the KLI)C acquired 
a total of 1,552,000 pvongs of land, or 1,242.5 acres. This represented 99.6 per­
cent of the planned am1ount of' land acquisition. Of these 1. 193,000 j)yongs were 
industrial land, or 76.9 percent of the total land acquired in 1979. The volume 
of land acqui:,ition in 1980 was reduced to 1,271,000 pyong's, with 63.5 percent
consisting of residential land. The volume of' land ,cquisition increased bubstan­
tially in 1981. A total ofl 1,905,00()pvongs of land was acquired: 2,935,000 pyongs 
were residential, .19,000 were industrial, and 8,921,000 were for nonbusiness 
purposes. The volume increased further it, 1982. During the first half of 1982,the KLDC gained a total of 141,295,000 pyongs( 11,444.8 acres). A breakdown 
shows that 678,000 pvongs were residential; 1,000, industrial; and 13,616,000, 
for nonbusiness l)tIrlposes (see Table A-2). 
EVALUATION 
Framework of Evaluation for Land-Acquisition Policies 
Land acquisition by a public institution in Korea is a recent addition to many
powerful existing instruments of national land policy in that -ountry. Fornmula. 
tion and implementation of national land policy involves, both directly and 
indirectly, a number of'public agencies and a diversity of'private interests. The 
economic planning board and the ni n ist 'vyofco ist ruct ion are directly concerned 
with major decisions affecting national land use and are actively involved in 
formiulati nand implementation of' explicit land use 1)(iCiCs at the national level. 
However, these two governmental agencies d(o not engage cxclusiI 'N,in land­
use issues. For the econ(mic planning bo(iard, tie most important goal,; have 
been overall econonic growth and indlustrialiatiol. Tie inistry of constric­
tion has t, deal with a number of' urgent liroblernsof construction to sup)port
the olijective(ofecononric developmilent. Thus, many oft he act ivit ies of these two 
niinist ries are not primarily cuinncrritd with land use issues. These other activi­
ties are often carried out without clear reference to their inipact (i land use. 
The policies, which do riot directly deal with land use iss.,-e li~il '""ithlyaffect 
the result of land use decisions, may be terie(l, "impl icit I,11d use policaies."
There are a number ifother pulic agencies whose actiit ies also affect land 
use by their implicit land use policies. Act ivities ofthe ministries oflone affairs, 
trAnsportation, treasury, coninerce in(l industry, agricult u'e and fishery, and 
almost all other governmental and quasia-governrental gencies impl ment poli­
cies and prograins which create significant imipacts on land use, but their priori 
ties in the past have not been giver, to land use issues. 
In a country where tile narket plays the riajorrole for resour'ce allocations, 
Table A.2 Korean Land-Acquisition Record
 
(in thousands of pyong, with millions of won in parentheses)
 
Until 1979 1980 1981 Until June 1982 
Residential 
Site-development 
plan 
(A) 
207 
(3,771)*" 
actual 
(B) 
207 
(3,716) 
B/A 
(%) 
100 % 
58.5 
plan 
(A) 
482 
(13,635) 
actual 
(B) 
491 
(11,760) 
B'A 
1%) 
101.9% 
86.2 
plan 
(A) 
2,278 
(102,297) 
actual 
(B) 
2,450 
(97,919) 
B/A 
(%) 
107.6% 
95.1 
plan 
(A) 
410 
(21,220) 
actual 
(B) 
481 
(19,020) 
B/A 
(1%) 
117.3% 
89.6 
Normal purchase 156 
(13,026) 
152 
(12,983) 
97.4 
99.7 
350 
(35,053) 
316 
(26,076) 
90.3 
74.4 
623 
(60,000) 
485. 
(60,058) 
77.8 
100.1 
270 
(32,400) 
197 
(20,830) 
73 
64.3 
Residential total 363 
16,797 
359 
(16,699) 
98.9 
99.6 
832 
(48,b88) 
807 
(37,836) 
97.0 
77.7 
2,90i 
(162,927) 
2,935 
(157,977) 
101.2 
96.9 
680 
(53,620) 
678 
(39,850) 
99.7 
74.3 
Indus:rial 1,196 
(5,405) 
1,193 
(5,286) 
99.7 
97.8 
269 
(7,651) 
263 
(7,589) 
97.8 
99.8 
50 
(4,425) 
49 
(4,400) 
98 
99.4 
1 
(42) 
1 
(41) 
100 
(97.6) 
Nonbusiness - - - 250 
(4,600) 
201 
(2,501) 
30.4 
54.4 
4,000 
(200,000) 
8,921 
(78,868) 
223 
39.4 
3,000 
(99,391) 
23,616 
(86.417) 
453.9 
86.9 
Grand totals 1,559 
(22,202) 
1,552 
(21,985) 
99.6 
99.0 
1,351 
(60,939) 
1,271 
(47,926) 
94.1 
78.6 
6,951 
(367,352) 
11,905 
(241,245) 
171.3 
65.7 
3,681 
(153,053) 
14,295 
(126,308) 
388.3 
82.5 
Source: KLDC, unpublished records 
*Unit: 1,000 pyong. 
*Unit: 1 million won. 
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many decisions are made by private agents who strive to achieve their privategoals. In deciding their location and land use, they seck private profitability
and personal preference, which are not necessarily compatible with the public
objectives of land use. Thus, a pursuit of the public objectives of national landpolicy by private agencies is not always welcomed by the general public.Therefore, an evaluation of' laud use policies and procedures should be based 
on a clear recognition of the nature of conflicts and the impacts of various explicit
and implicit decisions affecting the pattern of laid use. 
Public Land Acquisition as a Land Use Policy Istrument 
The Korean government's interest in land use policy enierged during the 1960s%%ith a number of major acts concerning land use. However, the governmentdid not develop a comprehensive land use policy until 1971, when the first 
National Land Development Plan appeared.1;

Although this plan (1972-8 
 Ispecified a set of objectives, spatia:,development
strategies, and implementation plans, it was not vigorously pursued. Theimplementation of the policies and progriams outlined by the plan was severelylimited because of the national priority on aggre z,;le economic growth.In this context, the government frequently revealed inconsistencies betweenits policy statements and actua! pro0gram implementation. For example, whilethe government claimed that it encourages decentralization of' population and
supports policies aimed at furthering regional equality, Many government invest­
ment decisions favored the already prosp, ring Seoul-Busan industrial axis.Paralleling these decisions was the enactment of a number of laws ailnied atindustrial development which paid little attention to spatial issues. It is not
clear whether these decisions were made with firm understanding of the nature
of efficiency-equity tradeoffs or were mainly reached through politicai processes.What is clear is that many of the government decisions were made with economic­feasibility studies, usually a vaiat ion of cost-benefit analysis, which focus on
efficiency criteria of projects, and without much attempt to a'isess other land­
related project impacts

The 1970s marked a beginning of a number of explicit landi 
use policie! and
 programs. Many of these programs were designed to redistribute industrie and
population, one of the basic factoi s determining land use patterns. A number
of both dermand. and supply-side instruments for land use policy were employedduring this period. The demand-side instruments include financial incentivesfor industrial relocation, land taxes, and others. To facilitate or regulate landsupply, industrial estate development, greenbelts, zoning variation, land recla­
mation, and the like were utilized.
 
An extremely important shift i) government policy or was
land use noted
recently. In 1981, the fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan(1982-85)' recognized the importance of land use issues for tbe first time bydevoting a substantial portion of' its text to national land use policies.* 
*Note that previously the five-year plans were simply called "Economic Development Plans" 
without the additional term 'Social." 
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This effort was paralleled by drafting the second National Land Development 
Plan 1982-1991," 
In contrast to the first plan, the second plan puts its emphasis on population 
redistribution and urban and rural environmental planning. Land use in rela­
tion to economic development is also considered but not as important all ele­
ment of the plan as it was in the first plan. A considerable effort is also devoted 
to conservation of the environment. 
The apparent shift in these plans suggests that the issue of nat ional land use 
policy has gained increasingly more recognition among policy makers and that 
the priorities concerning national development might be changing. 
The effectiveness of public land-acquisition policy depends heavily on the overall 
structure of decision making for land use. Specifically, the extent to which land 
acquisition can be successful in providing land more efficiently and equitably 
is determined by (a) the direction and management, of implicit land use policies, 
(b) the structure of the demand- and supply-side programs, and (c) thre relation­
ship between land acquisition and other policy instruments. 
In view of the importance of the implicit policies and programs, it would be 
quite desirable to mandate "land use impact stateaments" for major governmental 
projects. The Environmental Conservation Act of 1977, which requires 
environmcntal-impact statements for major governmental projects in the area 
of urban development, industrial estate development, energy, transportation, 
water, tourism, etc. could be extended to address to spatial impacts of various 
projects in detail and evaluate land use implications of implicit policies. 
Moreovet, Lt present, Korea has few demand-side land use policy instruments. 
Several financial incentves have been used to relocate firms. But, households 
are not supported by strong demand-side programs. Although the Korean Hous­
ing Bank was established in 1967 to extend loans to home buyers, Korean house­
holds currently rely in large measure on private sources of fund, and there is 
no income tax deduction for homeownw's. The weakness of the demand-side pro­
gr-ams is that the low-income population, whose private funds are highly limited, 
cannot benefit from the progr-am. 
One of the supply-side instruments being used is the greenbelt system, which 
bans new growth in the outlying areas of cities. The supply restriction imposed 
by greenbelts, however, tends to increase land prices and further limit the access 
by the low-income people to land. The government has considered adopting a 
price discrimination system to provide land to the low-income groups at lower 
prices. But, this may entail inefficiency in land markets. 
Furthermore, exactly what proportion of the very poor can afford the price 
set by the government under current programs is quite uncertain. If the price 
discrimination system reaches only a fraction of low-income families, its perfor­
mance in terms of equity should be called into question. 
Long-Range Planning 
The National Land Development Plan sets forth the basic direction of the long­
term strategic planning for land use. However, no single agency is charged with 
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the responsibility and perogatives to enforce the implementation of the plan.This ambiguity regarding the legal mandate for implementation of the NationalLand Development Plan has been one of the prime weaknesses of the overallinstitutional structure of the Korean land use policy.The KLDC's Long-Range Land Supply Plan is an ambitious planning docu­
ment for the development of residential land through 1995. Perhaps the mostimportant element of the plan is its attempt to forecast land demand and to
estimate availability ofland for the 50 individual cities which will absorb much
of the new demand for land during the next 15 years. However, the current fore­
casting is seriously flawed by neglecting price effects on land supply and demand.The government has announced a price-d:scrimination system as a possiblepolicy measure to make land prices affordable for low-income households. But,if lands are sold by the government at a price much lower than the market com­
mands, the demand is likely to exceed the available supply of land. The situa­tion may require some sort of rationing practice by the government, which
normally involves serious efficiency and equity problems.
It should be noted also that the land availability is calculated by using the
existing boundaries for cities, unnecessarily limiting the amount of total avail­
able land. The total amount of land in a nation is fixed, but the supply of urbanland is not always limited. Therefore, the estimation of urban land availability
should employ a more flexible boundary definition which incorporates a notion
of commuting fields, geographical and geological suitability, and the existing
political landscape.
 
In addition, the plan estimates the demand for land with an 
assumption of25 pyongs of a site for a smaller public housing unit and 80 pyongs for otherhousing units, and excludes the possibility of developing high-rise residentialstructures. Alternative assumptions about the land size of average housing units
and structure types could lead to substantially different estimates. 
Quantitative Achievement to Date 
The KLDC has been in operation only for a few years, and therefore it is too
early to offer a comprehensive evaluation. Nonetheless, some of its achievements
 
to date 
are discussed here. As previously noted, for 1980, the KLDC planned
to acquire 1,351,000 pyongs of land and actually purchased 94.1 percent (1,271,000pyongs) of the target. In 1981, the actual acquisition recorded 11,905,000 pyongs,
an amount equivalent to 171 percent of the plai.,,ed target of 6,951,000 pyongs.For the first half om1982 the acquisition record again far exceeded the goal.In each year, the KLDC acquired about 45 percent of estimated land needs. Thisis a remarkable record considering the following. First, in recent years about50 percent of new residential construction was carried out by the private sector.Second, other public agencies are also engaged in development of residential land. 
Procedural Aspects 
The procedures of the KLDC described above are not uniform among all types
of land acquisition. The most important element of the acquisition procedure 
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relates to the process of price determination. To guarantee fidrness, negotiation 
and appraisals must be used. Negotiation is an inter'ubjective process, and there­
fore some objective guidelines for price determination is often needed to medi­
ate any dilference .n opinion between the seller nd tihe buyer. Appraisal serves 
the purpose of' providing guidelines fir an objective e v; ,oatin of land prices. 
It is required that the KLIX( call inl a public appraiser f'roni the Korean appraisal 
board and a private ;w'sessor. Using two appraisal reports certailu'y reduces the 
possibility of' abusing the appriaisal system. Since the negotiation comes after 
the appraisal, the potential seller can withdraw from the agreement if be feels 
the appraisal is biased. However, the current procedure does not provide reap­
praisal by a third appraiseir whe theinit ial appraisal and negotiation does not 
ead to a consensus. Reappr-lisil in case (if a filif,'e in a SuCCCssf'tlinegotiation 
may increase the fiairness is well as the likelihood (io'a successful contiact. 
CONCLUSION 
Kou-a has made sigificant effio'ts in recent years to promulgate corn­
preliensive land pilicies and to estimate futture land needs. Moreover it has estab­
lished a central land development institution, the KL C, that has been able 
to operate in the land markets without UnduLte constraint. Korea's llnd-policy 
formulzition and tihe KIDC institutiiml IiodeI aie worthby t ureview lv other 
developing countries. Unlike ninany deve 1 ping con ti-ies, KoI'e filas estiablished 
hind-nolicy f'ramework, institutional c:,lcitxv, and laws mnd idceuies ti, acc(,i­
plish land aciluisition. i he machimery f' land acquisition is lgely in place. 
It is too earl' totjudge whetheri this machiei'y has been well used to accoil­
plish tile intended goals. Nevertheless, existing evidence indicates that the qtan­
titative goals in land tcqtlusitioii has been satisfuctorily met. This tact 
demonstrates that the KI)C' is hisically capable of attailuing its most essential 
objective-a i achievement which few other public land agencies in developing 
countries can match. [however, there are two additional issus KI.)C must deal 
with in the coming years tor its successf'ul operiation,. The first is develo)ment 
of appropriate linechunisins for disposal of Iaid, and the second is a careflulI coor­
dination with ther 1,1aid use pilicy instruinents. 
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Thailand: Land Acquisition
 
Activities of the National
 
Housing Authority
 
Robert S. DeVoy* and Sidhijai Tanphiphat** 
SCOPE OF SURVEY AND CASE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to describe the land-acquisition policies 
and procedures of Thailand's National Housing Authority (NHA). After a brief 
description of urbanization trends in Thailand and some background informa­
tion on the organization and function of the NHA, there follows a description 
of land acquisition procedures and policies. A cw';e study of site acquisition in 
Khon Kaen is included. Some recommendations for future action are also 
included. 
POPULATION AND URBANIZATION TRENDS 
Since Thailand's population broke the 10 million mark in the 1920s, 
the population growth rate began an upward swing, which peaked at about 3 
percent per year during the decade between 1965 and 1975. The total popula­
tion of the country at the end of that period was 42 million, of which about 14 
percent, or six million, resided iai urban areas. By 1980, the overall growth rate 
had declined to about 2.4 percent, with the total population at 47 million. Growth­
rate estimates expected a decline to 2.1 percent by 1982, and a further decline 
to 1.5 percent by 1986. The World Bank estimates that Thailand will achieve 
zero growth in 2073, by which time the population is expected to be 103 million. 
*RegionalHousingAdvisor, Asia, RegionalHousing and Urban Deelopinent Office, US 
Agency for InternationalDevelopment, Bangkok, Thailand(ResidentAdvisor to Thailand 
National Housing A uthority, 1980-83). 
**Depity Managing Director,Government Housing Bank, Bangkok, Thailawl (formerly 
Director, Policy and Planning Office, N'tional Housing Authority). 
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In comparison with other Asian countries, 'T'liailind's level of iiirniization
today at about 18 percent is relily 1wIltw-desliit e uirb1-a inptl tlioio growthnthat is generally higher than the average growth rate ofother Asian countries.The reason for this is because the rural ecolnluy's mainstay, the agricultural
sector, has been able to expand its product iou at a high rate (averaging about 
5 pecent per yeari, mainly by expalding the laud area under cult ivat ion taver­aging Nollie 5 perce nit each Yia r) i rid t itus alb1solbi ig inlilch of the oncreas ig work­
fbrce. This agricultural growth has enabled Thailand to he one ot the tew loon 
exporters today.
The dominance of Bangkok over other urball (liters is overwhelming, how­
ever, and is showing llo sign ot alattlent. ['oday Bangkok is about -10 timeslarger than the next largest ulran cenriter and tout'ain1s 5.2 nilillion people-52 
percent ot the natitional populat on. l'xist inig and e 'ergig eclllnlic growth willlargely determine tIre future urbanization of' BIangkok and olt'r cities. MIIore­
over, tile gov'rnm ent is initiatilg tite' devellprnI lt irin traSrlltiCttlr andl faciii­
ties ill so-call'd growth +rnter ct ites to tirther encot rage' in vestmnt aindil job
cleatioini. Not with.;tanding thbes and Otiher glVil'llllellt plans, rost ohse'vel'sbelieve that langkok will tililtirtle to gr<lw rapidlly and that tile goverllnient-;
target of limiting the size of Bangkok's popunlation to six million is grosslyoptimlistic. 
THE LAND MARKET 
Ordinary citizens wet not permitted to own laud until 1932, when the
constitutional rionarchy was foirired. Today. tiet( land market is very iulch inhe hrods oft it' privite sctiO.()tIh ci relit 430 squt rei' k ilometers of t Ile b i t-11pBingkok metropolitan area, less thal It) percent beulogs i tithe various govern­
nient institutions; tilel ro'n'II lProperty Ptnreai, however, which nanages royal
househlrld properties, holds about another .1 percent. 
With ti t, lack if aliy sig­
nificant gliverlment interveritioi ly inealns of land :trecntrols, tirte oy'govern-
Illent influence in the land market is tlrorgh t it 
 mpact of public work; projeit.t,

and indirectly through property taxation. Zoning is ineftfective Iecause it Inust
be based oil :I waster, pla, 
 and tibus tar nione of the master plans proposed have
 
been adopted.
 
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NIIA) 
Background 
The Royal Thai governmnent created tit National Housing Authority (NHA)in 197 liy coiinl~iiiig severaliorganizat ions which were then inllved ill pulblic­housing product ion. It grew rapidly from 1973 to 1978, when it r'+ached its present
sze ofapproximately 2,100 persons. Ii 1978, the government directed the NA 
to disallow staff increrses and to reiesign its housing pr.gram to reduce govern­
merit subsidic,, substaitially. This resulted in a major redirection florn highly 
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subsidized rniddle-inceme apartment projects to low-cost housing solutions (sites­
and-services projects) and slum upgrading. Both the Agency for International 
Development and the World Bank agreed to finance this new approach. 
The NIA acquired substantial anv)unts of land in 1977, incl-iding two sites 
near Bangkok for new towns, which produced 8,000 sites-and-services plots. Five 
regional cities were also selected for similar projects, but in ,ttempting to acquire 
additional land near regional cities, the NI-A experienced difficulties with its 
own bidding procedures, board reluctance to act on a proposal, and statfing inade­
quacies. 
In 1982, a permanent staff or committee replaced an ad hoc working group 
(technical evaluation committee), which was appointed to evalulate the sites 
offered by landowners in response to NIIA announcements. Apdi ntment of a 
permanent, technical staff was considered ai improvement, because the previ­
ous evalutions re(uired the site evaluation trocess to be rel)eated three times ­
first by the original working group, second by tile land purchase committee, 
and third by the board. Tle section chiefof the land procurement section is trained 
as a lawyer, but f'ew of the seven technicians he heads have college degrees. 
There is authorimation to add two lawyers, one architect, and one engineer ftron 
elsewhere in the NHA. 
Land Acquisition Process 
The NHA identifies which cities and parts of Bangkok should have housing 
projects and recommends a niultiyear plan, subject to approval by its board. It 
then seeks sites in accordance with the approved land-purchase program. 
The basic Procedure to acquire land involves a public solicitation, in which 
the NIIA advertises for landowners to offer land which meets specified criteria. 
Then a committee conducts an analysis of each site offered. Next, a land­
purchasing committee is creatvd-often chaired by the governor and including 
both some board members and department heads-to decide which site to pur­
chase. This recommendation goes to the governor and board of' directors for 
approval and authorization to purchase. 
The next steps ar. the negotiation with the landowner regarding the purchase 
price or other terms, and a survey of the site. This process commonly requires 
about one year. If'no satisfactory sites are offered or acqlired, the process is 
repeated, involving another year or more. 
The NIIA board has been reluctant to act on site purchases because of their con­
cerns about allegations of corruption, which were associated with previous acqui­
sitions. The governor has the power to make purchases without board approval fbr 
up to 10 million bal ([IS $435,000). This power is useful in buying small sites 
in regional cities but is of* limited tise in Bangkok. 
Policy on Land Acquisition 
The NHA has a policy and program to provide low-cost housing fo'r urban poor 
households on a cost-recovery basis except Fbr the costs of major infr'astructure. 
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Land costs and construction costs byare recovered rents and hire-purchase 
payments. 
When the NIIA buys a site, it sets niaxinm prices it will pay, usually 100,000
baht per rai in regional cities and 200,000 ba/it in Bangkok.' These limits pre­
clude the purchase of well-located sites with roads and utilities ah'eady provided.
Standards for NIIA sites provide that the sites be located within a certain 
distance of the mticipal limits (usual ly :3-5 kilonmeters), that piped water and 
electricity be close (1-2 kilonieters), and that no more than one meter of landfill 
be required. The price limit phis these standards nearly always results, in sites 
being offered which are at the urban Fringe or beyond and which entail major
oftsite and onsite capital investments in infrastructore and landfill.** More. 
over, firequtient I t hese sites are fi.. froi mi1 ajor eniplov ment ce nters, secondary
schools, and hospitals. Thus, the )ottntial travel costs to occupants are con­
siderable. 
The NIA seeks sites which are at least 50 ri 120 acres), on which -100-500 
housing Units ciii be cinstiucied. If the asking price is low and a second project
in two to five yea rs seems appropriate, sites of 100 rui .10 acres) and more will 
be purchased. The NHA has purchased several sites in Bangkok and regional
cities for moltiphase projects. However, it does not buy sites for projects to be 
initiated more than a year or two in the tuture. 
Eminent Domain Act 
Although the NHA has lnd-acquisiti(n power under the 19541 Eminent I)omain
Act, it has not used this power and consequently its legality has not been tested. 
The concern of NI-IA hoard members and legal counsel is that low-cost housing 
may not be a sufficient "public purpose" to sustain this power under judicial
review. The procedures under the Emiient I)omain Act the following:are 
1. Determin ation o/ the area to be vxproprit'd.This step usually takes 4 to 
6 months for approval after an agency decides which arei is needed. Iluri ng
this stage, landowners cannot sell land or change the use of land fur two years,
but not to exceed ffve years, unless extraordinary circumstances justify a longer
extension. NIIA officers can enter the land to survey and can suinion landowners 
for negotiation of compensation for (a) immovables on the land, thtcost of the 
land, and (ct fruit trees and similar income sources. An arbitration committee 
may be sought to help con(luct the iegotiation. 
2. Enactmento/a lu to 'xpropriatt' li ht, 1 IFall l)iarticuir landlord refuses 
to sell, or a negotiation is tinsuccessftul, it is necessary to emlict a law to expropri­
ate the land. The agency drafts an Eninent l)omain Act including an attached 
map showing the area propo::ed fur expropriation and sends it to the ministry
of interior legislat ive review commit tee for consideration. This committee then 
*There are 2.5 raiper acre and 23 bhit per US iolliar; thus 100,000 baht per ri is $10,900 
per acre, and 200,000 bahut per rai is $21,800 per ic'ef.
 
**Much of' ie Bangkok m(i-tropolitan region is ver low-lying lard ald subject to flooding.
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proposes the act to the ministry of interior committee (chaired by the minister) 
and then to tile cabinet. When approved by the cabinet, the proposed Lct is sent 
to the juridical council for their legal opinion and back to the cabinet for their 
acknowledgment. The cabinet then sends it on to the national assembly and 
the 	legislature. 
This process takes a miniiiimum of one year, with an average of 18 months. 
3. Establishaent o/an expropriationcommnittee. An expropriation committee 
is established, usually consisting of officials of the agency needing the land. 
Among its functions are establishing compensation levels; informing all land­
owners of the time and (late of entry to their land 1)y officers, requesting them 
to propose compensation levels, and inviting negotiation with the landowners. 
When a negotiation is inconclusive, the agency can make a definite offer. If land­
lords do not reply within 15 days, a request for arbitration could be made and 
an arbitrator appointed within six months either by the landowners or by the 
agency. If disputed parties (to not appoint an arbitrator within six months, the 
expropriation committee can deposit the compensation amount the agency is 
prepared to offer with a court of law. When recipients of compensation cannot 
be located, the compensation can be deposited with a court of law. Officers can 
take over the land within one year of the deposit if recipients (o not come for­
ward. Those who obstruct the process of expropriation can be fined 2,000 baht 
($85) and/or be sentenced to cne year of imprisonment. 
SITE ACQUISITION CASE STUDY: KHON KAEN 
Khon Kaen is the principal city in northeast Thailand. A rapidly grow­
ing city, its 1981 polulation was 100,210. As a result ofa housing-nmarket study, 
the NHA determined that there was a substantial housing demand that was 
not met by private builders. 
The NHA planned a sites-and-services project with core housing. A total of 
500 housing units were to be built on a site of 50 to 60 rui (20 to 24 acres). A 
feasibility study concluded that an urban-fi-inge site would cost about 50,000 
to 100,000 balitper raito purchase the land (US $2,200 to $4,300). Landfill approx­
imately one meter deep would double this cost. 
In accordance with its procedures for land acquisition, the NHA advertised 
for bids from landowners on September 21, 1979. The required specifications 
were as follows: 
1. 	 The land must be 50 to 100 f-ai of contiguLus pii-cel(s). 
2. 	 The site shape should be regular (not have unduly irregular boundaries) 
and should not have severe undulations (ponds or hills). 
3. 	 The land must be in Muang District (central urban area of province) and 
not farther than three kilometers from the Khon Kaen municipal boundary. 
Twenty offers were received from landowners and their representatives. Two 
committees were required to evaluate the land offers: (a)a technical evaluation 
committee (TEC) and (b) a land purchase committee (LPC). The TEC evaluated 
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the 20 sites and identified those which were unsuitable based on the specifica­
tions. It presented its findings to the LPC. which subsequently proposed three 
sites to the NHA board for the final selection. 
The board decided on September 23. 1979, that none of the sites were accepta­
ble, because they were either too iar from main roads or the prices asked were 
too high compared to the assessed valtie (generally accepted to be grossly below 
market value). This decision reflected its unwillingness to make any land­
acquisition decisions which could be the least bit controversial. This attitude 
stems from allegations of' wrongdoing by previous board members regarding
the land purcha: , for the Na Bang Ple New Town project outside Bangkok.
As a conse(luelce, scarcely any land was acquired between 1978 and 1982. 
On October 7. 1980, the NI-A instituted a new land-aicquisition procedure (NIA
Procedire No. 38). In accordance with this new procedure, another attempt was 
made to purchase a Khoun Kaen site. Oi "ehrul-v 25, 1981, the NitA officially
abolished the old Iand purchase coi) Initt ee nId estahl ished a new one 1with :1ostly
the same imhers). The tllowing site specifications f'1 this second attempt 
Were anlnOtillced: 
1. Land Iocat,'d not fb i'ther t hre kilometers fi'om the municipal boundary. 
2. Price not to exceed 100,000 tbhflt) per rai. 
3. Contiguous land area not less than 50 rti. 
4. Unflo.ded land or needing ,i more onethan meter of landfill. 
5. Good road connections with access to a road at least 15 meters wide or not 
farther than 500 meters from a pul)lic road connected by a 15-nieter (mini­
mum) wide access corridor. 
6. Not more than two kilometers front existing water-supply network. If not,
landowners must provide evidence that acceptab!e alternatives are avail­
able to the site. 
Seventeen landowners offered their lands in response to this second NHA bid 
requ t. The previous ad hoc technical evaliatioii committee functions were taken
 
over by a 
new permanent committee. Following the new procedures, the land 
purchase committee proposed two sites to the governor foir his determimation. 
The governor can make land purchases of less than 10 million bait(US$435.000); 
more expensive sites continue to 'equire board approval.
Under this p'ovision, the NiIA governor negotiated tile price with the two 
proposers of the selected site. He acted to I)U,'chase both the adjoiniing sites oilSeptember 2, 1981, and to fix the date for transfli' of ownership oi Ja nuairy
12, 1982. The total price was 8,618,975 buht, inuclu(ling compensation for other 
Property. 
The governor decided to purchase sniall parts of adjoin ing parcels to improve
the overall site. Because the price was much lower than anticipated, the NHA 
had enough money available and the go i-nor' had the power to purchase a site 
twice the size necessary for the planned project of 550 housi ng units. TIMus, inKhon Kaen, the NHA now owns enough land for either a second-phase, sites­
and-services project, or a middle-income apartment development.
This was not the fii'st. time that the NHA effectively engaged in land banking 
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on a modest sciale (for example, in tile city of Chaing Mai in 1977). However, 
it was the first time the governor exercised his power to purchase under this 
provision. By s0d)oing, he ended ithe finr-year hiat us of n( land acquisit ion. Sub­
sequently, other sites hav e been aCtluird using tiuis prodt'turet. M0reive'r, tile 
board's attitude oinland acquisition has changed to cant iolns aggressiveness. 
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The process which NIIA now uses to acquire land is cumbersome, time 
constling, and expensive. A major revision of existing laws and procedures 
is necesSll'y tI sliotilti he ptr'inltd. In the meatinte, what the NIIA can and 
otlghti tt) o is to idnt itS' hintt lt-tl :ds teill'is pissihle antid acquir' tile land 
well in advance ot'ltd.Inother words, ,'loi acquisit ion intist he relioved frol 
mere prqit'c implemnti t it l.Anothetr high-priorit Vit iin l li be fh'rtie NiIA 
to use its tliinlt -dOll pi r its vidiitlit'.t)(\v to test 
Tile NItA netteds to conisid(,r the tollowing goals: (at to )l'ven 1 t't'preelltion 11-o11 
til' !ailid ia'let ) to )Il'hi,'-s sites at the best possibile Itca-Iy oit li"itiStisl'S 
initil It'l *tstStions cItisidterinIg hiot i tiCSSts as t.' y - otlay to CCUti s;antid 
(ci)to nialkt the 111151 co.st-t'ttective use of liitlittl t'illncial r'soulrces. These goals 
Call lit' ilptllel etit imy a1dopting st'vt'il long tetl'l) stli-u'ies. 
First, the NIIA shotld develop alil niailitajil a lol g-te!in I i!-yeaOt plan fOr" 
otltising projects by su -il-itas of'ililjol' cititS a1d illOtht' cities. Itwould lie 
wiste to itleltif V landIelt ir'etenlletvlltS ii:le'-y'iri intl wo-ytir increnlt ts.o n lealst 
This plan Should be updatetd ever two yeil's. 
Next, tile NIIA stiouild prepar' and ilpilimelt aitive,t've;r revolving land­
acquisition itiget io ilillmenlt tilis lolg-trlnl pllo). This budget should be 
Uliidtti a1 aid(Optetd eilch yet'll. It should icitie SolUi t'tS 01' Iti nis is well as 
hUtdgt't allocations by city and inajor I)rojects. Moreover, the tldt-acqtiisition) 
tlt i full-tinle siff' of' higllyi'oct'SS should be sl-talliie d cnti ralized witl 
colllpetent prot'essioilils (as tile NHA recentll*y hais been diing). Legislation aild 
i)rtocet cl lilgLti to pe i'illit tilt' N IIA to at'qlui ln Miise Iie diltdui' s slLuIld I)e uickly 
while tbe conipensatiin to ltiowN ners is dtltelnlilletd )Viaseiara-te illillistrl­
tive and judicial process. Quick possession becolt's less imlportant wv'hen land 
ispltllchst'd fllilladvlnA o ntd.H'eilt'vtr, he parlio nt Wit'l deci­
sions ald coenleill lit esiii tll iicitil.ltS lis s p iie ctil"ialt lle 'taothio 
the nieltncilt o in t corrupt iacte tl'l oft in. 
flurl Ilielniorlet, heitpt'lnlitni itt iplinst pi0JCt't Sshold bete~nlplliiiVd i)t't'MuSPt 
tecolloijits oea c:ll,er initerni cross-subsidies c'reitetrioughlevi-priolnet 
advInct-l d i-qithisition. so,joilt vent ures ovtil'sioss kinds withlthlepiviat 
sitol httsoult site- to Ie'vcrage public inve.stmnts 1) tsingpriviltel ownedbett imiportant
 
inlThailand, wvhere"80 pt'rcent oriimo~re ofl't land is privalt'lv oiwnetd aind builder
 
1-inds, detve'lopnment ca.pab~iilites, alnd tfilnlcing. This is iai't.iculaiilYv 
and devt'lope'rs a~re"sti-mgff and t'flciet .
 
Finlly, to inmplemetnt it, tht"NH A neetds': acqult;ire sites for at least
,prlograiml, tol 

tell projects each yearll, including five regionail cities Cor site's-and-services projects.
 
In f'act, thle NHA has been slo(w ill acquiring these,Sites. thlils
Severeliy delayving 
lIn hindering its sites-itnd-s'rv ices prograum. 
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Ecuador: Land-Acquisition 
Policies and Procedures in the
 
Shelter Sector
 
Gustavo Donoso and Carlos Luzuriagu" 
SCOPE OF THE SURVEY AND CASE STUDY 
In Ecuador, the problem of land acquisition is just beginning to have 
a serious impact on local and national development. Land prices traditionally 
have been heavily influenced by speculation of the private sector; yet, public 
sector agencies which purchase land have heretofore generally accepted high 
land prices as project costs that cannot be reduced. 
This attitude is beginning to change, particularly in the area of low-income 
housing. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the public sector to provide 
shelter sol ,tions that are affordable to lower-income groups as a result of increases 
in land and construction costs. Ways of reducing such costs are urgently needed. 
Urban growth in Ecuador is occurring very rapidly, making this problem more 
difficult. Hence, in the case of large metropolitan areas, it is becoming more 
and more difficult to find easily accessible lands, at reasonable prices, for pur­
poses of social housing and other public purposes. 
The purpose of this study is to discuss population and urbanization trends in 
Ecuador, and their relationship to rising land values; procedures for public land 
acquisition; and the land-acquisition activities of two institutions that play a 
major role in this area-the National Housing Board (JNV) and the Ecuadorian 
Housing Bank (BEV). Finally, we conclude with some observations and 
recommendations. 
*Lawyer and urban planner,respectively. 
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POPULATION TRENDS AND LAND VALUES 
T'e riral areas of lEcuador have been witnessing tihe e'.:oclus of much
of its population to urban areas. The process is part of a u ni ve. sal! pattern otransfer ffrom "underdeveloped" to devehped' areas. Th, eirect of this 'vpidpopulation growth on bind values inQuito, (;Iu:imuil, and otlhr urbaii lreasis not hard to inlagilie. Thte cost per Square meier oftcentral city land in Quito
today is approximately US $100. Land at tile urban periphery had an approxi­
mate val-ZtL' in 1980 of US $12.50 per square meter. compared to a cost in 1979
of $10 per square meter. These high prices in Quito are expected to increase 
substantially in the next few vears. 
It is against this background of population growth rind land-value increases
that the public lald-acquisition policies and procedures take on s'eeial 
importance. 
LAND-ACQUISITION MECHANISMS 
Voluntary purchase and sale transactions account for the vast majority
of public land acquisition in EI.cuador. Expropriation procedures are used by the 
public from time to time. Other mechanisms folr acquiring tit le to land include(a) 	donations, (b) inheritances, (c) barters, aind(Id prescription ''adverse pos­
session"). 
Lind Transfer 
Land transfer is carried out through a legal document, known as a contract ofpurchase ant sale. Following are the ;tlS n 'cessaryto transfer the hind: 
1.The written contract must he puhlicly registered and not rized.2. 	Taxes, hot h central and loal and dvalue added" tax, if appropriate must 
be paid on public transfer of titles.3. 	The new title Must be regi .tere ind filed intile real estaite pr perty register.4. 	The seller must deliver the property, verif ing that itcomplies with all
agreed stipulations and that "Y selr wl be rtsponsible for all hidden 
defects it may have. 
5. 	 The huiyer must pay the stipulated price. 
When public agencies are part icipat ing in the acquisition ofreal estatt, a state­
ment of' public l'eiefit or of'social interest has to be proclaimed. An expropria­tion trial follows, whenever it has not been possible to settle direci ly on the price
with the property's owners. If' there is such an agreement, it should he formal.ized through the pertinent pul)lic contract of purchase and sale. The price can­
not exceed the appraisal carried out at the request of the acquiring agency. 
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Expropriation of Lands Not Put To Socially Efficient Use 
Another legal provision is the prerogative of expropriation of urban lands, when 
these have not been put to a socially efficient use. In fact, the Municipal Regime 
Law (Ley ie Regimen Municipal)awards this prerogative to the EICuadorean 
Housing Bank tBEV), one of the agencies examined in this study. A parcel can 
be expropriated if not built upon within five years of a first notice by the BEV; 
the same applies to structures which the BEV considers to be obsolete, except 
that for houses or buildings, the deadline for improvement is six years. When 
the parcel is large (10,000 square meters or more) the deadline for parceling, 
development, and sale is two years. 
Payment for such expropriation is to be made in accordance with the munici­
pal assessment value, with 30 percent as a down payment, and 70 percent to 
be paid in 20-year bonds at 8 percent interest. 
The parcels or properties expropriated for these reasons must be used for multi­
family construction by BEV or, through sale, by the Social Security Institute 
(IESS). The lands can also be used for other low-income housing programs oi 
governmental and private savings and loan institutions. Moreover, when this 
requirement is met, the lands then can be sold for residential, commercial, or 
industrial purposes. 
INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE
 
NATIONAL HOUSING BOARD (JNV) AND
 
ECUADORIAN HOUSING BANK (BEV)
 
The National Housing Board (JNV) 
The JNV was created in 1973 to establish a national housing policy, coordinate 
with municipalities on urban development through rational land acquisition 
and housing programs, and construct projects. Its board of directors includes 
a cabinet-level officer who functions as the president of both the JNV and th, 
BEV and representatives of the ministers offinance and health, the Social Secu­
rity Institute, the national planning board, the municipal government associa­
tion, and the savings and loan associations. 
Until recently, the ,JNV has been dependent upon the Ecuadorian Housing 
Bank (BEV) to cover its administrative ccsts rom the BEV's budget. While the 
JNV and BEV will remain closuly coordinated institutions, the JNV now has 
an independent budget. It recently shifted its orientation to an increasingly more 
participatory and decentralized one through a series of institutional objectives. 
These objectives affect the following four principal areas: 
1. 	Administr.tive- to add two regional offices; to coordinate with inunicipali­
ties and ouler public and private institutions and organizations regarding 
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provision of project sites, infr'astructure,and community ficilities for BEV­finianced projects; to improve its programming and monitoring; to carry
out pilot shelter programs in priority rural areas; and to seek technical
assistance fromi international organizations and other countries to ilproveits methods of' planning and project design for urban levelopment.2. Financial-to increase lines of credit for the implementation of programsdirected to the lowincome sectors of the country; and to adjust the finance 
systems to fit the intended beneficiaries. 
3. 	 Legal-to broaden current policy to establish new urban lane policy, and 
to analyze and modifv the relationship and controls that exist between
JNV/BEV and the savings and loan system.
4. 	 Technological 
­ to maxinize the supply of shelter solutions through the use
of appropriate technologies, new construct ion systems based on small-scaleprefabrication concepts and components that support self-help ,'onstruct ion
efforts; to decentralize shelter programs to include all the provinces of the
country, especially urban areas outside of Quito and Guayaquil; and toincrease i s )roduction level by cmtracting project implementation withprivate sector construction companies. 
To carry out its new objectives, the structure of the JNV has been reorganized
and expanded. A new administrative and finance directorate will manage theJNV accounts, keeping trock of and control over administrative and project costs.A new legal directorate will ')e charged with facilitating the legalization often­
ure, determining procedures for contracting l)roject construction and land acqui­sition, and coordinating with the BEV legal division on niatters such as loan
criteria, orms of guarantees, and collective anl individual mortgages.The most important effort of the new planning directorate to date in assert ingits role at the policy level has been th.- completion of the NtionalStudyitho sing
,ild Demud fin- 1980-198-1. This study served as the basis for eval uat ion ofrhow the different housing finoncing institutions will invest their resources withJNV/BEV focusing on the lower-income groups. This study is the first attemptin Ecuador's housing sector to rationalize the application of shelter funds bythe public and prNate sector at different income levels. Regional offices will 
cover all 20 provinces of the country. The JNV is increasing the monitoring
and technical-assistance visits to tile regions to strengthen relations betwieenthe JNV central office and the regions and to prepare regional staffs to absorb 
a larger share of responsi bi Iities. Special emphasis is placed on techniques forproducing shelter programs for families with incornes well below the incomelevels of previous beneficiaries of' JNV projects.
Presently, the JNV has a stafl'of 39,t, with 263 professionals, mostly architects
and engineers, who reflect its past production and construction orientation. Thedecentralization and l)articipatory orientation in effect has obliged the JNV head­quarters to review its staffing patterns and skills and train its regional officepersonnel to include a stronger social work and commtinity-participation capac­ity and better coordination with the private sector. 
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The Ecuadorian Housing Bank (BEV) 
The government of Ecuador established the BEV as an autonomous public­
housing institution in March 1961. Its original mandate was to provide houses 
for low-income families, and its responsibilities included the planning, financ­
ing, and construction of housing projects as well as the development ofa savings 
and loan system and support for cooperatives. It has since been endowed with 
broad powers to determine housing-credit policy, issue bonds, collect savings, 
and conduct other banking activities. 
By 1973, the year in which the JNV was created, the BEV had sold approxi­
mately 360 million scres in bonds.* Since 1964, the government had increased 
its support for the BEV by providing 1.9 million sucres annually (approximately 
US $22,000 at the current exchange rate). The BEV had established a loan port­
folio of 456 million ser'sand assets of 775 million sucres as of 1972. Its support 
at that time for the savings and loan system had reached more than 205 million 
sucres. 
In the early 1970s, the BEV began a program to increase its capital. In July 
1972, it was empowered to r(-ceive savings, and 3 perccnt of contractors' guar­
anty funds was required to bc deposited with the BEV. The result of these opera­
tions was to increase the BEV's loan portfolio from 456 million sucres in February 
1972 to 4,098 million sucres in 1980. Support for the savings and loan system 
had been raised to more than 444 milliona sucres in 197C and ,76 million sUcres 
in 1980. 
The BEV has four main branch offices-in Guayaquil, Cuenica, Loja, and 
Portoviejo-and 14 agencies outside of Quito, the central office. The BEV's cen­
tral office recently has been reconstructed to reduce its dependence on dwin­
dling government resources and to carry out its policy of full cost recovery. 
Central to the responsibility of the BEV's headquarters is the determination 
of financial policy that includes interest rate considerations; loan terms anti guar­
anty requirements; resources acquisition, allocation, and recuperation; and project 
evaluation and monitoring of project accounting. The quality of the BEV's staff 
(919) is generally high since the BEV, as an autonomoig bank, is not bound 
by civil-service salary levels and can pay competitive salaries. In each of the 
BEV's branches and agencies, the JNV has placed its own technical and social 
staff to complement BEV staff skills for JNV projects. 
The Guayaquil branch office has the most experience with low-income groups. 
Personnel in the other branches are being trained by this branch through semi­
nars and publications. 
The BEV is also revising its policy regarding beneficiary selection criteric 
for home-improvement programs, and new construction projects to accommo­
date the characteistics and limitations of low-income families, a group with 
which the BEN' has had limited experience. Project standards, types and levels 
of loan guaranties, payment cycles, the use of intermediary groups to assist in 
payment collection, and other issues are now under consideration. 
*US $1 is 90 sucres (April 1984. 
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Comment. Even though JNV and BEV officials recognize the difficulty of the land­acquisition problem, it is clear that the agencies have not yet structured offices or divi­
sions to confront the problem. 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF LAND 
ACQUISITION IN ECUADOR 
Government Policies 
Although the 1980-84 National Development Plan specifically mentions land 
reserves for urban development programs, no clear funding is allocated to it.Under the plan, an urban development program is one by which municipalities
would progressively acquire land, setting up targets in quantifiable terms, such 
as 12 percent of the land needed for urban development in 1980, 17 percent in1981, 22 percent in 1982, 28 percent in 1983, and 33 percent in 1984.Further, municipalities would control ownership in such lands, would control
urban development, and would help curb land speculation. Later, these landswould primarily be use.d for JNV/BEV housing projects, for other public agen­
cies, and for small entrepreneurial purposes.
Unfortunately, this is just theory; nothing has been done about the practicalway municipalities will acquire those lands, let alone the source of funding forthis ambitious goal. Little is knovn about, the amount of resources that munici­palities in Ecuador devote for purposus of land acquisition, although large munic­ipalities like Quito and Guayaqui! do, in fact, own substantial amounts of land 
in about-to-be-developed areas. 
JNV Policies on LandAcquisition. Although the JNV has no specific policyin print which addresses land acquisition as a discrete activity, its attitude onland acquisition has been very clear: to try to acquire lands for housing projects
at the lowest possible costs to make the housing programs better accessible to
 
low-income groups.

Both the JNV and the BEV have had to confront the problem of increasingland costs, since land is largely in the hands of private individuals and -ubjectto speculation. There are no land controls or mechanisms available to the JNV
which lower land prices for social purposes.
Studies have been nade on the feasibility ofthe JNV acquiring large amounts
of land in various cities in the fiorm of "land reserves." Unfortunately, it has
not been able to implement such advance land acquisitior because of a scarcity
of financial resources. 
The process of land acquisition is carried out by the JNV in connection withindividual housing projects. As a public agency, the JNV must follow certainprocedures for land acquisition. The most common, not disregarding barter ordonations, are (a) direct morket purchase from landowners in areas where theJNV considers that housing program should be carried out; and (b) expropria­tion, where land parcels are declared needed for the "public benefit." 
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Steps in Land Acquisition. The JNV has established regulations which 
describe the procedures to be followed in, land acquisition. The following are 
the specific steps for expropriating land under the eminent domain legislation: 
1. Legal requirements.As a prerequisite o the implementation of low-income 
housing programs, the pertinent research and studies must be carried out. The 
land must be declared of "public benefit." The acquisition of land as reserves 
for future housing programs, if necessary, should be made an item in the JNV 
annual budget submission. 
2. Landselection.The process of land selection, has tile following aspects: loca­
tion; capacity to install and provide services and utilities; future expenses and 
capacity to function for the proposed objectives; and initial acquisition. 
3. Declarationof"public utility. " With all the necessary documentation, the 
general directorate of JNV, through the president of the agency, requests to 
the board of JNV/BEV that the lands be declared of "public benefit." 
4. Documentation. Documentation that must accompany the re(juest for a "public 
benefit" declaration are the following: 
a. 	 Assessments: municipal assessment of tile cadastral values over tile last 
two years, and JNV assessment, carried out by a technical staff'concerning 
the approximate prices per square meter in the areas whero the land is 
located. 
b. 	Certifications: ofexiting public utilities; of the area's master plan, includ­
ing zoning regulations and land use, and whether or not tile land is to be 
affected by future (levelopments; and of location and of the possession of 
the land during the last 15 years, its boundaries, and its taxes. 
c. 	 Technical report on land location; total area of the parcel, and the parts 
of it which are useful for development; availability of utilities, such as elec­
tricity, potable water, and sewerage, or a Feasibility and costs study for 
their provision; topographic survey ofthe land parcel; kinds of housing units 
that are intended and their approximate costs; anld pertinent conclusions 
and recommendations. 
d. 	 Legal reports on the name of the owner(s); background on possession of the 
land: and whether the land has burdens, such as rentals, tax payments, 
or other limitations. 
5. Proceduresat JNV heaodquarters.After all tile previous steps have been 
complied with, a report on the convenience or inconvenience to acquire the land 
parcel is prepared, recommending whether or not to continue the process, accord­
ing to the following procedures. First, an official letter requests an appraisal 
of the land parcel. Once the appraisal has been submitted, a report is requested 
from the BEV on the availability of financial resource,;, either for the acquisi­
tion of the land, or for the financing of the whole housing program. An analysis 
of' all available documentation and legal criteria on the acquisition is then 
presented to the JNV board of directors. The board considers all the documenta­
tion, and if it deems so necessary, enacts the declaration of"public benefi," deter­
mining whether the expropriation is urgent, and determining wilether the 
occupation of the land is imminent for the needs of the institution. 
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6. Proceduresafter the declaration of "public benefit." 
a. Notices: Once the parcel has been designated as one of "public benefit," 
such declaration must be notified to the following persons: the general man­
ager of BEV; the manager or agent of the branch of BEV having jurisdic­
tioi,; the owner or owners of the parcel; and the property 
-egister of the 
political subdivision where the parcel is located. 
b. 	 Costs: The general manager or branch manager, ill accordance with the 
instructions delivered by the JNV president, seeks an agreement with the 
landowner on its prite. The price cannot be greater than that specified in 
the assessment. 
C Purchase: If an agrcement on price has been reached between both parties. 
the process of settlement can be initiated. 
d. 	 Expropriation suit: If no agreement has been reached on the price and other 
conditions of the land acquisition at market, the lawyer commissioned for 
this purpose initiates demand for expropriation on behalf and in represen­
tation of the president of the JNV. In this suit, the agency establishes a 
favorable price through its legal officials. 
7. Payment. If the acquisition is made through the market process, the price
agreed will be registered in a settlement contract. once the seller submits certi­
fied copies of the notarized registration, and of its inscription in the property
register. In an expropriation suit, the judge will specify the definitive pric'!. If 
demanded by the JNV, the initial price will be determined and certified so that 
the judge will be able to allow for the immediate occupation of the parcel. If 
this price is not paid within three months after the official notification, the 
expropriation can be disallowed. 
8. Payment oftaxes and registration.To complete the acquisition, taxes on the 
land must be paid up to date. If the land has access to utilities, such as electric­
ity, potable water and telephone, these must also be paid.
Once these legal preconditions have been completed, the acquisition must be
 
registered in the property register. A cody of the title and a plan of the parcel

will always be available at JNV headquarters. 
ESTIMATE OF JNVIBEV LAND NEEDS AND 
PAST ACQUISITION PATTERNS 
Overall Programming 
Projections and programmatic activities of the JNV/BEV are short range rather 
than medium range in scope. The govermoent, as a whole, prepares five-year
development plans, the last of which was prepared to coincide with the new 
democratic regime, expected to run from 1980 to 1984. Accordingly, i. 1980 the 
government initiated a housing program seeking to resolve, at least in part,
the housing sbortag-. In the five-year period, 68,000 units were estimated to 
be the responsibility of the JNV/BEV. This estimate was later refined. 
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According to JNV/BEV projects, the average annual 
need for land during its 
1980-84 program far exceeds its land 
acqui~ition daring the 1977-81 period. 
Moreover, the JNV does not appear to 
be mab ing strides to resolve the issue. 
use much more land than it may be 
able 
The JNV has projected the need to 
to acquire according to its budget, even 
if lands are donated by a private, non­
profit institution. From this perspective, 
it i. clear that the JNV may have to 
use other forms of land acquisition, such 
as donations, or use municipally owned 
lands for land-reserve programs. In fact, 
Ecuador's total housing needs (not only 
the JNV's contribution) are roughly double the 
INV program in lands and money. 
land Costs and Budgeting 
significant. For example,
 
In Ecuador, fluc, nations in prices of 
urban land are 

in a recent housing-guaranty program 
sponsored by the Agency for International
 
Development (AID), working with the JNV/BEV, 
it was estimated that urbani­
per square meter in 1979, while unurbanized 
land
 
zation land cost US $100 
To put land costs; on the basis of 1980 
prices, we esti­
was estimated at US $10. 

mate a 25 percent increase, bringing urturbanized 
land costs to $12.5 per square
 
meter, a figure that will be maintained 
here. The previous analyses suggest
 
that, as an average, in Quito alone, the JNV/BEV 
needs 355,098 square meters
 
BEV would need 
every year. This implies that, in 1980 
prices, the JNV and 
to allocate over $4.4 million (132 mil\ion sucres 
every year) for land purchases 
more than eight million sucres 
alone. For example, it is our estimate 
that no 
(9.7 million in 1980 prices) were spent in 1978 
to purchase land in Quito. The 
1980-84 plan suggests that more than 
30 million sucres in land acquisition 
for 
used in 1981.the city should have been 
In a recent study carried out to design 
an AID-financed, low-income housing 
project in Ecuador, it was found that land represents 
about 50 percent of the 
some projects can count on parcels at 
cost of the proposed solutions, although 
very low cost, which are donated by 
municipalities. Since hand costs cannot 
be 
expected to drop in the future, the JNV 
must work closely with the municipali­
ties, must encourage acceptance of small 
lot sizes, must consider expropriation 
as a method of land acquisition and, when 
possible, must engage in land banking. 
Regional JNV offices are constantly 
negotiating for the purchase of land 
par­
cels on which new construction projects can be built. 
Another manner of acquir­
ing land is through joint.venture projects with municipalities 
such as in Cuenca 
and Jipijapa. Land costs on the coast tend to be lower 
than those in the Sierra, 
but site preparation procedures escalate 
costs to four or five times the raw land 
value. 
Urban Land and Housing
InteragenLy Committee on 

interagency committee to be set up by 
Recently, the government called for 
an 
to study the 
school of architecture at Central University, 
and the JNV/BEV 
problems of acquiring land for low-income 
housing projects. This committee sug­
representatives of the President's advisors 
office, the board of architects, the 
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gested, among other policies, certain legal measures to set up land banking to allow for rational urban growth and low-income housing. 
Legal Measures to Set up Land Reserves 
The 1980-84 National Development, Plan includesa Program on Land Reserves,to be carried out mostly by the :ountry's municipalities. Municipalities are 
expected to increase the lands owned by them, creating a reserve of urban lands. 
In turn, municipalities z-ould make these lands available to governmentcies to use them in the implementation, for example, of low-income housing. 
agen-Municipalitie,. would continue to hold legal Possession of the lands, althoughits use and the mproveinents would benefit the land's occupants. The legal meas­ures that allow for this arv either the "contracts of law and restitution" ('omedate is the process of lsidling gratuitously for a
"emphyteusis." limited time) or the process ofConiodtlo laws allow for land reserves to be transferred to others (for exam. pIe, to housing agencies generating afor a certain pcriod supply of shelter fbr low-income groups)ftime. Thus, the JNV/BEV could build units and transfertitle to beneficiaries, for only the life of the units, to be estimated for purposes of definition (.f the comodlcto contract. Once this period elapses, the owner the land reserve (the municipality) would decide whether to extend the comohto 
ofcontract or to cancel it, considering matters such as the condition of the units,urban de-elopment needs, and other forcesEmphyteusis is also being considered as a new part of the Municipal Adlminis­
of demand For the land.
tration Laws. This new procedure, not applica)le to immovable municipal goods but only to those belonging to other groups or agencies, is defined as "the trans. fer ofa parcel to a beneficiary, who maintains direct donain of that property, while he pays rent for it." Thus, it would be possible to "rent" lCnd for extendedperiods of time during which the owner of'a house would pay rent for maintain.ing his house on somebody else's property.A third mechanism being considered to make land accessible for purposes of 
low-income housing construction is the incorporation of rural lands into what is to be then considered "urban." This would allow use of landholdings presentlyadministered by Ecuador's Agrarian Reform and Colonization Institute (IERAC).For this purpose, legal dispositions need to be c,'eated-and possibly also some
 process of political or institutional negotiations-
 to allow municipalities to expandtheir region of coverage and to hold full possession of their newly incorporatedlands. For example, the muni"palities possession of these lands could be oper­ated through t he enmphyteusis 
or comodato procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
In Ecuador, the problem of land acquisition, particularly for purposes 
of low-income housing, is becoming increasingly difficult. Land is probably the 
source ofgreatest speculation, and the public sector does not seem yet to be quite 
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ready to enforce existing laws, or to set up new mechanisms to unable agencies, 
such as the JNV/BEV, to acquire lapds to provide low-income shelter. To make 
this problem more difficult, urban growth is such that the competition for lands 
is increasingly greater. Solving this problem will demand the greatest level of 
initiative and imagination. The government would be wise to start research now, 
probably with technical assistance from countries where the problem has been 
already addressed. 
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India: Land-Acquisition Policies 
and Procedures with Emphasis 
on the City and Industrial 
Development Corporation of 
Maharashtra (CIDCO), India 
Suryakant N Schroff* 
INTRODUCTION 
Scope of the Survey and Case Study 
The purpose of this study is to discuss some aspects of public land-acquisition 
policies and procedures in India. Special emphasis is given to the City and Indus­
trial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO) and the new town of 
New Bombay. There is also a section sunmnarizing the India Land Acquisition 
Act of 1894. This unique law establishes central land-acquisition units which 
act as a service agency for the various public sector agencies seeking to acquire 
land Finally, there is a critique of the system. 
Urban Population Trends 
Migration of people from villages to urban centers primarily for economic oppor­
tunities is a continuing phenomenon. The urban population of India in 1981 
was recorded as 156 million compared to 109 million recorded in 1971. Accord. 
ing to 1981 census data, urban population as a percentage of the total popula­
tion was 23.73 percent. This represents a growth rate of 46.02 percent in urban 
population from 1971. 
*AssistantManager-Legal,HousingDevelopment FinanceCoporation, Ltl, Bombay, India. 
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The geographic region Considered Cor tie Purpose of this study is the slate
of Maha'asltra, of which Bombay is the capital city. Th state o -Maharasht.'a 
has an ar',a of 307,762 square meters and has a populat ion of albout 62.6 million(equivalent to 9.9 pec'Cent of'lthe total populati o1(If tl coullntryt. It is thewthirdla'gest state, bo1th in ilrea llMid pIopIlliition, and is sit ltclld oilth %\westerll coast
of India. About 70 percent.of the people illthe state dlepen oila'gric'ulture It isthe []lost rllrballized state in the country, with an urban population o'35.03 
percent compa red to 23.73 percent for the enlire colnutry. 
Various Public Agencies Involved in Acquisition of Lind
 
in Maharashtra
 
The iollowinig public agellcies olperat in: lhrolIghout MChilialitshla acquirel )''eylarge areas of land for t heir use, 11l0)1111tie to ime: tile Mailaasiltra Housing11d A rea I)evelopment 'Alithority, the Mahaalht rilIndustrial I)evt'lopient 'o­
IOll'ittiOll,tit I y Midi lI(dastriiil i)evvopim-lit (orpoiation 1(f Mahar'asltra(CIL)', and various ot her [Iiublic ageIlCies. MOreov'er, illIldiCi,eligible Coonpal­lies 1I11Y use C. .;oipikolrY;aIld-;ICq(ljsition forDOWN'v1 ilnIdIustiiAl )prp'oses. 
CIDCO 
CII)CO was Constituted by tilt, sate gove I'llllit of'MCiIIaaCltra illMarch 1970 tir theexplicit purpose flati i id teXel1l111t If New 1301l V. 
Und,'r the Malirshtra Regional Toiwi Planning Act of 1966, (I)C(O cai etdes ig tel Is a Newv'wi I )veIopilint Altill) C tv fi nteVelopiigilny l',w tIwwiI
for ally part of Mahlaraslhtra. Acctrdingly, til 
 state, goIvernmelt hiCs (eclared
CII)C() as tile Ill' !')WlI development authority fOr tihc ltw(\ 
towns of New Bom­bay, New Nashik,Niow N;indt(, and New AuaIIgallli (II)( )'sgeographical

a rea (if'i1flec11 ill New BoillayN covers i area 

the two dist ricts of lhanie Cld Riaigad. This includ 

c of'3.1..80 square illeters ill 
s all area of 192.87 hectares
 
of private allid salt pan lands spread over 95 villages. In 1971, the state govern-
Illeit notified landowners of CIl)C()' intention to acquire all private 
laids ill 
the New Bill v iiiea. 
The broad objectives of (I )(() !'ortIle development of' New Bl1iIav II'e todecongest South Illlill ' and to provide l wvl-p[I il, lew town with goo
alilellities and employment oppmot tllities. CIDCO's role ill tile develolent isprimarily thiat of a catilyNst, deve~loping tile base 1f61'au~racti:ng pr'ivate. inlvest'­
mii'nt (portllit it's 05 weli CIst(' eilColging cor (lltCZt.y public inivestillelitsby otie agencies.More specificall , (II)CO('s r(oe includes prCparation of'a 11as­ter plan, development of and and provision of' industr'ial and r'esidential infira. 
str'llcture, and plnllliillg and development o1'public transportation and il 
Communication systell. 
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CIDCO's Land-Acquisition Activities 
*
CIDCO as a government-owned agency is totally dependent on governme funds 
for land acquisition. Its entire policy on land acquisition is based on the regiol.:l 
plan for the establishment of New Bombay. The plan strongly recommends bulk 
acquisition of lands as the keystone of the operational strategy of CIDCO. Fur­
thermore, it recommends that large parcels should he acquired in one operation 
to avoid subsequent increase in land value resut!ting from CIDCO's activities. 
Under Indian law, the notification of an intend, I public acquisition of private 
hnd has the effect of "freezing" the value of the land as of the date of the notice. 
Private landowners are only entitled to receive compensation based upon the 
value of their land at the time of notification. Although not all land was acquired 
in one transaction, acquisition proceedings had begun for much of the i equired 
land before public knowledge of the development of New Bombay caused land 
prices to rise dramatically. 
Accordingly, a notification was issued by the state government en March 20, 
1971, declaring certain areas as the site for the proposed city of New Bombay. 
Simultaneously, the government also issued notification declaring its intentions 
to acquire these areas. On August 16, 1973, certain additional areas were cov­
ered by similar notifications. Thus the entire geographical area of 343.70 square 
kilometers was frozen to protect CIDCO against payment of very high market 
rates. 
CIDCO handles the temporary inanagenient and disposition of large landhold­
ings by leasing out variol0. earmarked plots in developed or partly developed 
conditims to private 1),-. 'es and also to various other government agencies to 
be used for certain spfific purposes as indicated in the lease agreements. Thus 
under this method, iDCO retains ownership as well as control of how a partic­
ular site is used. (CiDCOleases are given for periods of 60 years initially, with 
renewal provisions. 
Beside finance, CIDCO's other concern is taking possession of vacant land 
immediately. The process of land acquisition is rather slow, because of resis­
tance from landowners for various reasons. Consequently, many projects have 
remained incomplete For long periods. Others have not been carried out because 
of lack of land availability. 
In 1979, concerned officials of CIDCO realized that a major hurdle in acquisi­
tion was that landowners were not prepared to accept grossly low compensa­
tion, such as 6,000 rupees per acre.*1 Moreover, the delay in acquisition or 
possession of lands was adversely affecting CIDCO's various programs as well 
as its budgets and projections. Thus, CIDCO decided to pay more realistic com­
pensation at a minimum of 15,000 rupees per acre, anl when the statutory award 
was less than 15,000 rupees per acre, the difference was paid by CIDCO as ex­
gratia.Since 1971, a sum of 30,100,000 rupees has been paid as ex-gratia com­
pensation. 
As an added incentive, in 1979 the state government, at the request of CIDCO, 
*12.20 rupees -US $1 in 198,4. 
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decided to relax the application of, tile Urban Land Ceiling Act of' 1976 in theNew Bombay area so that ac([uis tion in New Bombay Would be ca'riedo (litonly
under the Land Acquisition Act of' 1894l. Under the 1976 act, vacant land in 
excess of the prescribed ceiing is acquired by tile government on paymfnt of 
nonminal compensation. 
THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT O r 1894 
The Land Acquisition Act of 18941 is the primary law for acquisition
of private lands where land is acquired by the state for public purpose. Privatelands also can be acquired for private companies, if' the company is engaged
in any industry or work which is for a public purpose.
Moreover, the Land Acquisition Act of 189-1 is the basis of'all central and state 
laws relating to coinpulsory acquisifion an d coinpensation. 
Procedures Prescribed in the Lind 
Acquisition Act of 1894 
Illaccordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the governimnt must first 
publiish a prelininary notice idCtntit'ilng certain Iand i'e(Illired fo' a public pul'­pose. An authorized government official then surveys and investigates tile land 
in (Iliestion. (The government is required to pay F'or any damage done by such 
entry.) 
OIjections to the land acquisition may be made by any personi interested in 
the land, wit hi n 30 days of the not ificat ion. ) rso isobject ingai'e in vifed to ineet
with the collectoi, who hears the oil)jection, makes necessary inquiries, alnd sub­
mits a repo't to the appropriate governineni official, whose decision is final. 
'ihe secretai'y to the governinent or sone offitcur duly authorized certifies that
tle land is required for a public purpose. This declaration is published and is 
conclusive evidence that the land is marked for a public purpose or for a coin' pav. After this dcilaration, the collector obtains the order for acquisition f'iol
 
the alppropi'iate governnlent officer.The collector then has the land marked out,

measuired, 
 ind planned. The collector serves notice on all persons interested 
in the government's intention to take )ossession of the land, stating that claims
of colpensation fi' all interests in the land may be made to him at a tine and
place specifically ntioned (at least 15 days after the dlate o publ ication). Pbll)­
licnotices arc also affixed i.convenient Ilaces on o near the land to be acqui red. 
The collector has the power to take oaths oi' statements of a pei-solls's ownership 
or 1iutei'ests in the land. (False statements are punishable Undei' the Indian Penal Code.) The collector makes inquiry into measurelents, value, and claiins, and 
deternines the final a waid. 
After the awai'd is issued, the collector can take possession of the land, whichis ver,,ted absolutely in the government fi'ee fr-omi all encumbrances. 
The collector has special powers in cases of urgency to take possession ofllild
when only notice had been issued but where the awa.'d had not been yet given. 
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In such cases title to the land will also vest in the government, free from all 
encumbrances. Notice of' 48 hours, however, is required to be given to the 
occupants of such land. 
Any interested person not accepting an award may apply in writing to the 
collector to refer the matter to the court with respect to any controversy over 
the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, or the apportion­
ment of the compensation among the various persons interested. The applica­
tion should be presented to the collector within six weeks from the date of the 
award if the applicant was present at the inquiry. Otherwise, the time limit 
is six weeks from the receipt of the notice from the collector. The collector also 
has to submit a statement in writing to the court. 
Thereafter the court notifies the applicant, persons interested in the objec­
tion, and the collector (if the objection is in respect of the area or amount of 
compensation). 
The criteria for determining coilpcisati(i are (a) the market value of the land 
at (lie date o he notification; (b)damage sustained by persons from the taking 
of any standing crops of trees; (c) dlamage sustained by reason ,fsevering such 
land from other land owned by the person concerned; (d) damage affecting his 
other property, movable or immovable, or his earning-s; (e)reasonable expense 
in changing his residence or place of business; and (f) danmages frr'm diminution 
of the profits of the land between publication and ac.claration of taking and the 
actual taking by the collector. 
Apart from the market value of the land so asses ;ed, the collector is required 
to award an additional 15 percent on such market value as "solatiurn," o," bonus, 
in consideration on the compulsory nature of thc acquisition. Mattei s not to 
be considered include the urgency of the acquisitmn, the disinclination of the 
owner to sell, damage to the land after the declaration, increase in land value 
resulting fr'om the anticipated use to which the land will be put, increase in 
value of the owner's other lands, or any improvements made by the owner after 
the notification of the intended acquisition. 
The amount awarded should not be in excess of the amount claimed. The court 
should not gr-ant an amount inexcess of the collector's award when the ippli­
cant had refused to claim ,r omitted to claim it Cor no sufficient reason. 
Calculation. It is obvious that if 100 plots of land are to be acquired and 
if a broker privately !ipproaches some of the ownei-s on behalf of any unknown 
client and obtains agreements to sell, in a fair and open market, at a certain 
rate for even 20 or :30of' the plots, it would be difficult for the owners of the 
remainder to hold out for i vagant increase., upon these previously negotiated 
prices. The government has therefore approved, in soni casos, the institution 
of preliminary negotiations without divulging its intention to acquire when the 
local officers consider that a better price will result. When this is done neverthe­
less, the act subsequently shd ild be employed and, to those persons who have 
agrced, the prices agreed should be awarded. It should be made clear in the agree­
ment that the price is inclusive of everything, including the "solatium." In othec 
words, the price should be divided by 115: 100 as market value and 15 as the 
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statutory "solatium." Thus the party will get the actual price agreed upon, andtile government will get an indefeasible title. The broker's fee will require the
sanction of tile government, and it should also be counted as part of' the cost 
of acquisition. 
Comments on and Analysis of the Land Acquisition Act 
The inordinate delays in land-acquisition proceedings cause hardships to both
the government and the public. The government feels it should be able to take
possession of the land needed to carry out works of public utility without delay.And tile public is unhappy with Unconscionably slow compensation to landowners
and other hardshitps created by large-scale acquisitions. Many have lost theirfarnily occupation and have been completely uprooted. Moreover, the public corn­
plains that in many instances land has been acquired and left utoused by thegovernment f'or long periods. Yet another public complaint is that tile govern­
ment uses the emergency provisions indiscrin-inatcly.
It is clear that suggestions for expediting land acquisitior and any attempt
to identify problem areas 1ust be sensitive to both governmnent needs and the 
forner landowner. 
The Land Acquisition Act (foes not contain any exhaust'i'e definition of"pub­lic purpose." Moreover, it makes the executive determination of the existence
of a public purpose final and nonjusticiable. These two sitnations make it easyfor the acqu;':ig authorities to abuse the provisions of* tile act. Although it is\ oil recogni, ed that tile ac, cannot have an exhaustive definition of the term
"public purpose," as the concept has been changing in all countries of the world,the government should at least clarify certain ;. ';cy so that both the landowners
andI the acquisition authorities know for what purposes private land may be
acquired. Such clarification is needed because in many cases where landownershave challenged in the state high courts or the Supreme COU't of India tile pub­lic purpose declared by the government, tle courts have upheld the landowner's

contention 
 that the impugned acquisition was not for a "public purpose."There are also ,no vuidelines for the dete rination of the area required for
 
a particular public rutrpose. Often 
excess land is acqui , more than what is
actually needed ft'" a l)ublic purpose, resulting in court iroceedings, which intin ultimatel-, result in long delays even for lands that are genuinely required 
for tm iriic purpose.
Because the government has not iiiade any policy oil what is a lpublic pur'pose 
or which area is to he acquired, it f'orces one to conclude that the governmentfears, and perhaps rightly so, that any guidelines or policy might be held against
the acquiring authorities by a contesting andowner. There are fears 'oo that
today's definition of "public purpose" might not fit tomorrow's needs. To solve
this problem, appropriate amendnents could le made in tile existing policy fr'oni 
tirne to tirne. 
Tile declaration of the government for the existence of a public purpose is sup­posed to be final except in cases involving fr'aud. 'fhe existing law places serious
restrictions on the right of a person to challenge the acquisition of his land on 
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the ground of a public purpose. There is little *.iustificationfor continuing the 
existing provisions of the Land Acquisition At. which makes the government 
the sole judge of whether the purpose of acquisition is a public purpose. The 
government at best only can be presumed to be a good judge of whether the 
purpose of acquisition was in the general interest of the community; but to nmke 
the government the absolute judge is to deny to the person, whose property is 
.aken without his consent, a valuable right ofan objective determination ofthe 
existence of public puvpose. There are innumerable cases in which the govern­
ment has not been as careful and restrained in interpreting the term "public 
purpose" as it should have been. Therefore, it should be left to courts in their 
ordi nary jurisdiction to determine whether the power conferred for acquisition 
is being exercised properly. Public Purpose therefore should be madejusticiable 
by 	amending the )rovisions of the act suitably. Such a provision would act as 
a del errent restraining the acquiring authority to have acquisition proceedings 
only in respect of genuine public purposes, thereby cutting down on the enor­
mous time, efforts, and money expended on 	unnecessary acquisition.
Today, tie authorities exercising tie power Of compulsory ac(luisition have 
considerable discretion as to the (luantu i of land to be acquired. Very often 
lands became superfluotus becaus.- they are acquired on the basis of a careless 
or NArong estimate. Ofteii it is found that land is acquired merely as a reserve 
fund 'r expansion of an existing project and for projects which have not yet
been conceived. It is recommended when the land acquired, or any portion thereof, 
is not u:,ed for tie purpose for which it was acquired or for any other declared 
public purpose, within reasonable time, that the government should offer to sell 
the land back to the original owner. It also should be made possible Fbr tie owner 
in such cas.s to compel tie government to return the land by an appro riate 
court proceeding. 
In land acquisition for pub)lic purposes, there is ill absenc( of a central body 
to nmonitor and advise the central and the state governmentson all matters i-elat­
ing to the land acquisitio~i. Such a committee or body sh(,uld be constituted for 
advising the government with respect to land use policy in large-scale acquisi­
tions For any public purpose, including the implementation of projects. The func­
tions of the committee would be to ensure that 
1. 	the land which is already in the possession of the acquiring body is put to 
optiinum use before permitting the proposed acquisition. 
2. 	 an excessive acquisition does not take place. 
3. 	 the acquisition of good agriculItual land does not take place ifit can be avoided. 
4. 	 the proposed acquisit ion is justified from the point of view of the location 
of the project. 
5. 	 the acquisition gets proper and expeditious supplort flom all concerned authori­
ties at all stages. 
O~ther various step. may be taken for streamlining the process of acquisition.
rhc, evenuc dcpartnment of the state government, which is concerned with the 
subject of land, its classification, settlement, and land records tiutation regis­
ter), should be the appropriate department to formulate policy for land acquisi­
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tion. It can also coordinate, initiate, and exercise supervision and control. Fur­
thermore, the revenue depart nient is in a position to he objective regarding land 
acquisition, particularly because acquisition is made by this department mostly
for other departiments. land-acquisition cells should be set up at the local, dis­
trict, and state levels v.which should collect necessary dta fiom the revenue depa,rt­
ment as well as firon the offices of the subregi.;trar. The cell at the state Level 
prefeiably should be under the charge of a trai ned valuation officer. Full-time 
staff(including clerical) should be appointed for land-acquisition work for expedit­
ing the various stages involved in acquisition. Sulitable trai ning courses may
be designed for training the staff to coLdct slveys, mesulrenlellLS, vahl ation 
of land and inore, if coiisidered uecessarV. 
Furthermore, a directorate of land aicqluisitioni under the supervision of the 
mneibelr, boarid of iyeveniue, shoul be set up with high seci-eta,'iat stat'us and 
made responsible for the speedy co niplet ion oif all land-acquisition p roceedings
in the entiie state. A regular system of hirMonthly review at the state level and 
monthly review at tile level of collector and laid-acquisition officer should be 
introduceCl. 
The iiiultiplicity of laws has greatly added to the hardship that is caused to 
a handowne," whose land is being acqui red. A simple and single piece of legisla­
tion relating to land acquisition would be very helpful to avoid confusion. 
Yct -'aother problem is that th acquii-ing authority is different fiom the 
authority for which the acquisition is made. The user aul ihorit has to depend 
upon the state government's revenue departalent, which in turin has to depend 
upon the requiriing authot-ity for vlliols ifoniatio froni time to tillie dluring
the course of' acquisit ion. This problem can be ameliorated by having periodic
meetings between tie offices of the two atilt hioiities undTer the supei-vision of 
the collector or tile deputy collector of the district. 
Compensation is requ ired to be determined oni tihe basis of m'ark et value of 
the land at the date of publicati(i of the iiotificat ion. There can ',)( argument
against selecting the notification dlte as the base date for de4ermniing tile mar­
ket value. Howeve-, to make acquisition proceed inure expeditiously, the g(;vern 
ment should consider taking into account the "potential value" of the land or 
the base date. In this context, it is suggested that the land should not be valued 
merely by reference to its use at the time of valuatiom, but also to1any future 
Use which is reasonable. 
Another possi)le apprioach to facilitating aciuisition is the soltittm. A sohatium 
at the rate of 15 percent on the market value is payable to the sellers. Some 
states either have deleted this p-ovision or reduced the (qlaitiL of 15 piercent
to 10 percent, with an additional priovisioni for even no payment in cases such 
as posses:sion ofinn area certified to be unhealthy as declaired by a disti-ict magis­
trate." It is felt tb u,the omission oi- reduction of solatiuiii in 'tate amendments 
is not fair to the pei-sons deprived of their properties in these states and is a 
clear violation ofthe spirit of the Land Acquisition Act. It ini st he reniembered 
that it is not enough for a person to get. the "frozen" market value of the land 
as compensation. Because of inflation and costs of relocation, tile landowner may
have to spend considerably more to be in the same position as beftore. 
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Yet another way to mako a more "useful" compensation is to pay compensa­
tion in kind, rather than in cash, or partly in kind and partly in cash. While 
the Land Acquisition Act contemplates payment of money to the persons enti­
tled to the award of the collector, there is also a provision that the collector may, 
with the sanction of the appropriate government, grant other lands in exchange, 
grant a remission of land taxes on other lands held under the same title, or make 
other equitable arrangements having regard to the interests of the parties con­
cerned. 
Some provisions allot land after development to the same persons whose lands 
had earlier been acquired so that these persovs are not rendered homeless. This 
method of settlement has been found useful and convenient to all parties. 
Finally, under the existing provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the land­
acquisition office first decides the amount of compensation. Then the collector 
makes the final award. Often the courts make a final decision on compensation. 
The present practice of getting the compensation determine,1 1"rst by the land­
ac([uisition officer and next by the collector, both being revenue department 
officers, and then getting it reviewed by the civil court is an unnecessarily long 
process and from the acquiring public agency's view, often uneconomical. While 
the compcinsation issue is in progress, the costs to the public agency for develop­
ing the land are rising. Often the litigation cost to the state is more than the 
vahe af the land itself. If the determination of the compensation is left to the 
civil court from the very beginning, it would be less costly and much faster for 
the state to acquire a piece of land than to prolong the process. 
There are no easy answers to the problem of making the land-acquisition pro­
cess more efficient while protecting the ights of the landowners. Taken as a 
whole, the Land Acquisition Act has enabled the public to assemble considera­
ble quantities of land. Unlike procedures in other countries, the act has worked 
and resisted efforts of landowners to paralyze its operation. Moreover, the cen­
tralization of the land-acquisition functions in iaud-acquisition offices has allowed 
various technical skills to be available o many public agencies without each 
creating its own land-acquisition units. 
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